Reconstituting rural communities and economies: the Newfoundland fisheries household resettlement program, 1965-1970 by Withers, George
  
 
 
Reconstituting Rural Communities and Economies: The Newfoundland Fisheries 
Household Resettlement Program, 
1965 – 1970 
 
By 
George Withers 
 
A thesis submitted to the 
School of Graduate Studies 
In partial fulfilment of the 
requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of History 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
 
Winter Semester 
2016 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
In Newfoundland, the word „resettlement‟ evokes strong emotions decades after 
the program was abandoned. Many people feel that a heartless government uprooted 
families who were living an idyllic lifestyle in remote communities scattered along the 
coast. My thesis is that households were not forced into slums by the state. Although they 
did not resort to violence, coastal people were not as apathetic or powerless as the 
literature on resettlement suggests. Although it was more coercive than the preceding 
provincial Centralization Plan, the notoriety of Newfoundland Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program (FHRP) is due, in part to the dearth of historical studies of 
resettlement. Historians have left the field to social scientists and the artistic community 
to write the narrative that laments a lost heritage. The archival record is replete with 
evidence that coastal people redefined the objectives of the FHRP and pressured 
governments to amend the Resettlement Agreement. Through appeals to church leaders, 
provincial and national politicians, and the media they persuaded the Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Committee (FHRC) to approve moves that planners considered irrational, 
but which made perfect sense to the relocatees. When the FHRC agreed to concentrate a 
large number of fishers into a receiving community with scarce resources and 
employment opportunities, charges of coercion were heard in the capitals where lack of 
planning turned relocation into a debacle.  
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 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 In its first two decades as a province of Canada Newfoundland experienced a 
social, cultural and economic revolution that threw into question a century old way of 
life. Premier Joseph Smallwood in a rush to modernize the province told fishermen to 
burn their boats and flakes. Alleging that Newfoundland must develop or perish, 
Smallwood embarked on a modernization program to raise consumption closer to the 
standard enjoyed by North Americans. The rapidity of cultural and economic change 
created concerns among scholars at Memorial University.
1
 Historian and university 
president,  Leslie Harris, asserted that changes which had occurred over the space of 
decades in other provinces were being crammed into years.
2
 Academics were concerned 
that the distinctive elements of Newfoundland culture would soon disappear. 
The majority of the rural population accepted Smallwood‟s promise that union 
with Canada would mean an end to poverty. Many had been awakened to the benefits of 
industrial employment during World War II. Between 1945 and 1953 nearly 50 
communities relocated voluntarily. David Damas draws a distinction between two types 
of resettled communities on the basis of the processes by which communities come to be 
resettled.  One process, termed migration, occurs without intervention of external 
agencies while the second process involves planned movement of communities and 
individuals to a destination determined by outside agents.
3
                                                          
1
Jeff A. Webb, Observing the Outports: Describing Newfoundland Culture, 1950-1980 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 278. 
2
Webb, Observing the Outports, 200. 
3
David Damas, Arctic Migrants/Arctic Villagers (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-
Queens, 2002), 3. 
 2 
 In the case of the Newfoundland centralization programs the two processes were 
combined. Some resettled without intervention by an outside agency while others were 
relocated to a destination determined by the state. In Newfoundland migrations have had 
a long history but rural to urban migrations have proceeded at a slower pace than in most 
Western states due to dependence on a staple resource. The construction of the railway, 
development of mines and paper mills along with military base construction drew people 
from coastal settlements. In the post- World War Two era the pace of migration speeded 
up when thousands left the shore fishery to build roads, hospitals, schools, as well as to 
work in the small-scale manufacturing industries established in the 1950s. For rural 
communities Confederation represented a chance to escape the poverty trap through a 
combination of wage labour and social welfare benefits that they were entitled to as 
Canadians. They sought escape from the pluralistic peasant economy which was 
remarkably similar to a Himalayan peasant village.
4
  
Domestic commodity production everywhere requires the equal participation of 
women. In Rock Harbour, and hundreds of other coastal communities, families engaged 
in a variety of market and non-market activities. Gender roles were fairly well defined 
but did not always conform to socially constructed definitions of femininity. Males and 
females performed the back-breaking work of “making” fish, but women, believed to be 
“Jonahs,” never fished.  Fishing was a masculine activity. Just as in Kumaun, a northern 
Indian village, men prepared the soil while women planted and weeded gardens and took 
care of the cattle. Men cut the hay and firewood, caught the fish and occasionally worked 
                                                          
4
Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in 
the Himalaya (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 21. 
 3 
outside the community while women stoked the stove, cooked and cared for children. 
Women sheared the sheep, spun yarn and made clothing for the family. During the1950s 
the economy underwent significant change when families abandoned the fish flakes and 
sold their fish green to companies with artificial dryers or delivered it in a fresh state to 
fish plants. Household production declined further when cheap duty-free produce entered 
the province after Confederation.  
 The demand for modern services also intensified when the pro-confederates raised 
expectations. I watched as one inshore fishing village welcomed roads, electricity, 
telephone and telecommunications, and the opportunity to trade a risky enterprise for the 
security of wage labour. In the 1960s most Rock Harbour households gave up the shore 
fishery when governments built a shipyard and a fresh/frozen fish plant in Marystown. 
The construction boom, and concomitant employment propelled the region into a modern 
age wherein automobiles replaced horses and boats as a means of transport while 
telephones and television reduced the desire to gather in public and private places for 
socialization and exchange of information. Even the architectural landscape underwent 
change. When people accepted the bungalow as a symbol of modernity, owners of two-
story houses cut off the second story. Within homes parlours previously set aside for the 
repose of the dead became living rooms furnished with chesterfields and appliances 
bought on the installment plan. The new oil stoves ended the practice of putting the fire 
out before going to bed, and families no longer broke the ice in chamber pots and water 
buckets on winter mornings. 
 I bring to this work a personal knowledge of the traditional fishery and the 
experience working in fresh fish processing plants at Fortune, Marystown and Trepassey. 
 4 
I was born in 1948 at Rock Harbour, a Placentia Bay settlement of 135 persons. Until 
1955 transportation was by water or cart road. The nearest doctor was ten miles away. 
One of my earliest memories is of my mother, who was haemorrhaging badly, being 
lowered into a trapskiff for transport to the Burin Cottage Hospital via Marystown. The 
outport economy, which had changed little in a hundred years, underwent a radical 
transformation in the space of a decade. The fishery continued to be the economic 
mainstay of outports but family allowances, old age pensions, and unemployment 
insurance benefits softened the blow of a bad season. Social welfare also reduced the 
length of the fishing season to the caplin scull in many outports. When caplin struck off 
fishers took up codtraps and the commercial fishing season concluded mid-August. The 
social safety net contributed to the decline of fishing incomes which made it easier for 
policymakers to present resettlement as a rescue mission. 
 One of the criticisms of the traditional fishery is that it allowed male heads to 
exploit the labour of his wife and children.
5
 From age of eleven I earned a small share of 
the catch by placing fish on the splitting table, a common job for the sons of trap-
skippers. However my parents made it clear that my main job was to go to the one-room 
school to qualify for a white-collar job. Very few of my generation entered the fishery, an 
occupation with irregular hours and income. Most graduates became teachers or nurses 
and chose to live in more urban centres. School curricula awakened pupils to new 
possibilities and opportunities to move out of isolation and escape the industry that kept 
families and regions poor.  
                                                          
5
See Peter Sinclair, State Intervention and the Newfoundland Fisheries (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1987). 
 5 
 The Canadian government became interested in addressing the problem of rural 
poverty during the Great Depression, but did not introduce the first regional development 
program until the 1960s. All Newfoundland premiers, from Smallwood onwards, have 
consistently argued that the federal government has an obligation to introduce programs 
to improve incomes and services of the poorer regions.
6
 Canada‟s regional development 
policy-makers were influenced by the works of French economists Francois Perroux and 
J. R. Boudeville who investigated causes of regional disparities in France.
7
 Perroux 
theorized that economic development tends to concentrate around certain growth poles or 
centres. He suggested „growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it reveals 
itself in certain growth points or poles, with different degrees of intensity, [and] spreads 
through diverse channels.”8 Development experts in the Canadian government accepted  
growth pole theory as a strategy for eliminating poverty in slow-growth regions of the 
country.  They accepted as truth the concept that industries located in an urban area 
would induce further development of economic activity throughout its zone of 
influence.”9 
 Growth pole theory provided a framework for economic development programs 
that aimed to eradicate rural poverty in northeastern New Brunswick, the Gaspe 
Peninsula, and rural Newfoundland. Rural development planners advocated a 
multidimensional approach that included improvements in water and sewerage systems, 
educational facilities, and productivity in agriculture and fisheries. When they concluded 
                                                          
6
Donald J. Savoie, Regional Economic Development: Canada‟s Search for Solutions 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 4. 
7
Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 6. 
8
Quoted in Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 6. 
9
Quoted in Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 6. 
 6 
the labour force was out of balance the bureaucrats accepted resettlement as the 
appropriate remedy. Fisheries commissions accorded low productivity to low technology 
and a surplus of fishers in the inshore sector and recommended centralization of the 
population and modernization of the fishing industry. Smallwood introduced a modest 
resettlement plan 1953 to little effect and in 1965 Newfoundland and Canada entered into 
an agreement to modernize and rationalize the fishery by moving people from small 
outports to growth poles. 
 In Newfoundland, the word „resettlement‟ evokes strong emotional sentiments 
decades after the program was abandoned. Many people feel that a heartless government 
uprooted families and interrupted an idyllic lifestyle. How did the myth of a cold-hearted  
state corralling people in poor neighbourhoods become part of our historical narrative? 
Jerry Bannister proposes that to understand the origins of this narrative we need to 
consider the use (and misuse) of history.
10
 Bannister suggests that the arts community 
created a body of nostalgic literature that resurrected old narratives of conflict and 
persecution and ignored the contemporary revisionist literature. Songs and plays on the 
theme of uprooted people remain popular. Harold Horwood, Ray Guy and Farley Mowat 
produced works that mourned the loss of Newfoundland‟s distinctive way of life. In their 
narrative powerless outport people were shuffled about by agents of the state. 
Sociologists and anthropologists focussed on qualitative issues, and they too painted a 
romantic picture of a folk society. Newfoundland history texts introduced a whole 
generation of school children to fishing admirals and naval governors who forced settlers 
                                                          
10Jerry Bannister, “Making History: Cultural Memory in Twentieth Century 
Newfoundland”, Newfoundland Studies, no.18, v. 2 (2002): 175-190, 175. 
 7 
into coves where he battled nature and built a home on forbidden ground. Nationalists 
considered Confederation itself to be a threat to our distinctive culture. Bannister, quoting 
Sandra Gwen, wrote: “The old order that produced all of us is being smashed and 
homogenized, and trivialized out of existence.”11 Memorial University‟s orator, Shane 
O‟Dea, introduced Parzival Copes as the chief apologist for resettlement and the man 
who had tried to destroy Newfoundland‟s cultural soul.12  
 A mostly urban-based cultural elite constructed a narrative in which powerful 
bureaucrats and politicians imposed a ruthless resettlement program on a population that 
were so marginalized they could not resist. My thesis challenges the narrative that the 
state forced impotent subjects to move from pristine locales to growth centres. The 
evidence does not support the narrative of persecution and displacement. Men, women 
and children were actors in the process. Contrary to popular belief women did not always 
support community evacuations. A close examination of archival documents reveals that 
some women actively protested against resettlement and influenced outcomes.
13
 
 In most cases there was no form of local government to act as a buffer between 
the state and the community.
14
 In unincorporated settlements agents of the state consulted 
with the local power structure and left without holding a public meeting to explain the 
                                                          
11Bannister, “Making History,180. 
12Shane O‟Dea, “Oration Honouring Parzival Copes”, Gazette, vol. 37, no. 5 (November 
2004): 9. Memorial presented Copes with an honorary degree fall 2004. 
13
Alex Hickman, MHA for Burin District in the 1960s, informed the author spring 2013 
that Lottie Senior was a major force in the Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour move. Her name 
does not appear on any of the archival documents I examined but she did appear in an 
episode of Land and Sea, a popular local CBC production.  
14
Stewart Fyfe, A Review of local Government in Newfoundland: A Report to the Minister 
Of Municipal Affairs (St. John‟s: Institute of Local Government, 1966), 3. Out of a total 
of 1,200 communities in 1966 there were two cities, 62 towns, 4 rural districts, 10 local 
improvement districts, and 72 incorporated communities. 
 8 
program. Although few communities were incorporated in the 1960s many coastal people 
had some experience running organizations. They ran co-operatives and local roads 
committees, organized locals of the Fishermen‟s Protective Union and locals of the 
Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen. Through church-related sororities and 
fraternities women and men acquired skills to run meetings and participate in political 
discourse. Construction and administration of lodges, churches, schools, and union halls 
are examples of coastal people working co-operatively to build a better community.
15
 The 
Amulree Report
16
 proclaimed the majority of Newfoundlanders were unfit to participate 
in public life and their dependent nature rendered them incapable of self-help. Lord 
Amulree‟s comments influenced Newfoundland historiography the rest of the century.17 
   Despite the Report‟s slanderous judgement of the Newfoundland character, the 
people demonstrated they were capable of taking collective action against a state-
sponsored migrations. They engaged in resistance activities which anthropologist James 
Scott called “weapons of the weak.”18 Both Scott and sociologist Ramachandra Guha 
claimed peasant protestors  in remote northern India and Malaysia made effective use of 
non-violent forms of resistance.
19
 Marginal groups rarely engage in violent uprisings and 
when they do resort to violence it usually precipitates a violent reaction from the state. 
                                                          
15
Ralph Matthews, There‟s No Better Place Than Here (Toronto: Peter Martin and 
Associates, 1976). 
16
Great Britain, Newfoundland Royal Commission (1933) Report (London: King‟s 
Printer, 1933). 
17Jeff Webb, “The Amulree Report and the Lessons of History,” in Garfield Fizzard, ed., 
The Amulree Report: Truth Lies and Consequences (St. John‟s: Newfoundland Historical 
Society, 2001). 
18
See James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), xvi. See also Guha, The Unquiet Woods. 
19
See Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Resistance in the 
Himalaya (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
 9 
The Newfoundland loggers strike in 1959 is a local example of an underclass of workers 
confronting a multi-national company supported by the state. Smallwood used the power 
of his office, a ruthless propaganda campaign and the police to crush the strike and 
outlaw the loggers‟ union. Scott argues that everyday resistance strategies such as foot 
dragging and evasion do not make news headlines but when repeated thousands of times 
they become an effective weapon. When angry residents of Rencontre East greeted the 
Director of Resettlement as he got off the boat they chose not to throw him overboard, 
but today a defiant message greets travellers: “Welcome to Rencontre East. Isolated and 
Proud of It.” A row of neat stages lines the beach and out in the harbour farmed salmon 
breach in a cage. 
 The history of resettlement is not a violent one. Communities opted to write 
letters, circulate petitions, enlist the aid of local elites, send delegations to the capital, and 
threaten to vote against the Liberal Party. Few communities publicly proclaimed their 
intention to stay and the paucity of such headline-grabbing activity reinforced the trope of  
victimization. But unlike the blacks of Africville whom Jennifer Nelson contended were 
so marginalized that they lacked the means to protest, residents of the outports engaged in 
political and civil protest to reign in overzealous civil servants and MHAs.
20
 The 
Department of Fisheries adopted a more restrained approach than was in vogue when the 
Parks Branch expelled the Ojibway from Rocky Mountain National Park, Manitoba. Nor 
was the FHRP as coercive as the relocation of northern Quebec Inuit into the high 
                                                          
20
Jennifer J. Nelson, Razing Africville: A Geography of Racism, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008), 78. 
 10 
arctic.
21
 Historian Tina Loo contends that all relocations are traumatic since trauma 
originates from being asked to turn away from all the familiar physical landmarks and 
pattern of life.
22
  Development consultant Donald Savoie argues that cultures exist in 
spaces and that environments play a crucial role in forming cultural identity.
23
  He 
advised economic planners to be sensitive to people‟s attachment to place and their desire 
to live and work in  familiar spaces. Among the pull factors Savoie identified are: 
Family, friends, institutions, landscapes, climates, a general sense of belonging 
and of knowing how to behave in a particular society - these exercise a strong pull 
on most people. And this pull means that mobility could never be costless, 
instantaneous, and painless even if transport were free, and if churches, houses, 
hospitals, schools could be transported, instantaneously and costlessly, along with 
the people.
24
 
 
In the case of Newfoundland Household Resettlement planners left it up to the people to 
remove churches, schools, halls and other public property. The relocatees attempted to 
prevent previous knowledge, training and experience from becoming useless by 
relocating to familiar spaces and by returning seasonally to the old community to fish 
familiar grounds. But cultural and physical environments could not be transported and 
social connections could not be reestablished in another place.    
 The shortage of employment in reception centres ensured that many resettled 
harbours would be occupied during the fishing season. The shore fishery remained the 
                                                          
21
See Frank J. Tester and Peter Kulychiski, Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in 
the Eastern Arctic, 1939-1963, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1994). See also John Sandlos, 
“Not Wanted in the Boundary: The Expulsion of the Keeseekoowenin Ojibway Band 
from Riding Mountain National Park,” The Canadian Historical Review, 89, 2 (June 
2008, Alan MacEachern, Natural Selections: National Parks in Atlantic Canada, 1935-
1970, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2001. 
22Tina Loo, “People in the Way: Modernity, Environment, and Society on the Arrow 
Lakes”, BC Studies, (Summer 2004):161-197. 
23
Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 10. 
24
Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 10. 
 11 
occupation of last resort. Even in the fisheries growth centres the fish processors needed 
the inshore fish to create full-time work and to maximize profits. Fish plant managers 
realized that the inshore sector could produce a higher quality product at less cost than 
trawlers could supply.
25
 Plant managers welcomed inshore fishers. One suggested that the 
governments should outfit them with longliners to allow them to return to the old grounds 
to recover a lost resource. These events indicate that while companies needed more plant 
workers and crewmembers, they also recognized the value of preserving the inshore 
fishery.    
 Knowledge that their production was valued gave relocatees the power to resist 
and control the migration, sometimes to the detriment of all. When fishers convinced the 
Committee to assist moves to neighbouring fishing communities, the newcomers 
overtaxed resources and infrastructure in the receiving centre. The attempt to implement 
the program without a clear statement of goals gave relocatees room to manipulate the 
process. Stratford Canning contended that confusion surrounding the goals of the 
program created much speculation on policy objectives and empowered the community.
26
 
Economists A. L. Robb and R. E. Robb considered the absence of a comprehensive study 
prior to implementation of the FHRP problematic. They reckoned moves bordered on 
irrational when the value of real estate in the sending community outweighed the assets 
of the reception centre. Their study confirmed that some moves only made economic 
sense if they negated the building a road. The Robbs reported that the absence of rational 
                                                          
25
The vice-president of Fishery Products, and the managers of Booth Fisheries and BC 
Packers recognized the importance of the inshore catch to their firms. 
26Stratford Canning, “Outport Newfoundland: The Potential for Development,” MA 
thesis, Memorial University, 1971. 
 12 
criteria for designating growth centres gave relocatees the luxury to resettle in a place that 
they considered a nice place to live. By the end of the joint resettlement program the 
Resettlement Committee had assisted moves to 321 centres. 
 There were three phases of resettlement. The first was the provincial 
Centralization Plan which remained in effect from 1953 til the second phase came on 
stream in 1965. This program subsidized moves from one inshore fishing community to 
another with minimal change to the economy. Historian Jeff Webb attributed the 
provincial centralization plan to Smallwood‟s drive to modernize and his intense desire 
for progress.
27
 But in Ottawa rural development planners considered it to be a welfare 
program and refused to get involved.
28
 The second phase, the Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program, was the most interventionist, in that it aimed to direct settlers into 
designated growth poles. The third phase came into play just as the outcry against 
resettlement peaked. The new Resettlement Agreement was administered by the federal 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) and Newfoundland‟s Department 
of Community and Social Development (C&SD). Historian Raymond Blake regarded the 
joint programs “exemplary example [s] of co-operative federalism.”29  
 The concept was acceptable but mismanagement turned the FHRP into a political 
liability. The Resettlement Committee, with the approval of cabinet ministers, approved 
community evacuations at a pace that created housing, education and unemployment 
crises. Resettlement became a political liability for the Smallwood regime when the 
Progressive Conservative Party attacked it during the 1971 election. Two years into his 
                                                          
27
Webb, Observing the Outports, 278. 
28Tina Loo, “We Was Drove,” Canada‟s History (August-September 2013): 26-33. 
29
Raymond Blake, Lions or Jellyfish (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 128. 
 13 
mandate Premier Frank Moores announced an end to community evacuations and Don 
Jamieson, Minister of DREE and MP for Burin Burgeo, reported that Ottawa would assist 
individual moves from non-petitioning communities.
30
 In a St John‟s Rotary Club address 
Jamieson announced that the federal government was considering the possibility of 
improving fishing facilities in evacuated outports.
31
 
 My dissertation focusses on the Fisheries Household Resettlement Program for 
several reasons. Firstly the FHRP was the most successful in terms of the number of 
communities and persons relocated, but it was mismanaged. The large number of 
government departments and agencies, which sometimes had opposing agendas, made it 
a difficult program to manage. The FHRC was unable to control the pace of resettlement 
or direct households into growth centres with opportunities for employment and more 
modern amenities. Consequently people often did not move to improved circumstances. 
Many of the problems can be traced to the rush to resettle communities. By proceeding 
before relocatees received sufficient information to understand their obligations and 
responsibilities and by allowing political pressure groups to interfere in the selection of 
growth centres, the goal of moving people from isolation and poverty into urban centres 
of employment was undermined. Subsequently relocatees often felt worse off and more 
socially isolated than they had been in the old community. Secondly, the archival record 
includes official reports and correspondence, but most of all resounds with voices from 
                                                          
30Canadian Press, “Ottawa Agrees to Plans to Cancel Outport Moves, Times News, 
Thunder Bay, Ontario, 30 April, 1973. 
31
Donald Jamieson, “Notes From an Address by Don Jamieson, Minister of DREE, at a 
meeting of Rotary Club, in Conjunction with Business Week Activities at MUN” (St. 
John‟s, 1973), 17-18. A. G. Stacey Collection, Binder “O,” #74, Archives and Special 
Collections (ASC), Memorial University. 
 14 
the outports as they protested moves, requested modern services, and sought clarification 
of their status. Thirdly, the negative publicity generated by cultural groups, the media and 
politicians turned resettlement into an emotionally charged national debate that 
culminated in the abolition of community evacuations. 
 While critics of FHRP condemned Smallwood for destroying a traditional way of 
life, historians David Alexander and Shannon Ryan contended the decline of the inshore 
fishery can be traced to the nineteenth century.  Several enquiries into the fishery 
convinced governments that only an industrial approach to fisheries development could 
improve productivity of fishers and alleviate rural poverty.
32
 The Amulree Report 
(1933)
33
 and the Kent Commission (1937)
34
 focussed on creating an orderly marketing 
regime and enhancing the reputation of salt fish but Kent favoured expansion of the deep-
sea banks fishery.
35
 But until 1934 the Commission government merely tinkered with 
improving standards of grading and marketing of salt cod. An important policy shift 
occurred during the war when sales of fresh/frozen fish to Europe and the UK increased 
rapidly. In 1944 Commissioner of Natural Resources P. D. H. Dunn announced a 
fisheries reconstruction plan that favoured expansion of the corporate fishery. He 
informed his radio audience that the Commission planned to extend loans and subsidies 
                                                          
32
See David Alexander, Decay of Trade (St. John‟s: ISER, 1977; Shannon Ryan, Fish 
Out of Water (St. John‟s: Breakwater Books, 1986 ; and Miriam Wright, A Fishery for 
Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-
1968, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
33
United Kingdom, Newfoundland Royal Commission (1933) Report, Cmnd. 4480, 1933. 
34
Newfoundland, Report of the Commission of Enquiry Investigating the Sea Fisheries of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John‟s: King‟s Printer, 1937). 
35
Newfoundland, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 101. 
 15 
to fresh fish companies supplying frozen fish products to North American markets.
36
 
Post-war fisheries committees concluded that the frozen fishery should be developed to 
the fullest possible extent with utmost haste by transferring labour from inefficient 
traditional inshore activities.
37
 
 Sociologist J. Douglas House reported that fisheries economics was informed by 
three fundamental assumptions:  
Firstly, the fishery must be conducted in the most rational and productive manner 
possible; secondly, these measures can be best achieved by organizing the fishery 
on the model of other viable resource and manufacturing industries; and thirdly, 
the exploitation and development of the common property resource required 
government oversight and intervention.
38
 
 
House disagreed with fisheries economists who proposed the fishery could be best 
organized on a model of other viable resource and manufacturing industries. The lack of 
alternate employment for displaced households made the industrial modernization model 
inappropriate for the Newfoundland fishery. House challenged the model of development 
endorsed by Dunn, Bates, post-war fisheries committees, the Walsh Commission, the 
South Coast Commission, and the Pushie Commission.  
 The Walsh Committee produced a very gendered report. It claimed the shore 
fishery could not alleviate rural poverty even when it exploited women and children who 
could be more suitably employed at home and school. The Committee suggested the 
traditional fishery interfered with a woman‟s role as homemaker and nurturer and 
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disrupted children‟s education.39 In the industrial model the male breadwinner would 
work for wages while women, freed from the flake, could concentrate on non-market 
activities. Similarly, male plant managers and union leaders restricted female employees 
to positions that they defined as unskilled. Modernists promoted education programs in 
which women were not encouraged to enrol. They were discouraged from enrolling in 
technical courses. Middle-class ideals of masculinity reserved science and technology 
courses for male breadwinners and confined women to home economics courses to 
prepare them for the role of homemaker and consumer. The Walsh Report connected 
fisheries modernization to a realignment of gender roles and transfer of production from 
family units to factories wherein skilled workers were male.
40
 Modernist planners, who 
alleged female workers were exploited in the traditional fishery, were willing to condone 
exploitation of women by male factory managers and union leaders who concocted 
gendered definitions of skilled and unskilled work and negotiated rates of pay 
accordingly. Filleting, a masculine task, was deemed to be more skilled than packaging 
fillets, which was a feminine activity.    
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 Anthropologist Reade Davis declared that “the same high-modernist ideology that 
fuelled the international development movement was at the heart of efforts to transform 
Newfoundland‟s environment, economy, society and culture during the twentieth 
century.”41 Evoking Scott, Davis argues that high-modernists had an unshakable faith in 
science, technology and planning to put rural societies on the road to modernity. 
Although Scott‟s analysis of high modernism is limited to projects undertaken in 
authoritarian states, elements of high modernist ideology informed Smallwood‟s 
modernization schemes. For 23 years Newfoundland was essentially a one-party state 
controlled by a populist leader who equated industrialization with progress. Smallwood, 
like other proponents of resettlement around the world, framed modernization and 
mobility programs in the discourse of orderly development and social services such as 
provision of health clinics, sanitation, adequate housing, education, clean water, and 
infrastructure.
42
 Education was an important component of the modernist agenda and the 
curriculum reinforced the notion that urban life was superior to rural and thereby 
stimulated rural to urban migrations. School texts associated rural lifestyles with poverty, 
ignorance, and backwardness while urban lifestyles were connected to progress and 
sophistication.
43
 
 Fisheries reports decried the ignorance and poverty in coastal Newfoundland and  
produced statistics to support the efficacy of transferring fishers from small open boats to 
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decked vessels. Sinclair proffered that fisheries investigations from the Walsh Committee 
to the Atlantic Salt Fish Commission (1964) created an impression that Newfoundland 
would be better off if the salt fishery disappeared entirely.
44
 Reports downplayed the low 
wages of plant workers, the dangers of deep-sea fishing and exaggerated the profitability 
of producing fresh fish for US markets. The South Coast Commission Report (1957) 
recommended eliminating facilities and withdrawing services from unviable outports. 
The appointment signalled Smallwood‟s faith in co-operative development had faltered 
and his commitment to the industrial model had been strengthened by the South Coast 
Commission. Secondly, the Premier appointed an interdepartmental committee to identify 
outports that were in decline. Shortly thereafter he announced that the pace of community 
evacuations must be increased.  In 1958 he doubled household resettlement grants to 
encourage householders to move.  
   While fisheries commissions touted the benefits of industrialization and the 
province poured millions of dollars into new technologies of harvesting and processing, 
the corporate fishery continued to struggle. Meanwhile the traditional fishery was 
suffering from neglect. By the time the governments provided bounties and loans for the 
purchase of more efficient gear the resource was in decline due to overfishing by the 
offshore fleets that frequently trespassed into inshore fishing zones. Average per capita 
landings fell and incomes remained stagnant despite increased prices.
45
 The build-up of 
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national trawler fleets and increase in factory freezer trawlers eroded stocks, demoralized 
inshore harvesters and increased dependence. Wright contended that planners ignored the 
correlation between the build-up of offshore fleets and decline of the inshore fishery.
46
 
 In the 1950s and 1960s fisheries economists in both capitals advocated a policy of 
development based on growth pole theory. Provincial economist Robert Wells, who 
wrote a report on resettlement, asserted that the raison d‟etre for many communities had 
disappeared, and that unless the fishery incorporated the results of applied scientific 
research the industry the outports dependent upon the traditional fishery, would remain 
marginal.
47
 Gordon Bradley, Newfoundland‟s first federal cabinet minister, informed the 
Walsh Committee that the problem of the fishery could only be resolved by scientists and 
engineers in the laboratory.
48
 
 Development experts believed that state intervention was necessary to break the 
cycle of illiteracy and economic dependence.
49
 By 1965 Canada was funding a number of 
regional development programs that were intended to improve productivity in rural areas. 
In 1957 Diefenbaker introduced the first equalization program to help slow-growth 
regions to attain more equitable services and standard of living. To reduce unemployment 
and rural poverty the federal government began to provide incentives to private 
companies to relocate to less developed regions. In 1961 Parliament passed the 
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Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (ARDA) to rationalize agriculture by 
consolidating family farms and introducing new methods of production. ARDA aimed to 
improve productivity in rural regions through research, development of water and soil 
resources and promotion of employment programs. This initiative was followed by Area 
Development and Initiatives Act (ADIA) and the Area Development Agency (ADA), 
legislation that gave the Minister of Industry license to assist private industry initiatives 
in the poorer regions. ARDA and ADIA focussed on economic development within the 
poorer regions but in the mid-1960s the emphasis switched to reducing the numbers 
employed in domestic commodity production and training displaced workers for factory 
work in urban Canada. The Fund For Rural Economic Development (FRED) signalled an 
ideological shift in rural development policy. FRED provided funding for residents of the 
Gaspe Peninsula, north-eastern New Brunswick, all of Prince Edward Island and the 
Interlake region of Manitoba to settle in areas with expanding economies.
50
 FRED 
encouraged males to train for jobs in factories in urban centres.
51
 The creators of the 
Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement applied the same ideology 
to fisheries development in Newfoundland. 
 In the spirit of co-operative federalism Canada agreed to pay two-thirds of the 
cost of relocating 80,000 people into designated growth centres. The Resettlement 
Committee started to compile a blacklist of communities, but then decided it was not 
advisable. The stated economic goal of the FHRP was to relocate people from 
communities in decline “to other communities more favoured within the province in 
                                                          
50
See Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 26-30. 
51
Ralph Matthews, “There‟s No Better Place than Here:” Social Change in Three 
Newfoundland Communities (Toronto: Peter Martin and Associates, 1976), 123. 
 21 
terms of social services and modern amenities.”52 Smallwood‟s refusal to assist extra-
provincial migration contributed to the employment crisis in the reception centres. Like 
so many other economic development projects, the FHRP was weakened by inadequate 
planning. The settlement proceeded without any comprehensive sociological or 
anthropological studies of the outports or the designated growth centres. Reacting to the 
program, Herbert Pottle, a former provincial cabinet minister, described it as “planning 
gone mad and only justifiable during a time of national crisis.”53 From the outset the 
Resettlement Committee was on the defensive. Over the life of the Agreement criticism 
solidified and designated outports began to demand the right to move to a reception 
centre of their choice or stay put. 
 A variety of events led to community evacuations. In the 1957-65 period fishing 
incomes were static while the numbers of inshore fishers increased by thousands due to a 
decline in the construction industry and the extension unemployment insurance benefits 
to independent male fishers.
54
 It was easy to conclude that there were too many fishers 
and fishing communities. Decline of the rural economy was not always fisheries related. 
Subsistence activities declined when family allowances and other social welfare benefits 
boosted household disposable income. Mechanization of the logging industry and decline 
of the seal fishery decreased earnings and increased dependence on social welfare 
programs. Perhaps the greatest push factor was the development of a negative attitude 
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towards fishing as a career choice for high school graduates. They were the cohort that 
could have been trained as professional fishers. Parents discouraged their offspring from 
entering the fishery and with no alternate employment available the young generation 
moved away. The closure of the federal experimental fish drying stations signified 
Ottawa was not interested in reviving the salt fish trade. With Canada‟s share of the 
Atlantic offshore catch declining Prime Minister Lester Pearson decided to expand and 
modernize the Canadian fishing fleet and show the flag. 
 Fisheries economists calculated that offshore trawlermen were 10 times more 
productive than inshore fishers and that their earnings were six times greater. 
Furthermore each offshore fisher would create three to four workers on shore.
55
 While the 
aim of the FHRP was to expand the industrial fishery, government support for the inshore 
sector continued. Continuation of subsidies for small craft and price supports in the form 
of unemployment insurance created ambiguity about the goals of the resettlement 
program. On the one hand the governments hoped to move fishers into the offshore 
industrial fisheries bases but on the other offered them incentives to stay in the traditional 
fishery. For instance, the unemployment insurance regulations favoured fishers who 
continued to salt cod and penalized the shore fishers who sold their product in a fresh 
unprocessed state. These kinds of ambiguities and contradictions in fisheries policy made 
the resettlement program less effective than it could have been. 
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The belief that Smallwood forced families out of the outports was entrenched by 
1970. Matthews contended that panic-stricken people took on a herd mentality when 
press releases were followed-up by visits from the director of resettlement.
56
 He 
attributed the panic to lack of counselling but agreed with Copes that a more visible 
official presence would have left governments more susceptible to charges of coercion.
57
 
Matthews reported that no social researcher found any member of a dispersed community 
who admitted to having moved voluntarily. Post mistresses, wharfingers, clerks, power 
engineers, and merchants felt aggrieved. Historian Miriam Wright argued that the FHRP 
was a highly engineered program in which planners compiled lists of communities and 
sent officials out to encourage people to leave.
58
 The resettlement grants, which were as 
much as three times higher than fishing incomes, were an inducement. Ken Harnum 
visited nearly every community in the province in 1966 leaving behind applications and 
petitions with the male power structure.  
My thesis argues that the degree of resistance to resettlement was determined by 
the social vitality of a community, the industriousness of the population, the amount of 
capital invested in the fishery, the attitude of community leaders, and the existence or 
absence of local government. I subscribe to the hypothesis that coastal men and women 
exercised much greater control over their lives than has been heretofore recognized. The 
literature on resettlement has generally assumed that women encouraged husbands to 
leave for the sake of the children. The archival record contradicts the widely held belief 
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that wives led the exodus from the outports. Wives sometimes convinced husbands to 
stay. Women who ran businesses, managed post offices and taught school were often 
unwilling to abandon careers. Though mostly male signatures appear on resettlement 
petitions, a widow‟s vote could be decisive. The patriarchal notion that the old hen was 
sure to follow the old rooster was challenged.
59
 
 Many have questioned the benefits of resettlement. Pottle claimed government 
left self-help and social capital, such as local group support, off the balance sheet, 
downplayed the viability of rural communities and exaggerated the absorptive capacity of 
growth centres.
60
 A. L. Robb and R. E. Robb, who conducted a cost-benefit analysis of 
resettlement, calculated it would take decades for some households to recoup losses.
61
 
The cost of supporting a dependent family in a rural community was less than supporting 
a welfare dependent family in an urban centre.
62
 Anthropologist Ottar Brox declared that 
welfare payments could outweigh the cost of bringing services to the outports and 
advocated a more decentralized approach to fisheries development.
63
 Storrs McCall 
suggested that if planners had concentrated more on quality of life issues than savings on 
services, they would have proposed more “stay options.”64 Pottle accused government of 
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placing policy ahead of people, and of using resettlers as fuel to stoke the industrial 
vision.
65
 
 Pressure to resettle came from several sources. It arose when government refused 
to repair harbour facilities, when  petitions were circulated several times, when 
bureaucrats suggested changes to community boundaries in order to gerrymander the 
vote, and when overzealous officials exaggerated the benefits of moving. Pressure came 
from priests wishing to consolidate parishes and from announcements by teachers, nurses 
and merchants that they were leaving. It also came from neighbours and kin who had 
already moved or planned to relocate. It also came from a desire to reunite with family. 
For those who worked outside the community it could mean a shorter commute. Many 
seized the opportunity to move to better services. 
 Resettlement planners in Newfoundland were as familiar with growth pole and 
modernization theory as development experts in other Western nations. In the post-war 
era states embraced them as blueprints for transforming peasant societies by altering 
attitudes and awakening within the people a desire for “the good life,” which 
governments of welfare states believed was possible for all citizens.
66
 Historian Tina Loo 
contended that most provinces and the federal government invested in capitalist mega 
projects with the understanding that massive projects like Churchill Falls could improve 
the quality of life for everyone.
67
 Such models of modernization required rural people to 
cast off a belief system founded on “traditions, superstitions, fatalism or emotions,” and 
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to replace them with a more civilized outlook “dominated by reason, an appreciation of 
efficiency and the ability to explain the world scientifically.”68 Western leaders had a 
faith in capitalism and applied science to produce a better world for all. President Harry 
Truman professed that through the systematic transfer of scientific knowledge, 
technology, and capital the West had the ability to eliminate the ignorance, hunger, 
disease and poverty.
69
 Development experts envisioned modernization as a process that 
required social, psychological, economic, cultural, and even biological changes. 
Modernizing was “a multi-faceted process that had the power to change human thought 
and activity.”70 Education was the key to modernity, but middle-class ideals of femininity 
and masculinity excluded women from the technical trades. 
 Western development specialists aimed to replicate in slow-growth regions a 
process of development that included “industrialization and urbanization, technicalization 
of agriculture, rapid growth of material production and living standards, and widespread 
adoption of modern education and cultural values.”71 Roberts and Hite suggested the 
modernizers‟ credo was “borrow, import, imitate and rationalize.”72 W. W. Rostow‟s 
Stages of Economic Growth solidified modernists‟ faith that primitive economies could 
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be transformed by injections of capital and applications of science, and technology.
73
 
Development experts, convened by the United Nations Department of Social and 
Economic Affairs, reported underdeveloped societies needed to go through a painful 
metamorphosis that required  “[dismantling] old social institutions, bonds of race and 
creed, and leav[ing] behind those who cannot keep up with the pace of progress.”74 In 
Newfoundland, older people, who found it hard to adjust to life in a growth centre, 
believed administrators of the FHRP sacrificed their well-being to improve the lot of the 
next generation. 
 Arturo Escobar professed that progress exacted too high a price when it involved 
suppression of culture, identity, and history. He suggested that the modernist dream of 
progress and development became a nightmare of indebtedness, exploitation and 
impoverishment. Scott contended that modernists, who saw a symbiotic relationship 
between progress, industrialization and urbanization, had a misplaced faith in science and 
technology to improve “backward” societies.75 The American defeat in Vietnam and the 
collapse of northern cod stocks raised doubts about the ability of capitalism, science and 
technology to create a good life for all. The decimation of the northern cod caused 
fisheries managers to create an inclusive management regime that incorporated data 
collected by sentinel fishers. The mismanagement of staple resources undermined the 
rural economy thereby increasing dependency and pressure to migrate. Multinational 
companies destroyed ecological diversity, depleted resources, and limited local access. 
                                                          
73
W. W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non- Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge, 1960). 
74
Escobar, Encountering Development, 4. 
75
Scott, Seeing Like a State, 5. 
 28 
Researchers contend that there is a correlation between the increase in deep-sea fishing 
and decline of the inshore cod fishery especially in the 1960s after the capitalist fishery 
depleted haddock stocks. Canada and Newfoundland responded by subsidizing the 
harvesting and processing operations of transnational food companies like Booth 
Fisheries, British Columbia Packers, Atlantic Sugar Refining, Ross Steers, Unilever, and 
National Sea Products. Despite the huge public investments in the offshore sector, 
including the Marystown shipyard, employment in the inshore fishery remained near the 
1949 level in 1966. 
 Fear of mass emigration to the mainland provinces motivated Smallwood to issue 
a manifesto: “We must develop or perish. We must develop or our people will go in the 
thousands to other parts of Canada. We must create new jobs ... Develop, develop, 
develop, that‟s been my slogan and that will remain my slogan.”76 He appointed Alfred 
Valdmanis, a Latvian with connections to German industrialists, to take charge of 
economic development.
77
 Most of the small-scale manufacturing failed, but Smallwood 
was not one to commiserate over setbacks. His faith in capital and technology generate 
wealth intensified over time. In the 1960s he turned to energy megaprojects as a strategy 
for attracting industry to growth poles. 
  Architect Robert Mellin postulated that Smallwood‟s interest in progress is 
present in the modern design of public buildings in St. John‟s and it “reinforce[s] a 
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perception that the town [is] superior to the outport.”78 The Premier equated modern 
architecture with progress, and by extension, considered the stage and fish flake to be 
symbols of regression and the antithesis of modernity. Mellin believed that Smallwood‟s 
enthusiasm for modern architecture arose from acceptance of a post-war modernist vision 
which was based on a “profound confidence in the power of institutions - political, 
cultural, and architectural - to create systems that could change lives for the better.”79 
Journalist and former cabinet minister, William Callahan, stated that the aim of the Urban 
and Rural Planning Act was to replace the irregular organization of towns with modern 
suburbs. Planners believed it was necessary to remove coastal people from an 
architectural landscape that was filled with symbols of backwardness. 
 The next chapter discusses the ideology that informed resettlement. It places the 
Canada-Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program in the context of 
modernization and explores the tensions between the proponents of the program and its 
critics. Criticism emanated from many sources: social scientists at Memorial University, 
who were hired inform policy but later became potent critics, print and electronic media, 
politicians, and the relocatees themselves. Inshore fishers resisted planners‟ efforts to 
move them from familiar spaces and occupations. The architects of the FHRP 
underestimated attachment to place and never understood the role home ownership 
played in a pluralistic economy. 
 Chapter III discusses the strategies fisheries planners used to address the labour 
shortage in four major fisheries growth centres on the Burin Peninsula. The central theme 
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is how resettlers challenged the goals of resettlement when they clashed with local 
values. Rural people‟s avoidance strategies forced state officials to reconsider the terms 
of the Resettlement Agreement. The primary goal was to move underemployed 
householders from unviable outports into growth centres by promising employment and 
more modern services and amenities. The architects of the FHRP discovered that most 
domestic commodity producers had little desire to assume the risks of deep sea fishing, 
work in fish factories for minimum wages, or accept the social disruption that a shift into 
modernity required. Island communities preferred moves to the near mainland where 
resettlement grants were sufficient to cover moving expenses, and wherein they could 
continue to live in relocated homes and fish traditional grounds. 
 Chapter IV describes the disappointments and problems relocatees experienced in 
growth centres when the population exploded due to the influx of resettlers. It highlights 
the social and financial hardships that resulted from concentrating of too many people in 
two inshore fishing communities, namely Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour. The 
congruity of housing and employment crises and infrastructure challenges in these 
centres created negative perceptions of the FHRP that intensified over time. The old 
residents resented the newcomers for overcrowding facilities, polluting community wells, 
imposing municipal government, increasing the cost of living and attracting a lot of 
negative publicity. On the other hand resettlers accused landowners of fraud and 
profiteering and alleged schools were inferior to the ones they abandoned. At Southern 
Harbour a dozen families found themselves living in worse conditions, and in a more 
isolated state, than before resettlement. These deficiencies, along with the high rate of 
unemployment, brought the FHRP into disrepute. 
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 Chapter V explores the social and psychological impact of resettlement by 
examining the experiences of resettlers in Placentia, Trepassey, and Harbour Breton. The 
decision to concentrate resettlers in subdivisions on the fringe of growth centres caused 
families to feel so alienated they shunned participation in lay and religious organizations. 
Denominationalism hindered integration of relocatees into Trepassey. In Harbour Breton 
long-time residents blamed underemployment and low wages on resettlement while 
resettlers at Placentia competed for scarce jobs in a town with a declining economy and 
no inshore fishing facilities. Families who moved there had to choose between returning 
to the abandoned community and going on welfare and suffering the scorn of 
townspeople who considered them backward, lazy people. The failure of FHRC to 
provide adequate counselling, before and after the move, made the transition from rural 
to urban and from traditional to modern a traumatic step. 
 Chapter VI focuses on the role of church leaders in centralization. Religious 
leaders played a key role in the political evolution of Newfoundland from colony to 
province and their participation in implementing rural development programs was 
important. Church leaders of all denominations supported centralization, but criticized 
FHRP for not compensating the church for abandoned property. Clergy also raised 
concerns over lack of counselling and social justice issues, particularly housing and 
employment. Roman Catholic priests in Placentia West and St. Barbe North opposed 
extending services to communities to force people out. An Apostolic Faith pastor in 
White Bay North used political influence and charisma to pressure the FHRC to approve 
the Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm move. On the south coast the Anglican rector at 
Burgeo urged Smallwood to improve transportation and communication services in 
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parish communities as well as to provide better schools and recreational facilities in 
Burgeo. The United Church felt resettlement provided an opportunity for outreach 
services to make the church more relevant in a modern world. The response of the clergy 
varied within denominations and between regions, but clergy of all denominations 
supported the FHRP. 
 Chapter VII discusses strategies coastal people employed to protest community 
evacuations. Resistance to the FHRP solidified over space and time. This chapter presents 
several community case studies that attest to the determination of the residents to bring 
services to their community. In 1968 media reports, academic studies, and the grievances 
of those who relocated created a groundswell of opposition to the program. When the 
Premier offered Fogo Islanders a choice between resettlement and development, they 
opted for development and centralization within Fogo Island. Communities such as Great 
Harbour Deep in White Bay North to Point Lance also rejected overtures to resettle and 
fought for new and improved services. 
 Chapter VIII is a study of a community‟s struggle to resettle as a viable unit. 
Under the leadership of the community council, the merchants, and the UC clergy, 40 
Port Elizabeth inshore fishing families forced the provincial cabinet and the federal 
Minister of Fisheries to designate an evacuated outport as a growth centre. By standing 
together, Port Elizabeth retained its social vitality and traditional economy and avoided 
problems of integrating into an existing community. The Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour 
move illustrates the degree to which resettlers were able to manipulate bureaucrats and 
cabinet ministers in the fourth year of the joint Resettlement Agreement. It is also 
testament to the degree to which resettlers were able to control moves. 
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 My thesis focusses primarily on the people who were most directly affected by 
FHRP rather than the policymakers in the capital. It draws on archival records and 
anthropological, sociological and historical studies of resettlement. The records show that 
there were many players in the resettlement drama and the key actors were the resettlers. 
I argue that the lack of planning by the state resulted in moves to growth centres that 
were ill-equipped to handle the influx and the consequences were such that resettlement 
was a traumatic experience for relocatees and long-time residents. The FHRP was not so 
much coercive as mismanaged. This work is a study of ways the subjects resisted and 
influenced state policy. 
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Chapter II 
The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program: 
Ideology and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 Newfoundland‟s population increased steadily throughout the nineteenth century 
without any corresponding increase in economic diversification. By 1900 the colony had 
a population of about 200,000 scattered in1,000 harbours scattered along six thousand 
miles of shoreline and adjacent islands. All relied heavily on a single staple economic 
resource, the cod fishery which was harvested and cured by family units. As the number 
of harvesters increased the catch per capita declined and the total number of quintals 
remained fairly constant and household incomes declined. Except during the Great War, 
coastal people were heavily dependent on subsistence activities and government relief 
projects. When the Great Depression came along salt cod prices plummeted, throwing the 
country into a crisis. Despite the addition of a second paper mill the opening of several 
mines, and some manufacturing in the urban centres, 35,000 coastal people depended on 
household production utilizing manual methods. Although the Royal Commission 
Newfoundland (1933) reported that the fishery must remain the mainstay of the 
Newfoundland economy, it recognized the necessity to reduce the number of fishers, 
rationalize marketing, and rehabilitate a demoralized population. In an effort to reduce 
dependence on the fishery, the Commission Government initiated a land settlements 
program to introduce fishing families to co-operative and commercial farming. The 
Second World War construction boom disrupted these efforts. Markets for fish improved 
and about 20,000 men and women became wage labourers building military bases. The 
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war created prosperity and reduced dependence on the salt cod trade, and created a desire 
for modern amenities which Smallwood reinforced during the Confederation campaign. 
By 1951 the new province responded to requests from Bonavista Bay communities for in-
kind assistance to move from the islands to the near mainland to take advantage of 
employment in woods camps and the construction trades.   
State-sponsored Resettlement Programs  
 Defenders of resettlement have noted that nearly 50 settlements disappeared 
between 1946 and 1953 without any encouragement or assistance from government.  
Nonetheless, Premier Joseph Smallwood, arguing that many more families would resettle 
if they had the means, introduced a centralization plan to cover moving expenses up to 
$300 provided everyone agreed to leave. The Centralization Plan was ineffective in the 
sense that it generally assisted moves from one fishing community to another. But in 
1957 the province transferred Co-operatives from Fisheries to Agriculture and replaced 
Bill Keough, a co-opereratives organizer in the Commission Government era, with John 
Cheeseman, a person who was a director of John Penney and Sons of Ramea. The 
changeover reflected a change in rural development policy and stronger emphasis on 
centralization. When Cheeseman, chair of the South Coast Commission, advocated 
curtailing services to unviable settlements, Smallwood decided it was time to make the 
Centralization Plan more efficient. In 1957 the Premier appointed an interdepartmental 
committee to identify communities that were economically unviable. The committee 
engaged welfare officers, medical professionals, educators, and clergy in the effort to 
identify outports that ought to be resettled. Smallwood equated urbanization with 
progress and Newfoundland could not progress as long as Newfoundlanders continued to 
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live in more than 1,200 communities dispersed along six thousand miles of coastline. 
Realizing that the least remote communities were the first to evacuate, the Smallwood 
government increased the grant to $1,000 for households who resettled from very remote 
places such as the Horse Islands, White Bay. The pace of urbanization was slow, and 
Smallwood, who wished to eliminate half the outports, had to accept that only 113 
communities had been eliminated by 1965, the year the provincial program ended. It was 
obvious that Newfoundland would need a richer resettlement program to entice people to 
leave the coves and crannies. The province lacked the funds to establish a more lucrative 
so the Premier looked for a partner. 
 Effective 1 April 1965 Newfoundland entered into a joint centralization program 
with Canada known as the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program.  
The FHRP had two main objectives: to create a stable industrial labour force to allow for 
the expansion of the offshore fisheries by moving surplus labour from the traditional 
inshore sector; and secondly to bring the people to centres with better opportunities for 
education of children and better access to services for all. The FHRP was the first of 
several five-year agreements that would oversee the relocation of 80,000 persons over a 
period of 15 years. Each household qualified for a basic resettlement grant of $1,000 plus 
$200 for each member if 90 percent of household heads signed the community 
resettlement petition and agreed to move to one of the reception centres approved by the 
Federal-Provincial Fisheries Household Resettlement Committee (FHRC). In 1966 
governments attempted to increase the pace of resettlement by reducing the 90 percent 
requirement to 80, and, perhaps realizing that the elderly and disabled were the least 
likely to move, by providing grants to elderly and disabled householders who wished to 
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reunite with families elsewhere in Newfoundland. The following year Smallwood created 
the Department of Community and Social Development (C&SD) to manage resettlement, 
but the federal Minister of Fisheries retained control in Ottawa.  
 The 1967 Agreement differed from the 1965 agreement in two respects. First, it 
extended assistance to individual householders who wished to move to a major fisheries 
growth centre and could produce evidence that they had employment in that place. 
Secondly, the amended agreement introduced a lot supplementary mortgage up to $3,000, 
which was forgivable at a rate of 20 percent per year for each year the resettled 
householder occupied the land. At the end of the fifth year the householder, without 
having made any payments, could apply for title. The FHRC restricted maximum lot 
supplementaries to families who moved onto a serviced lot in a land assembly area of a 
major fisheries growth centre, a town with a fresh fish plant that was in operation year 
round. The maximum supplementary grant in other centres was limited to $1,000. The 
administrators of the FHRP intended to reverse the flow of resettlers into other organized 
reception centres and direct them into offshore fisheries bases. The 1967 amendments 
clearly aimed to strengthen the economic goal of the FHRP. Critics of the provincial plan 
alleged that  resettlers moved without improving employment opportunities and in the 
first two years the FHRP appeared to be assisting moves from places of 
underemployment into centres of unemployment. Social scientists, geographers and 
economists produced reports that questioned whether the FHRP met either its social or 
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economic goals, while the media and the arts community produced works 
commemorating pre-Confederation outport culture.
1
 
  In late twentieth century, Newfoundland and Labrador writers revived the theme 
of persecution that had dominated the pre-1960s historiography. In these narratives 
settlers dispersed into remote locations where they developed a semi-subsistence society 
that modernist bureaucrats and politicians regarded as medieval. In 1965, Newfoundland 
and Canada agreed it was advantageous to evacuate hundreds of coastal villages by 
assisting the households into more urban environments where families could enjoy the 
benefits of a wage economy and social amenities, more specifically easier access to 
medical, educational, and transportation services. By imagining rural Newfoundlanders 
as deprived citizens, living in crannies beyond the limits of civilization, and by 
denigrating household production, resettlement planners justified a radical program of 
resettlement.
2
 
 Nationalist narratives arose from disillusionment with Smallwood‟s failed 
modernization schemes which the arts community and the media claimed were 
destroying the very fabric of Newfoundland culture. Poet Al Pitman, satirist and 
journalist Ray Guy, novelists Harold Horwood and Farley Mowat, artist David 
Blackwood, and the popular CBC series Land and Sea, celebrated and sometimes 
romanticized outport life. Revisionist historian, David Alexander blamed the federal 
bureaucrats, who considered the inshore fishery to be an antiquated industry, for 
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undermining the traditional rural economy.
3
 When productivity in the inshore fishery 
declined relative to the offshore sector, the fisheries authorities made a case for 
transferring labour from the inshore sector into fisheries growth centres wherein they 
would be more productively employed. 
 The increase in the number of foreign draggers and factory-freezer trawlers, plus 
the expansion of the Canadian fishing fleet in the 1950s and 1960s placed unsustainable 
pressure on the northern cod stocks. By the early 1960s it was possible to connect the 
reduction of annual catches of inshore fishermen to expansion of the offshore sector. The 
demise of the Labrador fishery, which for more than a century had supported thousands 
of northeast coast families, created a crisis that led people to abandon the islands of 
Bonavista Bay. Burin Peninsula, Placentia Bay, and south coast communities experienced 
a setback when the salt fish schooner bank fishery ended, but the loss was cushioned by 
the establishment of fresh/frozen fish plants.
4
  
 Migration was a natural response to crises the world over and Newfoundlanders 
were not immune. The South Coast Commission (1957) reported many south coast 
communities were abandoned without any assistance. They migrated to the Canadian 
mainland or to Burgeo, Ramea, Gaultois or one of the industrial fishing towns of the 
Burin Peninsula where they crewed draggers or remained in the shore fishery. F. W. 
Rowe, a cabinet minister in the Smallwood government and author of several historical 
works, argued that the centralization of the population began with the construction of the 
railway, and accelerated during the construction of the pulp and paper towns of Grand 
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Falls and Corner Brook, and the mining towns of Bell Island, Buchans, and St. Lawrence. 
Rowe also felt employment in military base construction awakened men and women to 
the benefits of a cash economy.
5
 For William Whiteway and Robert Bond there was a 
symbiotic relationship between railways, industrialization and progress.
6
 In the second 
half of the nineteenth century out-migration increased as the fishery became saturated and 
per capita productivity declined. The productivity problem continued to plague the salt 
fish industry throughout the twentieth century. After Confederation Smallwood looked 
for a way to prevent a mass exodus to the Canadian mainland by adopting a program of 
fisheries modernization and introduced a resettlement program to free people from the 
inconveniences of isolation and bring to an end a semi-subsistence economy. 
 A report by the Inspector of Protestant Schools reflects the ideology of nineteenth 
century educated elites, but also the thinking that shaped the attitudes of government 
officials in the post-war era. Like John Haddon, who advocated moving people from the 
“barren islands and rugged creeks and coves” of Green Bay into four or five larger 
centres in which they could “find the blessings of civilization: resident clergymen, 
doctors, efficient schools, and the great blessing of good roads ... If the people could be 
withdrawn from the barren coast line and established in agricultural parts of the bays, 
what a vast amount of future poverty, discomfort and ignorance would be prevented, and 
what a large degree of material prosperity and happiness would be promoted.”7 Haddon‟s 
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report supported a strategy of development based on landward development which had 
been in vogue since the early 1800s. In short, Newfoundland would not progress unless 
the government moved the fishing population from the rugged shoreline to places with 
greater potential for agriculture, mining and logging. 
 There was broad support for modernizing the fisheries. The Newfoundland Royal 
Commission (1933) Report recommended that fisheries must be the centrepiece of any 
plan to rehabilitate the country. John Hope Simpson, Commissioner of Natural Resources 
in the Commission Government, agreed, but feared the economy could not absorb the 
excess labour that would be released from the inshore sector.
8
 The Commission favoured 
development of a fresh/frozen industry but were convinced a radical restructuring of the 
fishery would create massive unemployment and raise the ire of the fish merchants.
9
 Tied 
to merchant credit and outdated production methods, the salt fish trade could not provide 
the 35,000 fishermen and their families with decent incomes, except during times of 
international crises. 
 When Newfoundland entered Confederation there were two distinct economies.
10
 
Historian Rosemary Ommer and anthropologist Ottar Brox commented on the wide gulf 
between the economic organization of industrial centres and the outports wherein 
families engaged in a potpourri of market and subsistence activities. Salt fish, the 
mainstay of the rural economy, was generally a low-priced, low-quality commodity 
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produced by families utilizing manual methods to produce a product for export to poor 
countries in southern Europe and the south Atlantic. Increased exports of fresh/frozen cod 
during the war stimulated interest in developing that sector. Immediately after World War 
Two, the National Convention, which was set up to decide the future of the country, felt 
it was advisable to encourage expansion of the fresh/frozen industry for North American 
markets. The National Convention Sub-Committee Report on Fisheries concluded 
modernization of the fishery necessitated concentrating the fishery in a few ports and 
shifting production from family-based units into mechanized plants.
11
  
 Raymond Gushue, chairman of the Newfoundland Fisheries Board and the Post-
war Fisheries Planning Committee, predicted that when European fisheries recovered 
total world production of salt cod would again exceed market demand. The Committee 
warned that reduced prices would not only threaten Newfoundland‟s traditional economy, 
but might also dash Newfoundlanders‟ dreams of political independence.12 As an 
international trader with a small internal market and with no means to adjust currency 
exchange rates, Newfoundland was handicapped when it came to negotiating bi-lateral 
trade deals. Dependent on the return from cod exports for much of its revenue, 
Newfoundland could do little more than contribute to the glut by increasing production to 
offset low returns.
13
  The Post-War Committee reported “it is obvious that further 
expansion of the frozen fish industry in Newfoundland to the greatest extent and as 
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rapidly as possible, is most desirable... and as many men as possible should be diverted, 
not only into the frozen fish trade, but also into canning and other branches of the 
fishery.”14 The Fisheries Committee of the National Convention agreed and stressed “the 
urgency to consolidate the United States market for our frozen fish products.”15 
  The Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee agreed. The Walsh Report 
recommended that all fish, except the smallest and poorest quality, should be processed 
into fresh/frozen products for the US market. This proposal, if adopted, threatened to 
further marginalise the salt fish trade and coastal communities dependent upon it. The 
report of the federal-provincial committee recommended government provide financial 
assistance to private companies to expand plants and deep-sea fishing fleets and 
encourage inshore fishers to move into longliners or deep-sea trawlers. Like previous 
studies the Walsh Report considered undercapitalization, low productivity, low incomes, 
a short season and an over dependence on salt cod to be major concerns. 
 Bates, along with W. L. Mackenzie, who wrote most of the Walsh Report, and the 
Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Newfoundland and former federal fisheries bureaucrat, 
Clive Planta, shared a belief that the pluralistic, family-based enterprises should be 
eliminated. As Ommer put it: “The seaward rural economy was seen as backward, 
inefficient and part of the past that was often scorned and had to be outgrown.”16 The 
fisheries economists assumed injections of capital and technology, along with moral 
                                                          
14
Newfoundland Fisheries Board, Report of the Fisheries Post-War Planning Committee, 
72. 
15
Hiller and Harrington, Report of the Fisheries Committee, 19A. 
16
Rosemary Ommer, ed., The Resilient Outport, 34. 
 44 
rehabilitation of fishers, was the solution to the productivity problem.
17
 Smallwood, 
Planta and John T. Cheeseman, chair of the South Commission (1957), contended 
retention of traditional methods and attitudes kept communities mired in poverty and 
ignorance. But coastal households, who demonstrated a willingness to migrate to Nova 
Scotia and New England to find work, were reluctant to make permanent moves, even 
within Newfoundland. Consequently, summer labour shortages in fish plants 
mushroomed into a crisis in winter when workers drawn from the hinterland returned 
home to pursue customary subsistence activities and collect unemployment insurance. 
 But Prime Minister St. Laurent, who had reservations about making more federal 
assistance available to Newfoundland than was available to other provinces, balked at 
investing in private companies.
18
 Historian Raymond Blake suggested that if the St. 
Laurent administration had accepted the advice emanating from the Department of 
Fisheries bureaucracy, rural Newfoundland would have undergone very radical change in 
terms of distribution of population and industry.
19
 In 1949 Smallwood had reservations 
about implementing the industrial model as well. He established a Department of 
Fisheries and Co-operatives and appointed William (Bill) Keough to the portfolio. In 
1953 cabinet approved a modest resettlement program to assist families to move 
anywhere in the province on the stipulation 100 per cent of householders agreed to 
evacuate. The principal goal of the Centralization Plan, which was administered by the 
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Department of Public Welfare, was to bring people to improved social services, and 
building an industrial fishery was secondary. It was apparent that while government had 
invested millions of tax dollars in private companies and doubled resettlement grants to 
speed up community evacuations, he had not given up on the traditional salt fishery. 
  Although the joint Fisheries Development Committee recommended governments 
offer financial assistance to the offshore sector, St. Laurent was not willing to offer more 
support. The Premier decided to modernize the fishery with minimal help from federal 
sources.
20
 The federal government did finance construction of bait depots, community 
stages, and funded research. The Report linked improvements in productivity to 
centralization and modernization which required a redistribution of the population. 
Secondly, harvesters needed access to capital to purchase larger boats to extend their 
range and fishing season. The Committee, finding the employment of women and 
children in processing and curing fish unacceptable in the modern age, proposed 
switching from sun-cure to artificial drying, a change that was already happening without 
government intervention.
21
 The government of Canada financed experiments in artificial 
drying at Valleyfield and Catalina in an attempt to replicate the quality of the light salted 
sun cure. The federal government refused to invest in trawlers and fish plants owned by 
private firms, but improved the standard of living of rural Newfoundlanders by extending 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits to fishermen. When the post-Confederation 
construction boom wound down and the Canadian economy went into recession in the 
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late 1950s, UI benefits made a return to the inshore fishery more attractive and kept 
families in remote places where they could survive on a combination of home ownership, 
subsistence and market activities, family allowance and unemployment insurance. UI 
transferred more of the social welfare bill to Ottawa, but frustrated the provincial 
centralization program. 
 Three years after Newfoundland introduced the Centralization Plan, Smallwood 
expressed impatience over the lack of progress and assembled an interdepartmental 
committee chaired by Provincial Economist G. K. Goundrey. The committee consisted of 
senior bureaucrats from several departments together with Ministers of the Departments 
of Public Welfare, Education and Highways.
22
 The objective of the exercise was to 
compile a list of communities that should be resettled and to discover ways to make the 
Centralization Plan more efficient. The task force enlisted the aid of educators, civil 
servants, medical personnel, and clergy to survey the communities under their purview. 
The release of a report on the poor state of the economic conditions on the province‟s 
south coast may have impelled the Premier to act.  
 The South Coast Commission reported that the inshore fishery could never 
produce sufficient wealth to correct the adverse conditions found in many of the 180 
communities between Cape Ray and Long Harbour. Only one-third of them had a 
population in excess of 200 and 35 had fewer than 50 inhabitants. The Commission 
attributed the backwardness of the region to lack of transportation and communications 
services along with overdependence on the shore fishery and predicted that the situation 
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was unlikely to improve so long as people remained in remote unstable communities 
without opportunity for economic or social advancement.
23
 The Commission 
recommended establishment of a federally funded resettlement program to assist 
relocation of the most marginal communities to Harbour Breton, Burgeo, or to one 
industrial fishing ports on the Burin Peninsula. The Report suggested amendments to the 
Centralization Plan to enable the Department of Public Welfare to assist individual 
householders, moving to preferred areas, to supplement resettlement grants with interest-
free loans based on need.
24
 The Commission stressed that the success of any resettlement 
program depended on employment opportunities in reception centres, and only resettlers 
moving into those centres should receive assistance.
25
 It advocated moving families from 
the inshore sector to industrial fishing bases or industrial town where there were 
opportunities for employment. The Commission reported that the fishers of the region 
were so demoralized that between 1953 and 1956 an average of 400 per year abandoned 
the shore fishery. The report considered further investments in harbour facilities or other 
infrastructure in declining communities to be a waste of public funds.  
 Their message was clear: the raison d‟etre for living in remote coastal 
communities no longer existed; the traditional mixed economy that had supported these 
settlements at a level close to subsistence had no place in a modern industrial state; and 
therefore governments in St. John‟s and Ottawa had no obligation to continue to provide 
anything beyond the most basic of services. Although the province and Canada were 
unwilling to act on the Committee‟s recommendations in 1957, the authors of the FHRP 
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used the Report of the South Coast Commission to articulate a program of fisheries 
modernization based on centralization. The Premier discussed the possibility of entering 
into a federal-provincial resettlement agreement with Newfoundland‟s representative in 
the federal cabinet, who also favoured the idea, but St. Laurent was defeated and nothing 
came out of the talks. The Commission‟s proposal to set up a joint resettlement program 
for Newfoundland received little attention in Ottawa in 1957, but in the mid-1960s 
Canada and Newfoundland signed a joint resettlement agreement that incorporated many 
of the Report‟s recommendations.26 Most notably, the architects of the FHRP emphasized 
the importance of directing households from remote communities to industrial growth 
centres and provided supplementary assistance to householders who wished to move to 
fisheries growth centres with potential for expansion. 
 Provincial economist Robert Wells concurred with the findings of the South Coast 
Commission.
27
 He argued that providing services to people in remote communities was 
cost-prohibitive. Aware that the first communities to vacate were those nearest service 
centres, Wells proposed the province institute a more radical program to move people 
from the remote regions of White Bay and the south coast districts where people were 
unaware of more modern services and opportunities for industrial employment.
28
 Implicit 
in this statement is an assumption that the inhabitants of these regions, many of whom 
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had travelled outside the region for generations to work in Nova Scotia and New 
England, were too ignorant to recognize how backward and indigent they really were.  
 A rural development officer‟s account of a visit to Horse Islands, White Bay 
illustrates how uninformed of conditions in remote outports a bureaucrat in St. John‟s 
could be.
29
 Horse Islands, perhaps the most remote community on the island part of the 
province, contradicts the provincial economist‟s assessment of conditions in remote 
places. A. W. Thoms saw a village bustling with activity when he entered the community 
on a June morning in 1967. The vitality of the place was evident as inhabitants engaged 
in construction and repair of houses, boats, wharves, stages, and stores. Others were 
occupied spreading codfish caught the previous fall. He was aghast at the busyness of the 
place at such an early hour. The only cloud hanging over their community sprung from 
concerns over education. Forty-eight students had no teacher in 1966-7 and parents 
feared the unhappy situation would be repeated in 1967-8. Thoms reported families 
realized they would have to move if the school remained closed. Their willingness to 
sacrifice homes and abandon a way of life indicates the high regard for education in 
coastal communities. The above example reveals that not all outport people fit the 
stereotype image accepted by those who had the power to alter their lives. The visit to 
Horse Islands gave the development officer a chance to witness the industriousness of 
Horse Islanders and experience the social vitality of a remote island community. 
  To impose development policies without a needs assessment of either the sending 
or receiving community is to invite failure. Sociologist Ralph Matthews, who co-
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authored a study of the FHRP for the federal Department of Fisheries and later wrote a 
PhD thesis on resettlement, argued that development experts, who had  no direct 
knowledge or experience in rural Newfoundland, used hard economic data to devise 
development plans that ignored local social and cultural mores.
30
 He suggested that by 
exempting “subjective” data from their model, planners assumed they could create 
development plans that could be applied universally. Fisheries bureaucrats believed that a 
modernization model, designed to rationalize the Nova Scotia fishery in the 1940s, could 
be applied successfully to rural Newfoundland in 1960s. They ignored the economic 
reality that Nova Scotia had a more centralized population, a more industrialized fishery, 
and a more diversified economy to absorb labour freed from traditional activities.
31
 
Newfoundland‟s population was scattered in over 1,200 communities, most of which had 
fewer than 100 people, and few opportunities to change occupations. Modernization of 
the fishery would require a more radical approach than Smallwood‟s Centralization Plan 
which placed no restrictions on where resettlers moved.  
 P. D. H. Dunn, R. A. Mackay, Stewart Bates, Albert Walsh, Raymond Gushue, 
and John T. Cheeseman, believed that only an industrial fishery producing frozen fillets 
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for North American markets could solve the productivity problem.
32
 The Royal 
Commission on Canada‟s Economic State and Prospects reported that the outlook for the 
salt fishery was meagre and suggested that a fisherman in a one-man dory “using 
primitive, inexpensive and manually operated equipment” could not compete with a 
trawler equipped with the most modern navigational and fish-finding equipment.
33
 
Smallwood, who invested millions building roads and rural schools, accepted the findings 
of experts and concluded modernization was not only an economic necessity, but also a 
means to ease the hardship of isolation. The Centralization Plan was a response to a 
declining shore fishery and mechanization of the forest and mining industries. In the 
beginning the social welfare benefits of the Plan were most important. In the late 1950s, 
when efforts to diversify the rural economy through small-scale manufacturing faltered, 
Smallwood became more committed to expanding the industrial fishery. The 
establishment of a task force to survey rural communities to assess community viability 
and compile a list of outports which were likely to resettle, along with reasons why they 
ought to be resettled, attested to the Premier‟s desire to speed up the modernization 
process. The decline of Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries, in tandem with the loss of 
auxiliary employment in mining and logging, increased reliance on UI benefits and social 
welfare programs. The safety valve for Newfoundland historically was out-migration and 
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Smallwood‟s Centralization Plan and other modernization schemes were intended to be 
the finger in the dyke that would prevent a mass post-Confederation exodus.
34
  
 In the twentieth century the federal government expanded its role in regional 
development. In the 1930s the national government began to address regional disparities 
by introducing programs to revitalize Prairie agriculture to stem the tide of out-migration 
that followed several crop failures. In the 1940s Mackenzie King introduced  equalization 
grants to redistribute wealth to poorer provinces to provide basic services without 
overburdening the tax-payers of the less developed areas.
35
 The Royal Commission on 
Canada‟s Economic Prospects (1957) recognized that there were disparities between 
provinces and regions, and recommended Canada create programs to redress economic 
disparities in the Atlantic region.
36
 In 1961 the federal government passed the 
Agricultural Renewal and Development Act (ARDA) to improve productivity of 
marginal land, and in 1966 established  the Fund for Rural Economic Development 
(FRED) to assist households to move from marginal farms into industrial centres.
37
 
FRED reflected the high modernist ideology of economic planners who advocated 
eliminating pluralistic economies that they considered to be outdated by relocating the 
rural workforce into more productive industrial centres. Although the ARDA programs 
were formulated to rationalize agriculture in the less developed regions of Canada, such 
as Northeastern New Brunswick, the Gaspe Peninsula, and Northern Ontario, the 
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Newfoundland government saw them as an opportunity to get federal assistance to 
rationalize, centralize and modernize the fishery. In 1963 Smallwood appealed to the 
federal government for a renewed fisheries development program.   
   In 1964 Newfoundland‟s Minister of Fisheries, C. Max Lane, requested 
assistance to solve what he considered a desperate labour shortage in fresh/frozen 
integrated trawler-processing plants and the government of Lester Pearson responded 
positively.
38
 Ottawa, which had refused to provide funding for fisheries development to 
Newfoundland that was not available to other provinces, accepted Smallwood‟s request 
for fisheries funding equivalent to that which had been made available to farmers through 
ARDA was timely.
39
 At this time fisheries scientists began to observe the effects of 
overfishing in the offshore by European fleets that arrived in the early 1950s and in the 
1960s were generating concern in the nation‟s capital.40 The federal government, aware 
that Canada‟s share of the Northwest Atlantic fish was shrinking relative to foreign 
nations, responded with a plan to build up a competitive modern trawler fleet. 
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Wright, A Fishery, 70. A delegation, led by Deputy Minister of Fisheries Stewart Bates, 
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Wilfred Templeman, Marine Resources in Newfoundland, Bulletin 154 (Ottawa: 
Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 1966) in Wright, “Newfoundland and Canada,” 
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tenth of the total tonnage fishing off Canada‟s east coast. The largest fleet came from the 
USSR - 200,000 gross tons. Templeman noted that despite a 53% increase in the number 
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believed the increase in the offshore fishing effort was responsible for stagnation in the 
inshore sector. 
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Government financed construction of a shipyard at Marystown to build stern trawlers to 
replace the less efficient, but more dangerous, side trawlers. These vessels would be 
crewed by men recruited from the inshore cohort. The success of the fisheries 
development program, drafted in 1964, rested on creating a stable workforce. 
Newfoundland and Canada entered into a joint resettlement agreement to meet the 
projected increase in demand for workers to staff fish plants and crew trawlers. The 
newly created Fisheries College offered courses in navigation, refrigeration and marine 
engineering to train young men for the expanding modern fishery. When the two 
Ministers of Fisheries signed the Canada-Newfoundland Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Agreement they sealed the fate of hundreds of Newfoundland coastal 
communities. 
 In1965 the national and provincial governments passed the Newfoundland 
Resettlement Act, an Act that gave birth to the Newfoundland Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program (FHRP) which was to be effective from 1 April 1965 to 31 March 
1970 and to be administered by the Fisheries Household Resettlement Division of the 
provincial Department of Fisheries.
41
 The statute authorized the federal and provincial 
Ministers of Fisheries to appoint a fifteen-person advisory committee, to be known as the 
Federal - Provincial Household Resettlement Committee, hereafter the Resettlement 
Committee. Although the federal government agreed to pay two-thirds of the cost, the 
joint committee was co-chaired and 10 members of the Resettlement Committee were 
provincial.  The Resettlement Division, which came under the purview of the provincial 
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Newfoundland Department of Fisheries, “The Fisheries Household Resettlement 
Program,” in Iverson and Matthews, Communities In Decline, Appendix A, 146. 
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Department of Fisheries, took on the task of administering the Resettlement Agreement 
that was signed by the two governments 15 July, 1965 and was retroactive to 1 April. The 
Director of Resettlement Division, Ken Harnum, played a key role in the implementation 
of the program. Harnum and his staff visited coastal communities to explain the FHRP to 
key people such as the merchant, postmaster, clergy, or the teacher and asked them to 
disseminate information on procedures for resettlement as outlined in the Agreement, but 
did not see fit to call a public meeting to inform everyone of the advantages and 
mechanics of the FHRP.
42
 The decision to include persons who sat atop the local social 
hierarchy in the process was sound strategy, but it left rural communities vulnerable to 
rumour. 
 The first step in the process of resettlement required an interested party, including 
resettled householders, to request a two-part petition. Secondly, the Agreement required 
the individual, or group to call a public meeting, often chaired by a clergyman or teacher. 
If a majority of householders was present, the meeting had a duty to elect a three-member 
community resettlement committee, made up of a chairman, a secretary and an additional 
member. The local committee had a legal duty to bring the petition to each householder 
and certify its authenticity by dating and signing the completed document. The committee 
secretary then sent the petition to the Director of Resettlement. If 90 percent of 
householders signed the petition and agreed to move to an approved reception centre, the 
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Resettlement Committee could declare the community an evacuated outport.
43
 After 
moving to an approved centre a householder then applied for assistance by completing a 
form which included former and current address, number, name and age of all household 
members, along with current intended occupation. Item nine of the application required 
householders to agree not to reoccupy the vacated property without the consent of the 
Minister of Fisheries. The resettlement authorities approved assistance on condition that 
ownership of real property in the abandoned community revert to the crown, with a 
proviso that houses and other structures could be removed by the owner or sold to 
another person for removal or dismantling. If the application was approved, the family 
received a basic grant of $1,000 plus $200 on behalf of each member, as well as 
reimbursement for travel, expenses for removal of personal chattels along with the cost of 
fishing gear and equipment of householders who intended to continue fishing after the 
move. The cost of removing real property rested with the householder who had to pay the 
cost of removal, transport and setup from the resettlement grant.
44
 Initially, householders 
relied on private operators to relocate homes but in 1968 government purchased a 
motorized barge to alleviate the housing crisis in growth centres created by the rush to 
resettle. Although government made the barge available free of charge, the fees charged 
by the private operators and the purchase of a building lot, especially in major fisheries 
growth centres, consumed a significant portion of the resettlement grant and often left 
relocatees indebted. Consequently, movers tended to settle in reception centres where 
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cheap land was available rather than in a serviced land assembly in a major fisheries 
growth centre
45
 where the price of building lots was prohibitive. 
 Iverson and Matthews identified the cost and availability of housing and the 
importance of home ownership in the rural communities as factors inhibiting 
resettlement. They recommended increased grants to address the problem.
46
 When 
resettlement planners realized that the high cost of lots in growth centres stymied the 
economic goal of the FHRP, they enriched the program for householders who opted to 
move into major fisheries growth centres.
47
 Households that moved after 1 April 1967 
from a petitioning settlement onto a lot in a special land assembly in a major fisheries 
growth centre, qualified for a maximum supplementary grant of $3,000. The maximum 
lot supplementary was $1,000 in all other cases.
48
 The resettlement planners hoped to 
make housing more affordable in the industrial centres and thereby prevent people from 
moving into marginal centres that were as resource poor as the old community.
49
 By June 
1967, 5,000 persons had been resettled, but the labour shortage in the fish plants still 
threatened to derail the fisheries development program initiated in 1964. 
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 The fisheries planners also reduced the percentage of petitioning households from 
90 percent to 80 and provided assistance to widowed and disabled persons to move 
anywhere in the province, as well as to individual householders who wished to move to a 
fisheries growth centre. By 1966 the Resettlement Division realized how difficult it was 
to get the 90 percent of householders to vote for relocation.
50
 Consequently, the FHRC 
sometimes asked the Newfoundland minister responsible for the FHRP to use his 
discretionary power provided by the Resettlement Agreement to approve petitions signed 
by fewer than 80 percent of householders. The minister, for example, used discretionary 
authority to approve evacuation of the Placentia West communities such as St. Kyran‟s, 
St. Leonard‟s, Harbour Buffett, Port Anne, Oderin and Woody Island when more than 20 
percent of householders withheld signatures.
51
 The Harbour Buffett petition, on which 
only 72 percent of householders‟ names appear, included signatures of 10 resettled 
household heads.
52
 Families, who moved no more than 18 months prior to approval of the 
petition, qualified for resettlement grants. In some instances the Resettlement Director 
encouraged resettlers to pressure the residual population by informing them that unless 80 
percent agreed to evacuate the settlement, the resettled households would only qualify for 
a supplementary grant of $1,000.  
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 The decision to assist individual household moves reduced the population of 
designated outports, raised the average age in the community and when young families 
moved, reduced school enrollments, and the incentive for governments to maintain 
existing infrastructure, or to introduce new services. The out-migration of younger 
families and youth created an atmosphere of unease and uncertainty.
53
 During this 
anxious time, if the local resettlement committee circulated a petition, it was likely to 
succeed. When the signatures of former residents were combined with those of resident 
households, the die was cast for all. It was a wearing down process that was sometimes 
led by former residents who wished to qualify for, or maximize, resettlement grants.
54
 C. 
W. Keeping, the main merchant in Sagona who resided in Harbour Breton, wrote Harnum 
that he was tempted to flatten his business premises in Sagona to “create the desired 
effect,” namely force the people off Sagona Island by preventing reestablishment of the 
business by a new supplier.
55
 Resettlement was an attractive option for workers who 
commuted regularly to work outside the community. Iverson and Matthews maintained 
that frequency of travel increased the sense of isolation.
56
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 60 
 The case of Williamsport, White Bay North demonstrates how complex, and 
divisive, the process of resettlement could be. Residents employed in whaling joined with 
local merchants to oppose resettlement.
57
 On 10 December 1965 21 of 37 households 
signed the petition. A second petition circulated on 19 February 1966 garnered 29 
signatures, and when the Director of Resettlement visited in May he added eight names to 
the February petition.
58
 While the local resettlement committee implored their MHA to 
intervene, and warned that they would not let the matter rest, opponents of resettlement 
questioned the validity of the petition. The postmistress informed the Resettlement 
Director that the petition was the work of a former teacher and another person, neither of 
whom were long-time residents of Williamsport. She alleged that those individuals 
organized a committee at Englee without convening a public meeting at Williamsport. 
The postmistress, whose job depended on community survival, claimed several names 
should be removed from the petition because they were not householders, or had left 
before the FHRP took effect.
59
 Resettlement caused so much bitterness that the 
Resettlement Committee asked Ken Harnum to visit the community to compile a list of 
those in favour of resettling along with a list of resettled families requesting financial 
assistance and the dates they had left.
60
 The FHRC discussed the evacuation Williamsport 
in two meetings, but were unable to reach a decision. In February the local committee, 
which favoured resettlement, implored the MHA for White Bay North to intercede on 
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their behalf and asked to be treated the same as Little Harbour Deep which they said had 
been evacuated with only 85 percent voting to relocate of which only 61 percent intended 
to move to approved reception centres.
61
 On the other side the postmistress threatened 
legal action if the Committee sanctioned the move.
62
 
 The animosity within families and neighbourhoods destroyed the social integrity 
of the communities, and much of the discord resulted from lack of information and 
counselling, especially in those places that evacuated before the FHRP was fully 
organized. At Great Paradise no one was willing to call a public meeting to elect a local 
committee to take the petition to the people, perhaps fearing reprisals. Householders in a 
close-knit community did not wish to offend neighbours who wanted to stay. 
Consequently, the majority of residents of Great Paradise relocated to Placentia before 
the FHRC designated it an evacuated outport.
63
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1966. GN39/1, Box 126, File S69, The Rooms. See also D. M. Smallwood, Welfare 
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 62 
 In 1967 the FHRC classified growth centres according to absorptive capacity and 
potential for economic development.
64
 Year-round industrial offshore fishing bases with 
sufficient land for subdivision development and in-fill housing were assigned Category 
“A” major fishery growth centre status. Communities with potential for urban 
development and within commuting distance of a major fisheries growth centre were also 
included in category “A.” Towns that had fresh fish plants, but lacked space for 
organized land assemblies were classified type “B,” other fishery growth centres. 
Category “C,” other growth points included major urban industrial centres like St. John‟s, 
Mount Pearl, Grand Falls, Corner Brook and Labrador City. Category “D” consisted of 
31 approved organized reception centres that were considered to have sufficient 
absorptive capacity.
65
 The latter included Rushoon, Arnold‟s Cove, Come-by-Chance, 
Little Harbour East, and others that had a road connection, better access to services, but 
few amenities. The shortcomings of these communities are discussed in a later chapter. 
 In 1968 Noel Iverson and Ralph Matthews released Communities in Decline,
66
 a 
study commissioned by the federal Department of Fisheries in 1966 to determine the 
effectiveness of the program. The report identified unemployment and housing as the two 
main concerns. It received widespread media coverage and caught the attention of 
planners in Ottawa and St. John‟s. The Director of Special Planning Secretariat suggested 
“it might be in the interest of Ottawa and the Province to engage in a comprehensive 
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housing program” that would include rental, co-operative and shell.67 On 1 April 1967 
Canada and Newfoundland amended the Resettlement Agreement to address the concerns 
raised by sociologists. At the federal the Department of Fisheries continued to administer 
the program but the province decided to pass control to the newly created Department of 
Community and Social Development (C&SD). Acting on the recommendations of 
Iverson and Matthews, federal and provincial governments launched an initiative to 
alleviate the shortage of affordable housing in growth centres wherein the high cost of 
serviced lots discouraged resettlers.
68
 Ottawa and the province agreed to cost-shared 
development of land assemblies on a 75-25 basis respectively.
69
 Resettled householders 
who moved from an evacuated outport to a category “A” growth centre qualified for a 
maximum $3,000 supplementary grant to offset the cost of purchasing a lot in a serviced 
land assembly area. Relocatees who moved to other approved reception centres qualified 
for a maximum $1,000 lot supplementary, on condition the householder serviced the lot 
within eighteen months and they had moved from an outport in which a minimum of 80% 
of householders petitioned to relocate. It also provided assistance for widowed and 
disabled persons to reunite with family or to be nearer health-care facilities. The 1967 
changes, encompassed an element of humanity, but also revealed impatience with the 
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 64 
slow pace of resettlement which is revealed in correspondence between the Premier and 
the Prime Minister. 
 In January 1967 Smallwood reminded Pearson that the goal of “transferring 
people from a dependent status, to productive employment” was not being met and 
stressed that “the potential benefit of the centralization programme for the future of this 
province cannot be over-estimated.”70 The Premier advised the Prime Minister that the 
housing crisis in each of the fisheries growth centres - Marystown, Burin, Trepassey, 
Fortune, Grand Bank, Harbour Breton, Fermeuse and Harbour Grace - was no closer to a 
solution.
71
 Smallwood advised Pearson that unless the housing situation was resolved, the 
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Smallwood to Pearson, 12 January 1967, J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 
3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University. Smallwood noted that those wishing to buy houses 
in the Marystown subdivision would have to support a mortgage of $9, 000. He provided 
a summary of the costs: $3,500 for serviced lot, other costs $11,500 for a total of 
$15,000. To meet the cost CMHC offered a $9,000 mortgage, FHRP - $2,000, personal 
capital - $1,000 of which could be “sweat equity.” The remaining deficit of $3,000 
needed redress. The solution struck upon was a lot supplementary mortgage which did 
not require the mortgagee to make payments. The mortgage was forgivable at a rate of 
20% per year so that after occupying the land for five years the mortgagee could apply 
for title. For those who could not sustain a $9,000 mortgage, it was intended to make 
shell housing available at a greatly reduced cost. Smallwood did not consider it desirable 
for resettled families to occupy subsidized rental units indefinitely. In a province where 
families were forming at a very rapid rate, the Premier saw an opportunity to address the 
general housing shortage and have Ottawa shoulder the majority of the cost. (Smallwood 
informed Pearson that 47% of the people living in Newfoundland in 1967 were born after 
1949.) The issue of affordable housing remained a problem in the major fisheries growth 
centres for some time. Resettled fishermen who earned $2,800 per annum in a fish plant 
could not sustain a $9,000 mortgage. Trawlermen who earned $4,000 annually were in a 
better position to purchase a house, but they spent 90% of their time at sea and could live 
anywhere. In a province where home ownership was prized, the notion of a householder 
leaving his home to take on a mortgage or rent  was unrealistic.  
 65 
whole offshore fisheries development plan would remain in jeopardy.
72
 In the same vein, 
a memorandum warned the Minister of C&SD  that the program was not meeting the 
target of moving “10,000 inshore fishermen involving at least 5,000 households” in the 
five-year period, and furthermore resettlers were not relocating to industrial fishing ports 
where fish processing plants could absorb new workers at the rate of 500 per year.
73
  
 The federal and provincial governments realized families in the outports preferred 
to move to smaller growth points wherein they were more likely to remain homeowners. 
Resettled people, who valued home ownership more than industrial employment, tended 
to avoid the centres where a labour shortage was threatening the survival of established 
processing plants and the viability of new plants such as the one at Marystown.
74
 The 
authorities realized that the housing crisis threatened the fisheries development program, 
of which the FHRP was a key component. In 1967 the planners decided to direct more 
workers into urban settings by offering subsidized building lots and rental rates tied to 
family incomes. The future of the fish plants, as well as the towns, were at risk.
75
 The 
future of the industrial fishery depended on herding relocatees into category “A” growth 
centres, but politicians were aware that too much meddling by overenthusiastic 
bureaucrats would draw more unwanted public criticism. The program was already under 
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public scrutiny and being condemned by nationally renowned author Farley Mowat and 
Ray Guy of The Evening Telegram and A. B. Perlin of The Daily News. 
 In the 1960s academic interest in rural Newfoundland resulted in a series of 
economic and social studies funded by ARDA and published by the Institute of Social 
and Economic Research, Memorial University. ISER recruited graduate students from 
Norway, the UK, and the US to produce socio-ethnographic studies in Newfoundland 
outports over a two-year period. Ian Whitaker, the Director of Sociological Research at 
ISER asked the researchers to focus on values, political orientation, and power structure 
as they studied evolution of a people from primitive peasant society to modernity.
76
 The 
social scientists reported that the economic backwardness of rural Newfoundland was 
attributable to values, family-based production methods, and the individualistic nature of 
society that stymied discussion and co-operative initiatives.
77
 The Iverson and Matthews‟ 
report, discussed above, thrust the FHRP into the forefront of academic discussion. A 
colloquium at Memorial University sponsored by the federal Department of Fisheries and 
ARDA  provided a forum for discussion of the concerns raised by the study. Michael 
Skolnik stressed the importance of giving persons in remote communities the freedom of 
choice to move to a well-serviced rural community or to an urban centre.
78
 Ottar Brox 
noted that the FHRP was founded on the premise that inshore fishermen were “longing” 
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for a chance to move into draggers to improve incomes, but found little evidence to 
substantiate the claim.
79
 Brox referred to the move from Lumsden North to Lumsden 
South to illustrate how fishing families pressured government to waste money on useless 
moves. The people moved houses two miles down the road but intended to utilize all the 
resources of the old community, including gardens, fishing premises and animals. Both 
parties benefited - the households received resettlement grants while the government 
reduced the number of outports using federal tax dollars. Brox claimed a desire to end 
isolation was not a prime motivating factor since it was communities in close proximity 
to developed areas that moved first. He believed the absence of a fish buyer, teachers, and 
local government rather than poor roads or rough seas marginalized communities. He 
called for a rural development program, one that would focus on improving the general 
welfare of the people in their own communities.
80
 The benefits of the FHRP to the 
province included elimination the cost of continuing services to remote outports while 
using federal money to develop infrastructure in reception centres. 
 Wadel contended that in some cases there were few alternatives to resettlement if 
the people wanted modern services, but thought that many communities were easily 
serviceable.
81
 Furthermore, he challenged the simplistic method of calculating fishing 
incomes by dividing the value of codfish by the number of inshore fishermen.
82
 This 
methodology omitted incomes from other fisheries, contributions of other family 
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members to the household economy, as well as other income from wage work or 
subsistence activities. A. P. Dyke noted a study of communities of Bonavista North 
prepared by the Newfoundland Task Force on Rural Development in 1963 attributed one-
third of earned incomes of fishermen in the region to non-fishing activities.
83
 Dyke, who 
surveyed  nine households in Bonavista Bay, discovered that cash incomes from the sale 
of salt cod averaged $900 while total average cash incomes, including UI, family 
allowances, old age pensions, and other social welfare benefits, was in excess of 
$1,900.
84
 He argued that when one factors in cash income from all sources and added the 
value of home ownership, rural households were not living in such dire straits as Parzival 
Copes and Smallwood claimed. By limiting household incomes in Newfoundland‟s 
coastal communities to earnings derived from the sale of a single species, the 
Resettlement Committee could more easily make a case for designating an outport 
unviable and present the evacuation of the community as a humanitarian relief exercise. 
Dyke allowed home ownership provided annual income in kind in excess of average 
returns from sale of salt fish, and Brox pointed out that relocatees preferred to move to 
Trinity, where they could afford a house, rather than Marystown where they could get a 
job in a fish plant, but could not afford a house.
85
 Furthermore, he stated that if families 
were only given the choice of moving from Ireland‟s Eye to Marystown, they might not 
have moved at all. 
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 At the provincial level the Deputy Minister of C&SD, the Director of the 
Resettlement Division, Ken Harnum, Director of Urban and Rural Planning, J. T. Allston, 
along with Premier Smallwood, Ministers of Fisheries, C. Max Lane (1963-7),
86
and 
Aidan Maloney, Minister of Fisheries and Community and Social Development (1967-
71), William N. Rowe, Minister of Resettlement and Housing, were strong advocates of 
resettlement. Equally supportive of fisheries modernization were Prime Minister Pearson, 
Fisheries Ministers H. J. Robichaud and Jack Davis, A. W. Needler, co-chair of the 
FHRC and W. C. Mackenzie of the Fisheries Development Branch, federal Department 
of Fisheries. Through a process of relocation, employment and training, they argued, 
rural people would undergo a metamorphosis that would free them from an 
impoverished, dependent lifestyle that had changed very little since early nineteenth 
century. The Resettlement Committee presented the FHRP as a civilizing mission, a part 
of a process that would lead to integration into North American consumer society. Scott 
claimed that high-modernist ideology found “its most fertile soil among planners, 
engineers, architects, scientists and technicians” who became designers of a new order.87 
Politicians and bureaucrats used state power to alter people‟s work habits, attitudes and to 
stimulate desire for goods and services. Rostow‟s belief that primitive people would 
eventually acquire attitudes that would permit them to enjoy the benefits of an industrial 
consumer economy in an urban environment. Modernists equated rural with 
backwardness and connected urbanization to progress.  
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 A. G. Stacey, a former statistician with the Dominion Bureau of Statistics (DBS) 
who transferred to ARDA and later became secretary to the Federal - Provincial 
Resettlement Committee, recommended Newfoundland adopt the Icelandic model.
88
 The 
Icelandic government assisted harvesters to acquire large boats equipped with the most 
efficient gear and modern navigational equipment to maximize productivity and income. 
Stacey suggested that profits generated through the use of more efficient harvesting 
technologies could be invested in processing plants to create shore employment for those 
rendered redundant by the efficient fishing fleet. Experts, including William Black, 
emphasized the need to educate the next generation to prepare them for employment in 
the industrial fishery.  
 The FHRP aimed to change more than mailing addresses; it aimed to transfer 
people from a regressive social and economic setting into modern industrial fish 
processing centres. W. A. Black‟s study of the northwest coast suggested that unless a 
way was found to awaken a desire in the people for consumer goods, they would remain 
stuck in a semi-subsistence economy. Black recommended installing a television service 
to alter values, concentration of the fishery into several large harbours, and evacuation of 
the “crannies” as strategy for creating a more productive workforce.89 ARDA‟s 
development experts dismissed the older generation and focus on training high school 
graduates to captain longliners and enter trades to equip them for the modern fishery.  
 A common goal of all fisheries development programs - education, training, and 
resource utilization - was to raise fishermen‟s incomes above the subsistence level, but 
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the real focus was on breaking the cycle of dependence. Black‟s study of the St. Barbe 
coast, gave as much attention to the necessity for changing attitudes as it did to reforming 
the economy.  He proposed establishment of a six-week education program for adults and 
a two-year program at the Fisheries College to prepare high-school graduates to establish 
fishing enterprises or become skilled workers in the mechanized fishery. Secondly, Black 
recommended constructing medium size fish plants in larger ports like Port au Choix and 
St. Anthony. He proposed evacuating communities with a population of less than 225 
persons. If government had actioned these recommendations there would be few 
communities on that section of coast from Bonne Bay to Cape Norman.
90
 His suggestions 
for modernizing the fishery echoed a common refrain: a switch from manual to 
mechanical production; a change from family operations to fish plants; a change from 
unskilled to skilled labour utilizing mechanized methods, and a change from an 
individualistic, horizontally organized production to vertically integrated processing 
plants located in designated growth poles.
91
 Black‟s recipe for fisheries modernization 
was similar to those written by fisheries consultants and commissions for over two 
decades. The alternative the experts suggested was to leave people in a backward state. 
 Smallwood insisted that the resettlement programs originated from a need to raise 
the standard of social services in Newfoundland closer to the level enjoyed by the citizens 
of western countries. He argued that raising the standard of living hinged on providing 
the younger generation with quality education in schools staffed by university trained 
teachers. Implicit in the Premier‟s thinking was the assumption that families needed to 
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move to larger centres to enhance educational opportunities. Reacting to a 1976 magazine 
article that denounced the tactics employed by the province to implement the FHRP, 
Smallwood replied: 
My administration‟s reason, and my only reason, for being willing to help people 
who wished to move was primarily a powerful wish to help the children. As our 
programme of upgrading the standards of excellence of the teachers came into 
successful play, it became difficult, and ultimately impossible, to get qualified 
teachers to teach in small settlements, especially small islands, or in any remote or 
isolated settlement. The same was (and is!) true of doctors and nurses.
92
 
 
Smallwood remained convinced that the level of social services and incomes of coastal 
people could only be raised by assisting families to move to larger centres where modern 
amenities already existed and better opportunities for wage employment existed. 
Planners, who Matthews suggests often held values that conflicted with their subjects, 
concluded that only a radical state-funded program of fisheries modernization and 
elimination of hundreds of declining outports could improve the standard of living to a 
level approximating the North American standard.
93
  
 Raymond Gushue, Director of the Newfoundland Board of Fisheries,  W. C. 
Mackenzie, Director of Economic Services of the federal Department of Fisheries and 
federal representative on the Newfoundland Fisheries Development Committee and the 
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author of the Report, and John T. Cheeseman, proposed a reorganization of the 
province‟s chief industry to bring it more in line with production techniques used by 
other industries throughout the developed world. Their work formed the basis of a 
fisheries policy that led Smallwood to introduce the Centralization Plan in the 1950s and 
the joint resettlement program in which governments of Newfoundland and Canada 
agreed that “it was desirable that a considerable number of householders in the Province 
should be enabled to remove from small settlements in outlying areas of the Province 
where opportunities for economic development are limited, to other communities more 
favoured within the province.”94  
 One Canadian paper presented the FHRP as a rescue mission designed to free 
householders mired in poverty in isolated outports.
95
 Newfoundland Fisheries Minister C. 
Max Lane saw the FHRP as a means to solve the “desperate” shortage of trawlermen and 
plant workers in the fishery growth centres, especially the industrial fishing towns of the 
Burin Peninsula.
96
 The problem of creating an industrial labour force for Marystown, 
Burin, Grand Bank and Fortune is the subject of the next chapter. Few inshore fishermen 
considered resettlement a liberating experience and chose to relocate to a more traditional 
centre where housing was more affordable, access to social services easier, and from 
which they had the option to continue in the inshore fishery utilizing salvaged gear and 
equipment on old grounds. If government‟s only offer was relocation to Marystown, the 
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communities of Placentia Bay might have ignored the entreaties of parish priests, fish 
plant managers, and resettlement officials who promised a better life.  
Conclusion 
 By the mid-twentieth century, the state decided pluralistic economies of less 
wealthy rural regions needed radical intervention to raise incomes and productivity closer 
to the Canadian average. Many studies and commission reports emphasized that the 
traditional inshore fishers using manual methods of production could not supply their 
families with the basic necessities without the assistance of state welfare programs. In the 
1950s and 1960s the Newfoundland government embarked on a program of 
modernization and urbanization that would free coastal people from isolation, poverty, 
and ignorance by assisting them into growth points. The first state-sponsored plan, which 
was administered by the Department of Public Welfare, privileged the social over the 
economic, but Smallwood‟s goal was to eliminate most of the small outports by 
providing modest financial support. In the 1960s much of the discourse centred on ending 
occupational pluralism. The FHRP was an attempt by the state to rehabilitate the 
population and improve productivity of the fishing industry by assisting fishers to growth 
centres with factories operated by vertically integrated trawler-processing companies.  
 Resettlement was not a natural migration of people moving voluntarily to improve 
their well-being; it was different from the rural to urban migration that normally occurs in 
all industrial societies because whole communities moved at once.
97
 Evacuation of 
outports, urban renewal and the reordering of nature were projects conceived by high-
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modernist planners. In Seeing Like a State James Scott provides examples of high 
modernist commitment to the reordering nature, space and bodies. High modernism 
favoured homogeneity over diversity and presumed the mixed economy and social 
ordering of Tanzanian hill dwellers, the Appalachian population and rural 
Newfoundlanders was necessary to create a more productive society. Governments used 
centralization programs to make society more accessible, productive and accountable. 
Modernist fisheries planners believed that applications of science and technology and 
centralization of industry and population could transform a pluralistic rural economy into 
a modern consumer society.  
 Enquiries into the fisheries of Newfoundland and Atlantic Canada recommended 
centralization of the fishing industry in key ports where mechanical methods would 
replace manual and decked vessels would replace open boats. The principal aim of the 
FHRP was to remove fishers from one-man dories and trapskiffs and put them into 200 
ton trawlers outfitted with the most modern harvesting and navigational technologies. 
The labour freed from the family-based inshore sector would be employed in the 
processing plants. In 1965 the governments of Canada and Newfoundland entered into an 
agreement designed to free coastal people from poverty by concentrating them in 
industrial offshore bases. The degree to which the rural population resisted and frustrated 
the main goal of the FHRP is examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III 
Obstacles in the Road to Modernity: Recruiting Industrial Labour for Four Major 
Fishery Growth Centres on the Burin Peninsula 
 
Introduction 
 The architects of the fisheries development program overestimated both the 
absorptive capacity of the offshore sector and the earnings of the corporate fishery. The 
most salient of all obstacles inhibiting modernization of the Newfoundland fishery was 
the failure of the fresh fish industry dependent on North American markets to render 
sufficient returns to improve the standard of living of fishers and plant workers. Increases 
in the cost of housing and services associated with modernity ate up plant workers‟ 
wages. Furthermore, many coastal people preferred the freedom of living in an 
environment in which they had some control over their working lives. Many subsistence 
activities could not be practised in growth centres. Householders who had capital 
investments in the inshore sector wished to move to nearby centres from which they 
could utilize gear and equipment and fish ancestral grounds. In addition, some residents, 
whose job depended on the survival of the community, organized resistance to 
resettlement to any growth centre. On the other side, town councils of major growth 
centres passed by-laws barring salvaged houses from subdivisions. Discontented 
households claimed resettlement reduced them to a degraded state in which they 
experienced a greater sense of alienation and isolation than they ever felt before the 
move. The authors of the FHRP, who aimed to move fishing families from a peasant-
style economy into a wage economy by offering cash incentives and promises of a better 
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quality of life and a higher standard of living, created a regimented underclass whose 
wages were so low they could barely cover basic needs. 
Building an Industrial Fishery on the Burin Peninsula  
 Nowhere was the problem of the transition to a modern fishery more acute than 
on the Burin Peninsula. Fishery Products Ltd., a company which John T. Cheeseman, 
Newfoundland‟s fisheries minister (1957-1963) compared it to a sick patient requiring 
regular blood transfusions to stay alive, opened a plant at Burin in 1942.
1
 In the 1950s 
Bonavista Cold Storage Ltd. opened a plant in Grand Bank and Booth Fisheries Ltd. took 
control of a plant owned by the Lake Group of companies at Fortune. In 1967Atlantic 
Fish Processors Ltd. leased the government-owned plant at Marystown and acquired a 
fleet of stern trawlers to supply it. Burin, Grand Bank, Fortune and Marystown were ice-
free ports located close to the Grand Banks and access experienced deep sea fishers. 
 The construction of the fish plant and shipyard transformed Marystown into a 
modern industrial town, the commercial and service centre of the Burin Peninsula. To 
accommodate the anticipated population increase, Newfoundland and Labrador Housing 
Corporation (NLHC) developed a subdivision with more than 200 housing units. 
Marystown, equipped with banks, a modern hotel, a shopping mall, a shipyard with a 
synchrolift, and the newest and largest fresh fish processing plant in the province was 
poised to become one of Newfoundland‟s top industrial towns. The plant, during peak 
production, employed a thousand workers on shore and at sea. The Daily News reported 
                                                          
1
John T. Cheeseman, Minister of Fisheries, notes prepared in advance of a cabinet 
meeting to discuss extending further loans to Fishery Products Ltd. He advised cabinet to 
approve the loans because the company had become too important to the Newfoundland 
economy to allow it to fail. Smallwood Collection, Coll. 065, File 2.11.011, ASC, 
Memorial University. 
 78 
in the winter of 1969 that the demand for labour and provision of affordable housing in 
the four Burin Peninsula towns made resettlement on the Burin Peninsula more organized 
and successful than anywhere else in the province.
2
 The report glossed over the growing 
pains that these towns experienced and the struggle resettlers had to find affordable 
housing. 
 The Resettlement Agreement empowered the Newfoundland Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Committee (FHRC) to select and classify growth centres. All major 
fisheries growth centres were Category “A”, i.e., offshore fisheries bases with fresh fish 
plants operating year round and having space for expansion. Four of eight towns in 
Category “A” were located in former banks fishing centres on the Burin Peninsula.3  
Although the industrial fishing bases experienced unprecedented growth, small inshore 
fishing communities declined and several petitioned to relocate. Among them were 
Colmer, High Beach, Roundabout, Long Cove, Wandsworth, Point Rosie and Corbin.
4
 
During the period 1965-70, the population of Burin increased by 700, Fortune by 400, 
Grand Bank by 500, and Marystown had a net gain of nearly 1600. Much of Marystown‟s 
increased population was due to amalgamation of neighbouring communities of Mooring 
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Cove, the site of the fish plant, Little Bay, and Creston.
5
 The post-war baby boom, as 
well as resettlement, contributed to this population growth.  
 While centralization added to the population of the four major fisheries growth 
centres, citizens of neighbouring settlements were often reluctant to relocate to one of the 
industrial fishing towns. For example, families from Wandsworth resettled despite 
warnings from the Director of Resettlement that they would not receive resettlement 
grants.
6
 After taking note of the age structure of the householders intending to move, the 
FHRC relented and approved the Wandsworth to Epworth move on humanitarian 
grounds. Corbin families who also chose not to resettle into Burin or Marystown also 
received resettlement grants.
7
 The residents of Point Rosie resettled only after the FHRC 
added Garnish to the list of approved reception centres and rationalized their decision by 
stating Garnish was within commuting distance of Category “A” growth points. 
Following a visit to Point Rosie, H. R. V. Earle, MHA, and Ken Harnum formed the 
opinion that women were eager to move for the sake of the children, but the older men 
wished to stay.
8
  
 Older fishers, who had capital invested in the inshore fishery, were often the most 
opposed to leaving the outports. They had an antipathy to the offshore sector which 
intensified when offshore vessels trespassed on inshore grounds. Inshore fishers accused 
dragger skippers of destroying gear and fishing grounds. Whatever their reasons, or 
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grievances, the FHRC had difficulty encouraging resettling households to join the 
industrial workforce. Brox found that the problem for Burin Peninsula fish plants was not 
so much a labour shortage, but one of labour instability. He attributed the high turnover 
of plant workers and trawler crews to low wages of fish processing companies and the 
high cost of living in industrial towns.
9
 Brox found that resettlers sometimes preferred to 
move to communities that were more resource poor than the sending community, but in 
which affordable building lots and houses were available. Rural people had an aversion to 
rent and mortgages, and the expenses of urban living. They valued a house more than a 
job; for them home ownership represented security. 
 By 1966 the FHRC realized housing, together with the schools crisis, threatened 
to defeat the goals of the joint resettlement program. Unless they found a solution to the 
housing bottleneck, the FHRP was unlikely to provide sufficient labour to satisfy the 
needs of the fresh fish processing companies. Harnum informed the FHRC that only five 
percent of resettled householders moved houses in the first year of the program and the 
lack of available housing and serviced lots had reached the crisis stage.
10
 Until the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Housing Corporation (NLHC) and the Central Mortgage 
and Housing Corporation (CMHC) made affordable housing available the resettlement 
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program was unlikely to meet the goal of  moving 20,000 people in five years.
11
 Housing 
was blocking the transfer of people from subsistence work into waged activity. 
 Industrialization depended on urbanization, and fish plant operators continued to 
wrestle with the problem of labour instability and shortages. A meeting of the Ministers 
of C&SD, Municipal Affairs and Housing, Education and Highways, together with their 
deputies, projected that the industrial sector would require 3,350 new workers, afloat and 
ashore, to satisfy the needs of the industrial fishery in the last half of the 1960s. They 
anticipated the Burin Peninsula plants alone required at least 2,000 additional workers to 
maximize the profits in the offshore sector. The human resource needs of processing 
companies could not be met until the housing problem was resolved, and most realized 
that a fisher could not replace the house he left behind on a plant worker‟s salary of less 
than $3,000. The full-time offshore fishers, who earned annual salaries in the $4,000 
range could probably afford the mortgage payments on a $15,000 home, but they did not 
need to live in one of the growth centres. At a housing conference in 1966, J. T. Allston, 
Director of Urban and Rural Planning, Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 
emphasized the need to develop  municipal plans that set aside land for sub-divisions. He 
estimated lots could be developed at a cost of $2,000.
12
 A. Vivian, Newfoundland 
commissioner of housing, later head of the NLHC, informed the meeting that CMHC was 
prepared to pay75 percent of the cost of municipal plans and land acquisition and 
development. In addition the Commission would make mortgages available to individuals 
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as well as processing companies that wished to build homes for employees. He suggested 
co-operative housing, shell housing and subsidized rental units were options for keeping 
costs within an affordable range. Vivian informed the government that the price of 
housing was “beyond what the average plant worker can afford, or is prepared to pay.”13 
The idea of salvaging houses from the old community did not enter the discussion. Nor 
did the conference consider in-fill housing as an alternative to assembling and servicing 
land for construction of houses. 
 Vivian emphasised the need to improve counselling services, especially in the 
sending community, to prepare rural people for the shock of urban living and the myriad 
of new expenses they would encounter. He warned that efforts must be made to avoid 
“misunderstandings” that would inhibit the resettlement of households into major growth 
centres where Vivian felt they would be better off.
14
 C. Max Lane seemed more 
preoccupied with the orderly arrangement of houses in the new community than the 
welfare of the relocatees.
15
 Lane stressed the need for an ordered transfer to prevent a 
higgledy-piggledy arrangement that would result if households were permitted to squat 
anywhere.
16
 James Faris‟ study of Cat Harbour and Gerald Pocius‟ work on Calvert 
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demonstrate that coastal communities were more ordered than it appeared to an 
outsider.
17
 
 As early as1966 governments knew that housing was blocking the transfer of 
labour from the inshore to the offshore sector in which economist Parzival Copes alleged 
a trawler crew member could catch enough fish to employ three to four workers on shore. 
In February that year Harnum reminded the Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the danger of 
underestimating the value rural Newfoundlanders placed on home ownership and 
freedom from government regulation. The desire to own a home played a part in the 
decision of many families who left communities in Placentia West to move to the Isthmus 
of Avalon, where employment was doubtful, rather than resettle in the Burin Peninsula 
towns where fish plants were short of workers. Max Lane, Deputy Minister E. M. Gosse, 
and Assistant Deputy Minister Aidan Maloney, and Harnum were aware of the need to 
persuade resettlers into major growth points, but feared giving too much direction would 
expose the FHRP, which they insisted was a voluntary program, to charges that they were 
forcing resettlers to move to the Burin Peninsula. Harnum advised Gosse that any 
overzealous attempt by government bureaucrats to direct householders into a receiving 
community could create a backlash that could jeopardize the success of the program.
18
  
 While Harnum advised bureaucrats to practice restraint, he had no reservations 
about using local power structures to persuade families to move to industrial fisheries 
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bases. Harnum proposed that mayors of growth points, plant managers, and clergy visit 
communities contemplating resettlement in order to apprize them of the benefits of 
moving to a town with modern services and guaranteed employment. The team should 
also inform communities contemplating moving of the availability of serviced and 
unserviced land, as well as information on schools and religious services in the town. By 
using local leaders as point men, Harnum postulated the resettlement division could 
achieve its goal with a minimum of negative publicity. He asked the deputy minister to 
send a letter under the Department of Fisheries letterhead to industry, civic and church 
leaders to enquire as to what they were prepared to do to entice resettlers into their 
towns.
19
 Burin responded by organizing a delegation that included the manager of the 
Fishery Products plant and the Roman Catholic parish priest.
20
 The priest, they believed, 
could persuade people in Catholic communities that they would be better off in Burin 
where they could avail of better spiritual and education services. Aubrey M. Penney 
claimed that “old people and government employees, who knew where their cheque was 
coming from,” blocked moves from Tack‟s Beach to Burin where work was available.21 
 In a letter to Harnum, Augustus (Gus) Etchegary, Vice President of Fishery 
Products Ltd., informed the Resettlement Division of the company‟s need for additional 
workers at both Burin and Trepassey.
22
 He claimed that the labour shortage in the Burin 
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plant was so critical that he threatened to divert Burin-based trawlers to the Maritimes.
23
 
He claimed a shortage of cutters was threatening the viability of the company in all the 
single-industry towns in which Fishery Products operated. Etchegary urged Harnum to 
recruit more workers for Burin and Trepassey, which the company recently converted 
into a year-round operation. The vice-president claimed the difficulty would not exist if 
the government took a more aggressive approach to guide fishermen into industrial 
centres.  
 Etchegary blamed the dire situation on ineffective, or non-existent counselling in 
sending communities. He felt government was not doing enough to make householders 
aware of the procedures for getting resettlement grants or distributing sufficient data on 
employment prospects in growth points to enable those contemplating resettlement to 
make informed decisions. He, and no doubt other industry leaders, believed government 
had an obligation to eliminate confusion by sending a team of officials to explain the 
mechanics of resettlement, availability of grants, and opportunities for employment in 
fisheries growth centres. Etchegary believed a counselling team could discourage 
householders from moving to centres with few employment opportunities and services, 
and encourage families to move to Burin and Trepassey where worker shortages were 
likely to bankrupt the company. He urged Harnum to send a counselling team into the 
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outports before teachers were appointed for the following year. Etchegary feared that if 
householders learned the school would reopen in the fall they might not move that year.
24
 
He asserted that more outports would evacuate if they received more direction from 
resettlement officials. Etchegary referred to a letter he received from a resident of 
Greenspond alleging that four or five households were prepared to move if they “could 
come up with somewhere to go.”25 
  Harnum responded by visiting the Burin Peninsula to survey conditions in the 
growth points and to determine the extent of the labour shortage. Following the tour he 
informed Zeman W. Sametz, Deputy Minister of C&SD, that he had met with 
management of all four fish plants and all claimed that they had reached the “point of 
desperation” in their efforts to maintain a workforce of sufficient strength to operate 
efficiently.
26
 The shortage became even more critical during the winter when trawlermen 
and plant workers, who lived outside the industrial centre, returned home to engage in 
subsistence activities and reunite with families. At Grand Bank Harnum interviewed men 
who each spring left families in Seal Cove, Fortune Bay, to work at the Bonavista Cold 
Storage plant. He reported that 20 of the 21 workers agreed to resettle permanently if 
their houses could be floated to Grand Bank. The Director agreed that plant workers 
could only afford to move permanently if houses were transported and NLHC offered lots 
at a price the low-income plant worker could afford. If the Seal Cove workers were a 
typical sample, then it could be inferred that sentimental attachment to place could be 
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overcome if homes were moved along with the household. To illustrate, Harnum 
informed Sametz that12 of 30 families of Oderin, who indicated to him an interest in 
moving to Marystown and/or Burin, were now resettled in less productive centres, such 
as Rushoon.
27
 
 Harnum returned from the Burin Peninsula convinced that the Department of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing was responsible for the housing debacle, especially at 
Marystown, a town blessed with two industries. He noted that the FHRC had designated 
Marystown, Grand Bank, Burin and Fortune for growth in the winter of 1965, but two 
and one-half years later moves to these centres were being blocked due to the Planning 
Division‟s tardiness in developing a Municipal Plans for those towns. Until the plan was 
completed the local council could not authorized a building permit.
28
 Harnum informed 
Sametz that the Marystown town clerk showed him many applications for building 
permits, but until Municipal Affairs lifted the land freeze, the council‟s hands were tied. 
The Director insisted that Marystown desperately needed land assembled for lot layouts 
to accommodate both new and relocated homes. At Burin Fishery Products attempted to 
mitigate the crisis by constructing bunkhouses. At its best, this was a temporary solution.  
 Management knew bunkhouses would not solve the high rate of worker turnover, 
eliminate absenteeism or the custom of returning home for the winter. This seasonal ritual 
was part of an established routine in rural Newfoundland and should not be misconstrued 
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as laziness or an aversion to the discipline of wage labour.
29
 Historian Steve High 
attributed the high rate of worker turnover at Argentia to a desire to maintain a traditional 
culture, rather than “a general disposition to continuous work,” or an inclination to 
hibernate each winter.
30
 There was a dearth of defenders of a pluralistic economy or a 
fishery centred in household production, but rural Newfoundlanders continued to practice 
it because families with limited savings could not afford basic necessities in an urban 
setting on a plant worker‟s wages. 
 If the integrated trawler-processing companies experienced difficulties attracting 
and keeping workers, then higher wages appeared to be a solution. But the companies 
claimed profit margins were low due to Scandinavian and European countries dumping 
fish in US markets. An increase in labour costs would drive them out of business. If one 
accepts this as true, then the only solution was low-cost public housing or larger 
supplementary grants to compensate for the high cost of living in urban centres. Unless a 
creative solution to the housing problem emerged, resettlers would continue to flock to 
organized reception centres where there were fewer amenities, and opportunities to 
improve their condition were minimal. The majority of residents of Tack‟s Beach 
rejected offers of employment in Burin and elected to move to Arnold‟s Cove, a 
community with cheaper land and a lower cost of living. Burin had modern amenities and 
schools to accommodate the children, but households preferred to relocate to a place 
which was a terminus for the privately operated ferry from Tack‟s Beach. It was a 
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convenient location for commuting workers, and brought the elderly and disabled closer 
to medical services. For the employed, the disabled, and the retired, employment was a 
non-issue. Those who wished to remain in the fishery, like Millicent and Frank Best, had 
the option, inconvenient as it was, to return to old fishing rooms at Tack‟s Beach to fish 
in an evacuated outport with no services.
31
 
 One disgruntled relocatee told Harnum that old people, government employees, 
and the merchants conspired to prevent fishermen from moving to growth centres, but 
claimed women were mainly responsible for the decision to move to Arnold‟s Cove, a 
place where there was “only welfare and no work.”32 If one of the goals of resettlement 
was to transform a “peasant-level society into a market-oriented industrial one” as 
sociologists claimed, the architects of the program would have to overcome the 
psychological, economic and social barriers that blocked their engineering project.
33
 
Economist Michael Skolnik proposed that while industrialization necessitated 
centralization, reduction of communities would not necessarily lead to industrialization.
34
 
He correctly argued that without a program of education and training the transition to an 
urban industrial society would be bumpy. 
 One Federal Department of Fisheries bureaucrat seemed satisfied that the 
“benefits of resettlement would be felt in the next generation.”35 A. W. Needler, 
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Chairman of the Federal/Provincial Advisory Committee, stated that the primary purpose 
of federal fisheries department‟s participation in the FHRP was to oversee a program of 
fisheries development that would make fishers more mobile. Needler contended that 
planners could not have predicted the problems in housing and education that arose from 
resettlement. He did not explain why the planners did not foresee that relocation of 
20,000 persons in a five year period would lead to a school and hosing crisis. Needler 
stated the objectives of the program were: “to help people adjust their income and raise 
the standard of living; to benefit the next generation; and to make the fishing industry 
more viable.”36 These were noble goals but were difficult to achieve without greater state 
coercion. No doubt the incomes of many resettlers improved, but disposable income 
actually declined due to elimination of subsistence activities such as gathering firewood 
and agriculture. Many households chose reception centres that had better transportation 
and medical services, but few opportunities to change occupations. 
 “We have,” Smallwood wrote Lester Pearson, “an anomalous situation in which 
there are large numbers of unemployed and underemployed people [in isolated outports] 
and at the same time unmet labour demands [in growth poles].”37 Brox found little 
evidence of fishermen moving from trapskiffs to draggers, or improvements in standard 
of living.
38
 Inshore fishermen, accustomed to having the freedom to decide if the 
conditions were suitable for fishing and comforted by the thought they would spend each 
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night safe in their own home, did not find the prospect of spending up to two weeks at 
sea, in all kinds of weather, very appealing.
39
 Nonetheless, there were exceptions. For 
example, Brox reported that some former residents of Tack‟s Beach were aboard Burin 
draggers in the winter of 1968, but most of the ethnographic studies found that resettlers 
preferred to move short distances to places that offered them opportunities to continue in 
the inshore sector using old fishing grounds.
40
 Brox proposed that fishermen took 
advantage of the program to pressure government to expend funds on useless moves. 
 Social anthropologist Cato Wadel recommended planners introduce a new 
program to keep community evacuations to a minimum by supporting innovation in 
situ.
41
 The FHRC dismissed the social scientists as romantics and one Committee 
member, W. L. Mackenzie of the federal Department of Fisheries and Forestry, accused 
Brox and Wadel of wishing to keep the outports in a static state to preserve them for 
future study.
42
 Zeman Sametz claimed Brox, Wadel and Dyke exaggerated the economic 
benefits of subsistence activities and minimized the cumulative effect of community 
closures. For example, the resettlement of isolated communities in Placentia Bay cut the 
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cost of providing coastal boat service to a minimum in the space of two years. The 
Committee confined its comments on the Iverson and Matthews report to a single 
statement. It alleged that the decision to combine data from two programs skewed their 
report. In contrast, the Committee considered reports prepared by economists A. L. Robb 
and R. E. Robb,
43
 and Parzival Copes, to be more rational, objective and accurate.
44
 
Sametz criticized the sociological reports for ignoring the economic benefits of releasing 
youth to the labour force, but youth left rural regions without state intervention. 
Smallwood dismissed the sociological studies as useless and denounced reports that 
accused government of cultural genocide. 
45
 
 The Director of Programs for the Atlantic Region, G. E. McClure, wondered 
whether resettlement should be one of several development strategies or if government 
would continue to make it a central piece. The Committee concluded that the FHRP was 
producing beneficial results in three respects: first, it had made a significant improvement 
in the economy of the province; second, economic, social and cultural benefits accrued to 
the participants; and the evacuation of isolated communities had helped eradicate 
illiteracy that was linked to poverty.
46
 In his closing remarks, Needler acknowledged that 
resettlement had been slowed by inadequate infrastructure and lack of employment in 
reception centres. The fisheries scientist refuted the claims of economists who purported 
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fishing vessels over 100 feet were the most productive and efficient. He pointed out 
vessels less than 75 feet landed half of the total catch for Canada. Paradoxically, he 
cautioned fisheries development experts not to rush into resettlement or neglect the 
inshore. Earlier in the conference he proposed reducing the number of inshore fishermen 
by 50 percent. Needler concluded his address by predicting the resettlement program 
should continue to eliminate illiteracy and to lay the foundation for a modern fishery.
47
   
 Copes‟ main criticism of the FHRP was that it did not go far enough. He criticized 
Smallwood for restricting the program to assisting moves within the province, arguing 
that moving people from one unviable area to another did not improve the provincial 
economy or produce more productive citizens.
48
 His study, which was principally an 
analysis of the inshore fishing economy, criticised the FHRC for not directing 
householders into major fishery growth points, where a labour shortage threatened to 
destroy the fisheries development plan.
49
 He proposed that the resettlement program 
should assist multiple moves in order to orient households to wage work in 
Newfoundland, and after they had acquired the necessary skills, and were orientated to 
industrial work, they should be assisted to relocate to Ontario and Alberta.
50
 Brox, Wadel 
and Skolnik considered the FHRP too intrusive, but Copes criticized the FHRP for not 
being more interventionist.    
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 Ralph Matthews challenged Copes‟ study, claiming Copes produced a biassed 
study which denegrated the inshore fishery without subjecting the offshore sector to the 
same degree of scrutiny. He produced data to demonstrate the dependence of shore 
fishers on social welfare, but downplayed the dependence of fish companies on 
government supports. Matthews wondered how viable the offshore fishery would be if 
the government eliminated the massive program of subsidies paid out for construction of 
plants and trawlers.
51
 Alexander calculated that between 1949 and 1970 the state 
extended $40 million in loans and grants to the offshore sector most of which were never 
repaid.   
 Novelist Farley Mowat questioned the merits of resettlement on humanitarian 
grounds. He accused resettlement planners of “unsettling the mind and distressing the 
spirit” of communities while promising rural people a utopian lifestyle in a growth centre. 
In his narrative, outport people, succumbing to the overtures of resettlement officials, 
concluded that they had to trade the deprived life of a fishing community for the “good 
life” in a growth centre. Mowat rejected the claims of “apostles of instant change” who 
professed centralization was the best means to improve quality of life and standard of 
living: 
The entrepreneurs of the new industries wanted labour and they wanted it cheap. The 
outport people had to be induced - and if not induced, then forced - to abandon the ways 
of the world they knew. The government reduced services and let them run down and 
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then devised a centralization plan to induce them to move to growth centres where no 
jobs exist and young men have to move to central Canada.
52
 
 
Mowat, who lived in a fisheries growth centre in the 1960s, acknowledged that Burgeo 
had increased in population, but he considered it a dying community unable to employ 
the current population.
53
 The journalist Ray Guy shared Mowat‟s belief that the 
resettlement program forced families from pristine productive environments into slums.
54
 
These renowned authors railed against the resettlement program and its promoters. Guy 
attacked Smallwood and his officials for considering outports to be beyond the realm of 
civilization, ignoring cultural values and treating people as pawns to be moved at the will 
of distant governments.
55
  
 While such attacks affected public opinion and embarrassed politicians, it 
diminished the role played by locals, as we shall see in subsequent chapters. The 
evacuation of King‟s Island and Long Island, Placentia Bay, for example, remains 
controversial, but the fact is the residents of Tack‟s Beach, Best‟s Harbour, Broad Cove 
and Harbour Buffett insisted on resettling to the isthmus where a freeze on development 
was in effect. They pressured the Resettlement Committee to approve Come-by-Chance, 
Arnold‟s Cove, Southern Harbour, and Little Harbour West as organized reception 
centres. Similarly, Placentia West families refused to relocate until government agreed to 
relocate them to Rushoon from which fishers could continue to fish the old grounds.
56
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The families of Port Elizabeth mounted such strong opposition to resettling to Marystown 
and Burin that they forced government leaders to re-open Red Harbour, an evacuated 
outport.
57
 The householders of Port Elizabeth, backed by their merchant, clergy, and 
community council, pressured the provincial and national governments to build a new 
community, thus contravening the principles of resettlement. 
 People refused to move to the fisheries growth centres or other industrial towns 
within the province for many reasons. Land freezes, the price of building lots, the 
attachment to home ownership, their aversion to taxes, mortgages and rent, all combined 
with a reluctance of fishers to change occupations were obstacles in the road to 
modernity. The administrators of resettlement realized that fishers, turned plant workers, 
could not carry a mortgage on a home in a growth centre even with supplementary 
assistance.
58
 In Ottawa the Special Planning Unit in the Privy Council Office opined that 
the state had never invested in privately owned housing. However, cabinet did approve 
lot supplementary mortgages, which were described in the previous chapter. 
 Until government solved the housing crisis, the labour shortage in the offshore 
fisheries bases would continue to put the modernization program at risk. Premier 
Smallwood expressed his concerns in a letter to the Prime Minister.
59
 He alleged that 
unless the housing problem in the industrial fishing ports could resolved, the whole 
fisheries development initiative would crumble. The Frozen Fish Trades Association, 
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Ltd. presented a brief to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing outlining 
difficulties the housing shortage presented for the frozen fish trade.
60
 Responding to 
appeals from the Association, and reports from the Director of Resettlement 
acknowledging that plant workers could not afford houses built to national standards, the 
governments decided to provide supplementary assistance to householders who moved 
into major fisheries growth centres. In 1967 Canada and Newfoundland negotiated 
improvements to the Agreement that included payment of supplementary grants to offset 
the high cost of building lots in urban growth centres and thereby reduce the cost of home 
ownership. The Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing estimated an average plant 
worker could only sustain a debt load equivalent to half the cost of  a house constructed 
to national standards on a serviced lot while older workers could sustain even less.
61
 
 CMHC and NLHC began assembling land in Burin, Grand Bank, Fortune and 
Marystown to free the bottleneck. At Burin the rugged landscape in the town and a land 
freeze at Marystown restricted housing development. In March 1969 the Daily News 
reported NLHC had completed 20 new homes and Fishery Products, Ltd. was in the 
process of constructing an additional 12 in Black Duck Cove subdivision at Burin.
62
 In 
addition six Port Elizabethan homes were set up in the subdivision.
63
 Similar 
developments took place in other growth points, but the municipal councils of Fortune 
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and Grand Bank passed a by-law prohibiting placement of houses salvaged from vacated 
communities in subdivisions within their town boundaries. The towns advised C&SD 
officials that they would continue to welcome new resettlers on condition they purchased 
or rented existing units, or built new ones.
64
  
 In the summer of 1969 several families from Rencontre West became the first 
casualties of this municipal-imposed embargo. According to R. Hatcher, the Anglican 
parish priest, the regional development officer made a commitment to move their houses 
to Fortune, and have them ready for occupancy. However, the priest alleged the resettlers 
arrived in the town with no one to greet them and no place to live.
65
 The town council 
was not prepared to receive any more houses unless a representative of council inspected 
the houses in the sending community. In 1974 the town of Grand Bank informed Harnum 
that they, too, would not accept any more units from the inventory of salvaged houses 
until the town clerk verified the condition of homes.
66
 The by-laws passed by Grand 
Bank and Fortune councils resulted in part from a decreasing demand for plant workers 
due to depressed US markets.
67
 The situation had changed drastically from the heady 
days of 1966 when Harnum informed the Minister of Fisheries that “reliable sources” 
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anticipated that Booth Fisheries would need a total of 400 new plant workers and 
trawlermen.
68
 Buoyed by this report, Harnum urged the town of Fortune to assemble land 
for a layout of 400 lots to accommodate new families. 
 In the same year Arthur H. Monroe, owner of Fishery Products Ltd., advised the 
Burin MHA, Alex Hickman that due to a shortage of plant workers and the high rate of 
absenteeism he had decided not to expand the trawler fleet for the Burin plant.
69
 Monroe 
complained that the shortage of filleters and the high rate of absenteeism threatened the 
viability of the Burin plant.
70
 His second grievance was against trawler crews who 
refused to sail before new year‟s day. Monroe informed Alex Hickman that in previous 
years the first dragger had left port on Boxing Day. He complained crews now refused to 
leave port before New Year‟s Day. The company owner displayed no empathy for men 
(they were all men) who had a forty-eight hour turnaround period between trips. 
Trawlermen were co-adventurers who sometimes spent a hazardous ten to fourteen days 
at sea without earning enough to pay the expenses. 
71
 Similarly if management decided 
the catch literally did not pass a smell test, the full load was sent to the meal plant without 
any remuneration for the crew. Awareness of these conditions combined with loss of life 
at sea discouraged inshore fishers. The deck of a trawler was a hazardous workplace, and 
during the winter months the dangers increased. The loss of the Blue Wave and the Blue 
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Mist in 1959 and 1966, respectively, further discouraged participation in the deep-sea 
fishery.
72
  
 Monroe, apparently, saw no relationship between working conditions and the 
company‟s struggle to recruit and retain workers, or that the hazards of the offshore 
fishery deterred resettlers from manning trawlers. Fishery Products, which paid slightly 
more than the industry average, could have reduced absenteeism and attracted new 
employees by adopting more humane practices and paying higher wages.
73
 Monroe chose 
to blame the company‟s labour problems on its Marystown competitor, Atlantic Fish 
Processors, Ltd.
74
 He contended the competition for labour in a market where there were 
“at least two jobs for every man” drove up labour costs and reduced productivity. The 
plant owner also claimed that NLHC ignored housing needs of Burin, Grand Bank and 
Fortune and directed all resources to building new subdivisions in Marystown. He wrote 
that Atlantic Fish had made the labour situation so unstable that management had been 
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forced to employ 700 different persons in 1966 to maintain a workforce of 300.
75
 Monroe 
advised the Burin District MHA that until government addressed the housing problem, 
labour instability would continue to plague the industry. Monroe refused to recognize low 
wages and sub-standard working conditions as one cause of Fishery Products‟ labour and 
low worker productivity. Monroe accused government of wrecking an organization that 
had been operating for 20 years by constructing a competing plant at Marystown. The 
Vice-President of Trawler Procurement, Gus Etchegary, attacked government for denying 
Burin an opportunity to benefit from the resettlement program by concentrating housing 
developments in Marystown.
76
 He implied government was willing to put the Burin plant 
at risk by diverting labour to Marystown to ensure the viability of the crown-owned plant. 
 Executives of Bonavista Cold Storage and Booth Fisheries also complained that 
shortage of affordable housing hindered labour recruitment and stability. At a public 
meeting attended by representatives from C&SD and the Department of Municipal 
Affairs and Housing, Booth Fisheries plant manager, H. Maugher, stressed the need to 
assemble and develop more lots. Maugher reported that 75 percent of the company‟s 
trawlermen, and 55 percent of all employees commuted.
77
 Like Etchegary, he believed 
that his company would benefit more from the FHRP if Municipal Affairs made more 
housing units available. He also anticipated that improved harbour facilities would entice 
more inshore fishers and longliner operators to relocate to Fortune and contribute to the 
profitability of Booth Fisheries by allowing the company to reopen lines shut down due 
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to lack of fish.
78
 He contended that the resettlement program became counter-productive 
when it removed fishers from traditional fishing grounds. Maugher suggested that the 
government should outfit resettled shore fishers with longliners to permit them to return 
to fish the abandoned grounds. The plant manager also suggested that the high cost of 
purchasing stern trawlers, plus the cost of fuel and trawl nets, made the draggers less 
efficient than smaller inshore and near-shore vessels.
79
 He reported that 85 local and 
relocated fisher supplied one-eighth of total output of the Fortune plant. Maugher hoped 
government would improve harbour facilities to make room for more inshore fishers. It 
was very rare to hear an executive of the industrial fishery trumpet the benefits of 
preserving the inshore sector. The council estimated Fortune would needed  fifty houses 
to meet immediate demand.
80
 The council informed the C&SD that eight families of 
Parson‟s Harbour inquired about building lots, but only two were available. Council was 
trying to make arrangements for the other six households. The town also considered the 
price of serviced lots to be beyond the means of householders who did not qualify for 
maximum lot supplementary assistance.  
 Government‟s decision to not make supplementary grants retroactive generated 
discontent among resettlers and discouraged moves to industrial towns. The vacancy rate 
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in an NLHC subdivision in Fortune was nearly 50 percent in 1970.
81
 Sametz stated that 
only a fraction of the 60 families resettled to Fortune could afford the serviced lots.
82
 
Maugher reported that unless 85 percent of Booth Fisheries employees lived in Fortune, 
plant efficiency would suffer.
83
 Plant managers in Fortune, Grand Bank and Burin looked 
askance at Marystown and questioned why that town should benefit so much from 
resettlement. 
 While municipal councils and plant managers complained that Marystown 
received a disproportionate number of housing units, government officials considered the 
investment justified. The Burin Peninsula study reported that the majority of Marystown 
had the potential to accommodate a population of 8,000.
84
 Marystown had no municipal 
services or industry prior to construction of the fish plant and shipyard.
85
 In 1966 the 
Provincial Planning Office projected a need to develop 1,350 new building lots to 
accommodate workers. 
 Correspondence between Atlantic Fish executives and Newfoundland‟s Fisheries 
Minister reveals that Marystown, too, had housing problems. Atlantic Fish Processors 
advised Maloney, that the rents charged for NLHC units were “unrealistic” and beyond 
the means of production workers as they amounted to 40 percent of incomes.
86
 J. M. 
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Roberts also reminded the minister that Atlantic Sugar Refining leased the plant from 
Mooring Cove Building Company, Ltd. on condition a trained labour force be in place by 
1 February 1967.
87
 He  attributed labour instability, shortages and discontent amongst 
workers to the high cost of housing in the town. Roberts reminded Albert Vivian that 
very few families moving from the 80 outports resettled in 1967 had relocated to 
Marystown.
88
 He warned that the housing situation would become critical when the 
company‟s lease on trailers housing key personnel expired. Many fish cutters, the most 
skilled production workers, lived in a temporary bunkhouse, or commuted from 
considerable distances daily. Like all company management, he argued the housing crisis 
jeopardized company plans to increase processing and harvesting capacity. Roberts 
alleged the cost of housing was driving Marystown Seafood Workers Union to demand 
unrealistic wage increases at a time when the plant was operating at only 50 percent 
capacity.
89
  
 Roberts also accused NLHC of discriminatory housing practices. He claimed that 
NLHC gave preference to employees of Marystown Marine Works and denied housing to 
Atlantic Fish personnel on the same terms. Roberts asked NLHC to reserve a minimum 
of 100 low rental apartments to accommodate production workers who were forced to 
live apart from families. Unless the housing corporation mitigated the housing crisis 
Roberts contended the recruiting team, which included the plant manager and 
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representatives of C&SD and Canada Manpower, would have limited success. He urged 
Maloney to immediately press into service the motorized barge, which was undergoing 
conversion at the Marystown shipyard. The company executive also asked government to 
investigate the possibility of using heavy-lift helicopters to transport homes.
90
 
 Roberts‟ allegation of class discrimination may have been based on the ordering 
of housing in the subdivision. Shipyard management, many of whom were from the UK, 
occupied the largest homes at low rental rates. They were set along a street well away 
from apartment buildings housing plant workers. Adjacent to the apartment blocks were 
clusters of row houses that encompassed three floors with a small backyard covered in 
concrete. Detached bungalows were purchased, or rented, by teachers and other 
professionals in the town. Most preferred to live some distance from the blocks where the 
tenants formed an underclass of unemployed and underemployed workers. The cars on 
blocks in front of apartment buildings gave the subdivision a slum-like atmosphere.
91
 
 The Director of Resettlement was aware of the critical housing shortage in 
fisheries growth centres. Harnum informed Sametz that housing was the main obstacle to 
recruiting workers for Burin Peninsula plants.
92
 The Director recommended that C&SD 
should take steps to solve the crisis by permitting infilling, assembling land, assisting 
with financing where necessary, and possibly hiring its own planning consultant to 
provide a simple layout appropriate to the reception centre. Harnum recommended 
constructing houses below national standards as a way to reduce cost. Aware plant 
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employees could not afford homes built to CMHC standards, he proposed C&SD 
encourage town councils to participate in a “realistic plan” that took into account tenants‟ 
wages.
93
 In 1967 government and industry understood that the movement of coastal 
people into industrial fisheries bases on a large scale depended on solving the housing 
crisis. In 1968 the motorized government barge went int service in Placentia Bay to 
salvage homes from abandoned communities. 
  In response to memos from Harnum and complaints from company executives, 
Sametz met with Atlantic Fish managers to discuss the labour shortage. Roberts reminded 
Sametz of the terms of the lease agreement which placed onus on the province to develop 
a town site large enough to ensure Atlantic Fish 650 trained workers. At the end of 1967 
the company was short 200 workers, and critically short of cutters, 80 percent of whom 
commuted. Roberts gave the Deputy Minister an ultimatum: “Either we get the workers 
or we have to close the doors.”94 He told Sametz that Atlantic Fish was losing money 
and, unlike Fishery Products and John Penney & Sons, had no intention of getting into 
the housing business. Atlantic Fish, headquartered in Toronto, made it clear it was a 
problem for government to solve.  
 Shortly after the meeting with executives of Atlantic Fish Processors, Sametz 
proposed the following: NLHC make available on a subsidized rental basis housing for 
Atlantic Fish staff, and, to avoid further charges of discrimination, government should 
adopt a consistent subsidization policy for employees of the shipyard and the fish plant; 
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that NLHC must either induce the town to set up a trailer park or undertake one 
immediately; the temporary bunkhouse should continue to exist as a shelter for single 
workers, or as a temporary shelter for married workers; that the land freeze should be 
lifted and land assembled to permit housing to be built to adequate Newfoundland 
standards, possibly prefab or shell housing; and an interdepartmental committee be 
established to co-ordinate the effort.
95
  
 In March1968 the Provincial Planning Office presented C&SD with a residential 
infilling plan for Marystown.
96
 Harnum was anxious to have the lots prepared 
immediately to receive houses from Petit Forte, Monkstown, Southeast Bight and Port 
Elizabeth. He feared these communities would move into smaller growth centres with 
fewer opportunities for employment than the industrial towns of the Burin Peninsula.
97
 
C&SD, anxious to dissuade the householders of Port Elizabeth, the majority of whom 
intended to move to Red Harbour, convinced cabinet to order NLHC to set aside at 
Marystown land “on the basis of infilling, to accommodate houses relocated from 
communities under the FHRP.”98 The executive order loosened the log jam. Between 
January and October of 1968, the FHRP assisted 50 household moves to Marystown.
99
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But until the land freeze was lifted, the authority to approve building permits for 
Marystown resided in St. John‟s. 
 The Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing denied reports that it was 
responsible for slowing rate of resettlement at Marystown. Vivian informed Sametz that 
the NLHC had assembled sufficient serviced and unserviced land, but few householders 
were willing to pay $500 for an unserviced lot.
100
 He reminded Sametz that in a span of 
18 months 70 families had relocated to Marystown, 50 of whom received assistance 
under the resettlement program.
101
 He hinted that lack of information in the sending 
communities prevented resettlers from making informed decisions on choice of growth 
centre. The NLHC CEO contended that the Resettlement Division needed to eliminate 
confusion in the sending communities by making applicants more aware of the 
opportunities available in the major growth centres.
102
 He reported that all NLHC rental 
units were occupied as soon as they became available, but did not indicate how many 
tenants were resettled fish plant workers.
103
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 By mid-1969 the press reported that the construction boom arising from the new 
industries was about to collapse.
104
 After the Marystown Marine Works completed the 
last two trawlers for Atlantic Fish, work at the yard dwindled to refit and repair. Shipyard 
workers faced an uncertain future.
105
 Reports persisted that the plant remained 
unprofitable due to soft markets. When rumour of the sale of two of the company‟s 
trawlers to BC Packers surfaced, it created so much anxiety that the President of the 
Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen visited Marystown to reassure workers.
106
 
 There were signs that the Marystown economy had crested. The Evening 
Telegram reported that 100 of 260 housing units were vacant in the summer of 1969, the 
highest vacancy rate per capita in Canada.
107
 An NLHC spokesperson explained that the 
high turnover rate in the rental units resulted from a policy that allowed each householder 
up to18 months from the moving date to apply for resettlement grants.
108
 Presumably, 
some householders, who were unprepared for the expenses of urban living such as  rent, 
mortgages, and municipal taxes, or the monotony of assembly line work, left Marystown. 
Other families used resettlement grants and lot supplementaries to construct or purchase 
homes. 
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   The high vacancy rate at Marystown caught the attention of mayors and industry 
leaders. Reports indicated all units at Fortune, Grand Bank and Burin were occupied and 
there was a waiting list. At Burin the 20 NLHC  houses and the 12 units built by Fishery 
Products were occupied.
109
 The barge also transported six houses to Black Duck Cove 
from Port Elizabeth. Port Elizabethan families, who left a community wherein people had 
a reputation for industriousness and independence, found themselves living in the midst 
of a welfare community. The town council of Grand Bank informed the Telegram that the 
NLHC units in their town only satisfied half the demand. He declared that the barge was 
confined to Marystown while serviced lots at Grand Bank remained empty. The council 
denounced government for constructing surplus units in Marystown while labour 
shortages at Bonavista Cold Storage hampered the firm‟s efforts to maximize 
production.
110
 The decision of the towns of Fortune and Grand Bank to pass by-laws to 
bar salvaged houses from the towns‟ subdivisions, at a time when fish companies were 
hiring high-school students to bolster production lines exacerbated the labour problems of 
Booth Fisheries and Bonavista Cold Storage. The town councils‟ assurance that they 
would continue to welcome new settlers rang hollow. 
 It would be an oversimplification to argue that affordable housing was the only 
reason for shortage of labour in the plants. That was also partly due to gender bias in the 
organization of production.
111
 Until the mid-1970s packaging was the domain of female 
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workers who were valued for their digital dexterity.
112
 Males monopolized the cutting 
room and all jobs that involved the use of machinery and knives. Social norms, which 
management and unions accepted in the 1960s, defined women‟s work as unskilled and 
restricted female access to skilled work. Union leaders and plant managers were 
complicit in negotiating gendered spaces and reserving the highest paid jobs for the male 
breadwinner. In the 1960s the notion of giving a knife to a female to fillet or trim fish 
required a commitment by management to trespass into the masculine sphere. 
Consequently female skills remained undervalued and underutilised in a workplace where 
an all-male management team and male union heads continued to consider women 
temporary workers whose careers as a paid workers would end at marriage.
113
 Low pay, a 
lack benefits and mind-numbing work, performed in a cold, wet environment while 
standing at a station for the full eight to ten hour shift six days per week, contributed to 
the high turnover of workers. Ray Guy described horrendous working conditions in a 
shrimp plant in Port au Choix where women did most of the processing.
114
 Guy was 
struck by the “acrid smells of formaldehyde” and the hot steamy environment in which 
workers laboured. After leaving the Dickensian atmosphere of the plant, he observed 
women spreading fish on a flake in the wholesome gulf air. He questioned why fisheries 
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planners, who condemned work on the fish flake, condoned women toiling in the hot, 
steamy environment of a shrimp processing plant: “This is the soul-destroying drudgery 
... the backbreaking dehumanizing slavery out of which we are to be dragged kicking and 
screaming.” He wondered “what would you call the rows of shrouded women sitting 
amid the acrid formaldehyde hour after hour, day after day in the shrimp plant at Port au 
Choix ... if this is the future let the devil come and take us now.”115  
 The men who toiled on the decks of draggers chopping ice from the 
superstructure and battling hurricanes had a dangerous workplace. The cruellest trick of 
all was not played by nature but by a regime that sent the offshore fisherman back to his 
family without a pay cheque. Knowledge of these conditions was enough to keep the sons 
in the trapskiff and his daughters out of the plant. Predictably, many householders 
shunned the dragger and the plant. They chose a destination in which they could continue 
to live in their own houses, fish old grounds, and send their children to school to prepare 
them for a career outside the fishery. In this sense education became a barrier as few high 
school graduates crossed the threshold of the plant as full-time permanent production 
workers. Male graduates of technical colleges entered the plant as engineers, electricians, 
quality control technicians and office workers. These trades were dominated by long-time 
residents of growth centres and newcomers had limited access to more specialized jobs. 
Wright pointed out that graduates of the Fisheries College, who were mostly male, opted 
to work aboard non-fishing vessels where they were guaranteed a pay cheque and decent 
working conditions.
116
 Fisheries planners who considered women unsuitable for technical 
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trades did not encourage females to enter trades programs at either the College of 
Fisheries or District Vocational Schools. In the 1960s most women worked in fish plants 
to bridge the gap between school-leaving and marriage. As a married woman she was 
expected to trade the world of wage labour for the private sphere of unpaid labour. 
 Civil servants, captains of industry, and spiritual leaders, who promised 
everything from social and economic rewards to greater access to God, failed to dissuade 
households from moving to the nearest reception centre that offered little more than a 
road connection to the provincial highway system. After a thorough study of community 
resettlement files, the author can state, with confidence, that a majority of shore 
fishermen had no intention of switching to the offshore fishery after the move. Most 
petitioners wished to move to a familiar place, close enough to the old community to fish 
the old grounds utilizing abandoned fishing rooms.
117
  
 Government commissioned studies of coastal regions affirmed householders‟ 
reluctance to enter the world of North American consumerism. W. A. Black‟s study of 
the northwest coast, suggested lack of desire for consumer goods and services left the 
people content with their meagre lot and reduced their expectations.
118
 Black concluded 
that mechanization and a switch of production from family processing units to vertically 
integrated companies was the only way to transform a relief dependent industry into a 
viable commercial enterprise. Sociologist Peter Sinclair suggested that a population 
“resigned to a life of unchanging toil” was more likely to remain committed to an 
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economy based on domestic commodity production. He argued that uneducated domestic 
commodity producers lacked the skills to compete for jobs in a capitalist economy while 
Sinclair and Mannion contended they were not prepared to break with tradition.
119
  
 Copes proposed a very simple solution to the productivity problem that plagued 
the Newfoundland industry: reduce the number of inshore fishermen by transferring them 
to the offshore sector, and after a period of orientation to the market economy, resettle 
them to the mainland.
120
 Bates, the Walsh Report, Cheeseman, Black and Copes agreed 
antiquated methods must be discarded, and a highly capitalized and mechanized 
corporate fishery must be developed in its place. They proposed a program of 
specialization and modernization, but more specifically they believed it was necessary to 
change habits and attitudes toward work. The Pushie Royal Commission Report quoted a 
recommendation an international development agency made for economic development 
in Kenya: 
The most important factor in the process is the speed with which people adapt 
themselves ... to changing conditions. A bulldozer can move trees and earth but 
not ideas and habits. Development will not take place unless enough people and 
their leaders are prepared to make changes in their habits, attitudes and thinking 
necessary to achieve the end.
121
 
 
 Cold statistical data supported the arguments of economists, but humans are 
complex beings who refuse to have their lives reduced to a balance sheet. Families 
accustomed to surviving in a pluralistic economy, propped up by social welfare 
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programs, were not willing to become year-round fishers aboard deep sea draggers or 
accept low-paid, demeaning work in a fish plant.
122
 They did not share the values of the 
architects of the FHRP and when resettlement bureaucrats came calling they rejected 
their pleas to join the ranks of industrial workers who toiled daily to rise above the 
poverty line. 
 Iverson and Matthews concluded that one of several obstacles that inhibited the 
implementation of the FHRP was the ingrained values of the subjects. The sociologists 
and Black agreed that inshore fishers possessed neither the ability, nor the ambition, to 
break out of a peasant subsistence economy which lent itself to poverty and 
unemployment.
123
 Experts tended to paint in broad strokes and ignore local differences. 
Taken together the ethnographic studies created a distorted picture of life in a rural 
Newfoundland village. 
 In There‟s No Better Place Than Here, Matthews defended the traditional outport 
economy.
124
 He stressed the importance of assessing a community‟s social vitality, and 
adopted a gentler tone than appeared in the co-authored government commissioned study, 
Communities in Decline, in which he described outport people as apathetic and 
powerless. In the latter study Matthews described socially vibrant and proactive 
communities that challenged patriarchal power structures. Gerald Pocius debunked the 
simplistic dichotomous image of the outport family in his work on Calvert. The folklorist 
argued the outports were not always static, conservative havens weighed down by 
tradition. Pocius found in Calvert a forward-looking population that embraced the most 
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modern styles in furniture, glassware and flatware as soon as it became available and they 
had the means to buy it.
125
 
 Resettlers of Placentia Bay made decisions based on the limited information they 
knew about the growth centre and the industrial fishery. The majority of them said “no” 
to the company manager and the bureaucrat who tried to put them on the deck of a 
trawler or on a production line of a fish plant. In the mid-1960s the average age in the 
communities rose and the average level of education fell due to an exodus of high school 
graduates and young families who were assisted by the FHRP or the Canada Manpower 
Mobility Program. The out-migration of the most educated undermined the social 
integrity and long-term economic viability of coastal communities. The older residents, 
although unsettled by the departure of the young people, did not wish to abandon the life 
that they knew, or forfeit real property to the crown. The FHRP covered the cost of 
moving equipment to the new community, but the resettlers knew it was futile to move 
fishing gear, accumulated over a lifetime, into a subdivision without storage space or 
access to harbour facilities. Places such as Rushoon, Red Harbour, and Arnold‟s Cove 
were logical choices for older inshore fishermen who would find it difficult to compete 
for job in industrial centres.  
 My thesis challenges the usual narrative that the state hounded relocatees into 
submission. I argue that the people used foot dragging and evasion in addition to more 
proactive measures to negotiate moves. Resettler strategies of resistance did not ignite 
riots or incite people to do violence to state officials or property. Rarely did they make 
news headlines, but their low-key tactics were effective. Coastal people proved they were 
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still a strong political force despite the declining population. Copes theorized that 
fishermen held the balance of power in many districts and Smallwood regularly altered 
district boundaries to ensure that fishermen‟s vote continued to decide elections.126 If the 
Premier knew coastal people were his power base, then evacuation of outports was akin 
to political suicide. 
 Shortage of alternative employment kept householders in a trade that reports of 
several enquiries and commissions denounced as unproductive, medieval or archaic. 
These studies gradually, along with the decline of the salt fish trade, made the existence 
of many outports appear irrational and strengthened the conviction of planners that 
centralization and modernization of the fishery was necessary. The appearance of foreign 
fishing fleets, supported by factory freezer trawlers forced Ottawa to increase the 
Canadian fleet in order to capture a larger share of the catch off Canada‟s Atlantic coast, 
and amass a labour force to make the industrial offshore sector viable. 
 By the 1960s intense fishing in the Northwest Atlantic proved catastrophic for the 
expanding inshore sector. Fisheries planners in St. John‟s and Ottawa introduced 
programs to modernize the offshore and the inshore fisheries. Modernization of both 
sectors required centralization. While Newfoundland has a heavily indented coastline, 
few harbours could accommodate draggers or longliners without expensive harbour 
improvements. Due to the limited number of ports suitable for handling larger vessels, 
longliner crews were under pressure to relocate to a larger centre thus diminishing the 
viability of the home community. When the remaining families concluded that they had 
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to leave a dying community, they pressured government to approve moves that fisheries 
planners and the resettlement division considered counterproductive. But to the 
householders of Point Rosie who chose Garnish over Grand Bank, or the families of 
Oderin who opted for Rushoon over Marystown, it all made sense. 
 The superordinate goal of the FHRP was to amass labour in offshore fisheries 
bases, but it was challenged and contested by coastal people who forced planners to 
compromise.
127
 For example, when the FHRC approved moves from Tack‟s Beach to 
Arnold‟s Cove and Harbour Buffett to Arnold‟s Cove and Little Harbour East, 
communities with poorer resources and fewer opportunities for employment than the 
abandoned communities, they did so at the insistence of the relocatees. The assisted 
moves from the islands to Arnold‟s Cove were so poorly planned that they attracted 
criticism from many sources. The backlash that flowed from the Isthmus of Avalon 
produced ripples that influenced decisions in Great Harbour Deep, Fogo Island and 
Southeast Bight. Cognizant that too much direction would lead to accusations of 
excessive force, the Resettlement Division lost control over a program which had as its 
principal goal the creation of a centralized productive fishery.  
 Copes and Brox, who disagreed on fisheries policy, agreed that coastal 
communities seconded local merchants, municipal leaders, MHAs and MPs to their 
cause, and pawned their votes to hijack moves to major fisheries growth centres. 
Resettlers‟ fondness for home ownership was deeply ingrained, and knowledge that they 
could not own a home in an industrial town drew them to the smaller reception centres 
where land was cheap and they could build a house without concern for national building 
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codes. The moves from Oderin to Rushoon and Merasheen to Southern Harbour 
demonstrate the degree to which fishing households forced resettlement planners to 
accept new priorities. 
 The high cost of housing was the greatest single deterrent to resettling to an 
industrial centre, but other forces were in play. The monotonous, highly regulated 
working environment of fish plants did not appeal to families accustomed to regulating 
daily activities. Furthermore the inshore fishery, compared to the offshore, was a 
relatively safe occupation that kept a fisher in daily contact with his or her family. In 
contrast a trawlerman spent on average two days out of every 10-14 ashore. Company 
executives begrudged them a short respite at Christmas. Dragger crews faced the hazards 
of winter storms while inshore fishers enjoyed the comfort of home. Inshore fishers could 
not be easily morphed into deep sea trawlermen, and they told industry executives and 
government officials that they were not interested in changing occupations. 
 Gendered definitions work and women‟s role in society exacerbated recruitment 
efforts. Women were not expected to make careers out of plant work. Management and 
unions devalued women‟s work by classifying it as unskilled. By denying women jobs 
that required use of a knife or machinery, and failing to recognize the leadership potential 
of female workers in the 1950s and 1960s, management overlooked a partial solution to 
the labour crisis. Managers restricted women to the packing line while recruiters scoured 
the bays for fish cutters. Discriminatory labour contracts, negotiated by male union 
executives, locked women into the lowest paying jobs that required only digital dexterity. 
 There were many obstacles in the road to modernity. The lack of affordable 
housing, which resulted from bureaucrats‟ insistence on building houses to national 
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standards in tandem with low earnings of plant workers, was the main obstacle. Town 
councils that barred entry of houses recovered from evacuated communities contributed 
to both the housing and labour crises. Working conditions ashore and on the water 
discouraged resettling householders from moving to a major fisheries growth centre. 
Mannion‟s study of Point Lance revealed traditional fishers were not interested in deep-
sea fishing and considered work in fish plants to be demeaning women‟s work. Attitudes 
toward women‟s role in society prevented managers from placing women in skilled 
trades. There were many reasons why resettled people refused to move to the industrial 
towns of the Burin Peninsula, but ultimately they made choices that they believed best 
met their needs. 
Conclusion 
 Most communities of Placentia Bay rejected the overtures of company executives, 
resettlement officials, clergy, municipal leaders, and MHAs to persuade them to move 
from the inshore sector to the offshore industrial fisheries bases. The were motivated by a 
desire to continue to own mortgage-free homes, a desire to protect capital investments in 
the inshore fisheries, and desire to operate in a comparatively safe environment. Over 
forty families of Tack‟s Beach ignored the efforts of the plant manager and the FHRC to 
convince them to relocate to the Burin Peninsula. Instead they chose to resettle in the 
small fishing village of Arnold‟s Cove, place with very limited resources and minimal 
space for expansion Similarly, the community of Oderin chose Rushoon over Marystown 
because they could continue to fish traditional grounds and avoid the expenses associated 
with modernity. Those resettlers who joined the industrial workforce opted to commute 
during the milder months and return to subsistence activities in late fall. Workers who 
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migrated to Grand Bank from Fortune Bay each spring identified housing as the major 
barrier to taking up residence and full-time employment in the plant. Low wages and the 
high cost of living in industrial fishery bases made recruitment of labour from inshore 
fishing communities problematic. 
 Plan managers, union leaders, and the state, undervalued women‟s labour and 
restricted them to the lowest paying positions. Women, who later proved they were as 
adept at filleting fish as men, were not considered capable of operating a machine or even 
trusted with a knife. The College of Marine and Fisheries offered trades in navigation, 
engineering and food technology courses which males dominated. The socially 
constructed definitions of femininity and masculinity in the 1960s strengthened the glass 
ceiling to the detriment of the industrial fishery in the 1950s and 1960s. 
    The managers of the FHRP attempted to overcome the labour shortage in the 
offshore sector by increasing grants. The 1967 Agreement authorized the FHRC to assist 
individual household moves to fisheries growth centres and also introduced lot 
supplementary grants to make housing more affordable in the industrial centres. The state 
wished to assert the economic principle of the FHRP when outport families threatened to 
convert into a social welfare program. The subjects who used the plan to improve access 
to social services were agents of change.  
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Chapter IV 
Trials and Tribulations in the Transition to Modernity:  
Life in Two “Approved Organized Reception Communities” 
     
Introduction 
 Given the failure of the FHRP to direct families into one of the eight major 
fisheries growth centres, this chapter examines the experiences of resettled households 
which moved into small inshore fishing communities, Category 6 “Approved Organized 
Reception Centres.” The resettlement experience in every category of growth centre was 
remarkably similar. Housing shortages, overcrowded schools and  unemployment were 
common grievances. Furthermore, the rapid influx of new settlers into communities with 
a population of less than 200 downgraded the quality of life of long-time residents by 
overtaxing the local infrastructure and overcrowding facilities. The most immediate 
problem confronting resettled householders was a lack of affordable housing and serviced 
lots. The great discrepancy between the value of vacated houses, for example, and the 
cost of housing in the new centre caused mental stress. The average cost of replacing a 
home in Arnold‟s Cove was eight to 20 times greater than the average value of 
abandoned houses in Tack‟s Beach.1 The older generation felt neglected, materially 
dispossessed, and severed from a way of life. Smallwood, as well as the politicians and 
bureaucrats in the 28 government departments and agencies involved in administering the 
FHRP, stressed the benefits of resettlement for the younger generation, especially 
education. The premier proclaimed that children should not be “trapped in a one-room 
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school ... you‟ve got to give  ... at least the young people a chance ... to take the part they 
should in the modern world.”2 But sometimes resettled children found themselves in 
worse facilities than in the old community. Overcrowded poorly equipped one or two-
room schools without flush toilets, proper ventilation, or safe drinking water was an 
unhealthy environment for any student, whether newcomer or long-term resident. It is not 
surprising that the first study of the FHRP identified lack of suitable, affordable housing 
as a major inhibitor of the program.
3
 Growth centres such as Arnold‟s Cove and Southern 
Harbour, to which many families gravitated, lacked the infrastructure and employment 
opportunities to make moves successful. 
 In this chapter I examine the conditions in two reception centres, located on the 
isthmus of the Avalon, Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour. It sheds light on how 
moves from the islands of Placentia Bay altered the lives of relocatees. Any meaningful 
study of resettlement must consider the conditions subjects encountered in their new 
environments. In places such as these there was a deep divide between the promise and 
reality of modernization. Fishing families suffered from loneliness and mourned the loss 
of property and a way of life. Donald Savoie, Executive Director of the Canadian 
Institute for Research on Regional Development in 1992, considered separation from 
family, friends, institutions, landscapes, climates and loss of a sense of belonging and 
knowing how to behave in a particular society as important as material losses.
4
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Resettlement is not costless even if all the houses, schools, and churches were moved free 
of charge along with the people. Matthews compared the trauma of resettlement to the 
effects of an earthquake.   
Arnold‟s Cove 
 The tsunami of resettlement that swept populations from the islands into the 
bottom of Placentia Bay caught everyone off-guard. It had tragic consequences for both 
resettler and long-time resident. It overcrowded infrastructure, increased competition for 
scarce resources, and subordinated the economic objectives of the FHRP.  However, it 
was not powerful bureaucrats and politicians who pushed people into Arnold‟s Cove. The 
bureaucrats were able to persuade and induce relocatees to abandon homes, but failed to 
direct them into industrial fisheries centres in which there was a demand for workers. 
Coastal people hijacked the program by pressuring the Resettlement Committee to 
approve moves to the Newfoundland mainland, a customary practice under the 
Centralization Plan. The rationale for evacuating coastal communities evaporated and the 
intention to bring them to improved services was frustrated when the burgeoning 
population overloaded infrastructure. The FHRC bowed to political pressure and 
designated small inshore fishing communities as growth centres. 
 Smallwood, who was also Minister of Economic Development, equated 
urbanization with progress, and used executive powers to override bureaucratic decisions. 
In Ottawa and St. John‟s centralization was accepted as the means to reduce dependence 
on public welfare and eliminate the cost of bringing services to the people. Fisheries 
economists and scientists, whose main objective was to reorient the industry, mistakenly 
believed resettlement grants would entice coastal households into offshore fishing bases. 
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They underestimated the householders‟ attachment to the shore fishery and its 
concomitant lifestyle. The majority chose to relocate to the isthmus of the Avalon and 
occupy abandoned premises on a seasonal basis. 
 In 1965 Arnold‟s Cove was an inshore fishing community of 33 households 
served by a small Anglican church and a two-room school.
5 
Cod, lobster, and herring 
fisheries, supplemented by subsistence activities and social welfare benefits, formed the 
basis of the economy. Local fishers occupied fishing berths for so many generations that 
they became, in practice, private property. Consequently, when fishers arrived from the 
islands, only the most marginal land and marine spaces were available. Newcomers soon 
outnumbered the original inhabitants five to one, overcrowded roads, school, church and 
hall. In return they faced the rancour of a community unprepared to accept the large 
number of migrants who came mainly from the Anglican communities of Placentia Bay. 
The disorderly nature of the moves soon caught the attention of the media, and turned 
Arnold‟s Cove into a symbol of all the deficiencies of resettlement. National and local 
television crews and the press produced horrendous stories on the conditions at Arnold‟s 
Cove that threw into question the efficacy of the FHRP. 
 The negative press, which threatened to derail the program, caused a stir in St. 
John‟s and Ottawa. Sametz, dispatched two rural development officers (RDO), Donald 
W. Burry and Lance C. Shirley, to investigate the problems arising from the rapid 
abandonment of communities in Placentia Bay and to mediate tensions in the reception 
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centres.
6
 Burry and Shirley spent several days in Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour 
assessing the socioeconomic conditions of the two recently approved growth centres. The 
RDOs identified overcrowding of the harbour front and facilities, especially the school, 
as a significant source of discontent. Burry and Shirley alleged that overcrowding not 
only interfered with the quality of instruction, but also posed a health threat. The local 
school boards lacked the resources to construct additional classrooms or renovate existing 
structures to ameliorate conditions resulting from resettlement. 
 The benefits that planners claimed would accrue to the younger generation after 
the move must have seemed farfetched, when children accustomed to healthy, safe 
environments, found themselves in overcrowded, unventilated buildings in a growth 
centre. Iverson and Matthews reported that the pupils of the four-room school at Tack‟s 
Beach, which had no difficulty attracting university-trained teachers, were now being 
taught by emergency-supply teachers with a probationary licence. In the new community 
recreational activities were confined to a muddy gravel parking lot.
7
 House suggested that 
the government-imposed land freeze, which is discussed more fully later, delayed 
designation of Arnold‟s Cove as a reception centre and contributed to the overall state of 
unpreparedness. While the rector struggled with the school crisis, the merchants, Freeman 
Wareham and Kevin Wadman, accused FHRC of trying to divert prospective relocatees 
into Marystown.
8
 
 Donald J. Ryan, control officer for the Department of Municipal Affairs, informed 
his superior, J. T. Allston, that one resettled householder, having purchased land on 
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which to build a house, discovered he could not get a building permit.
9
 Stymied by the 
freeze, he purchased a house erected on ground that was too swampy for safe installation 
of a private water and sewer system. The well water was unfit for human consumption. 
Ryan alleged resettled people were being “fleeced of their grants and savings by local 
speculators.
10
  He recommended that government introduce an education program to 
advise resettlers on the intricacies of purchasing land and houses, and that government 
help resettlers recover money they “wasted through ignorance and through unscrupulous 
dealings by the above named parties of Arnold‟s Cove.”11 Harnum cautioned one 
contractor to supply invoices bearing the householder‟s signature certifying satisfaction 
with the service provided before requesting payment for moving persons, real property 
and chattels.
12
 
 The Minister of C&SD asked Sametz and Harnum to investigate these very 
serious allegations. They failed to uncover any evidence of fraud.”13 Harnum assured 
Rowe that the number of householders who had been wronged “have been very small 
[and] the great majority are grateful to the government. After the initial phase the most 
general comment heard is that we should have done it years ago.”14 Harnum and Sametz 
interviewed the alleged victims of fraud in their home, and concluded their bitterness 
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arose from making a bad deal. For example, when  householders sold their dwelling in 
the evacuated community for $400 and paid ten times that amount for a house in 
Arnold‟s Cove, they felt cheated, especially if their former house was larger and in better 
condition. Harnum concluded that there was no basis for allegations of fraud, but 
deference to authority could prevent a resettler from making allegations of fraud against a 
prominent member of the community to senior government authorities. Ryan‟s report did 
alert the FHRC to the need to locate rural development offices in various headquarters 
throughout the island to facilitate the program and mitigate problems.
15
 
 John Crosbie, Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, suggested that the case 
at Arnold‟s Cove was symptomatic of the problems arising from the way the FHRC 
implemented the program. Did Sametz and Harnum, the two top administrators of the 
FHRP, intentionally gloss over the conditions at Arnold‟s Cove in an effort to counter 
negative reports on resettlement in general, and Arnold‟s Cove, in particular? One can 
only speculate what their motives were when they reported that the great majority of 
families were “grateful to the government” and “wished they had moved years ago.”16 
MP Richard Cashin reported that in spring 1967 former residents and newcomers alike 
were discontented with the management of resettlement. One can only conclude that 
Sametz and Harnum deliberately omitted from their report the deplorable conditions in 
the resettlement subdivisions and the unhappiness of settlers reported by Ryan, Shirley, 
Burry, and Cashin. 
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 Cashin, as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, was responsible 
for administration of the FHRP at the national level. He informed F. W. Rowe, then 
Minister of Education and the Department of Community and Social Development
17
 that 
he was alarmed “over the magnitude of the problems facing these two communities.”18 
He described the local roads in the settlement area as the “most deplorable” he had ever 
seen and suggested there was a general unhappiness with overcrowded schools and lack 
of fishing facilities. Cashin hoped to convince the Department of Public Works to 
construct a wharf and two community stages to accommodate inshore fishermen. He 
noted that doubling of the population in 1966 had strained local infrastructure and 
facilities, especially schools. The MP urged Rowe to make special funds available to 
address the schools crisis.  
 The Resettlement Committee conceded that there was a real problem keeping 
pace with the demand for new schools in growth centres.
19
 The Committee recognized 
that resettlers who had exhausted most of their savings and resettlement grants in efforts 
to establish homes could contribute little toward the cost of providing new schools. 
Government assisted 919 persons to move to Arnold‟s Cove between 1966 and 1968. 
Unfortunately there was no provision in the Resettlement Agreement for underwriting the 
cost of salvaging of schools, halls, fishing property, churches or community stages from 
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evacuated outports. The FHRC acknowledged the problem but could only recommend a 
change of policy. Rowe refused to deviate from the 70-30 formula, create a special fund 
for new schools or write off mortgages on abandoned schools. Local boards had a 
responsibility to raise 30% of the cost of adding new classrooms from long-time residents 
and resettlers whose grants had been used to relocate.
20
 
 Rev. Edward House informed Harnum that classes met in makeshift classrooms in 
the Orange Hall.
21
 He estimated that the community needed four additional classrooms 
and an auditorium to meet the educational needs of Arnold‟s Cove. He asked C&SD to 
underwrite the cost of new school construction in growth centres. House suggested 
neither native resident nor newcomer should be penalized. The householders of Tack‟s 
Beach and Harbour Buffett left behind schools that were larger and of a higher standard 
than the schools on the isthmus. In their opinion, the FHRP created the schools crisis so it 
was the government‟s responsibility to address it. Ottawa sidestepped the issue by 
pointing out education was a provincial responsibility. Cashin confined his actions to 
advising provincial ministers to make a special grant available to assist school boards to 
acquire more classrooms.
22
 The Minister of C&SD took the position that schools were the 
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compensate the church for schools and churches in the vacated community or assist new 
construction in the reception community. Following the move parishioners discovered 
they were not only responsible for outstanding loans on abandoned buildings, but had  to 
take on additional debt to construct or expand school and church facilities in the reception 
centres. From 1968 the province made the government barge available free of charge, but 
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responsibility of the Minister of Education and forwarded requests for extra funds to the 
Minister of Education. It was a game of pass the parcel. 
 The crisis in education, coupled with housing issues and high rates of 
unemployment, attracted criticism from many quarters. Much of the controversy swirled 
around the need for more affordable housing in all categories of growth centres. House 
informed Harnum that Wadman Bros. had charged $4,000 to float the rectory and 
teacher‟s residence from Harbour Buffett to Arnold‟s Cove. He estimated it would cost 
an equal amount to rewire it, install water and sewer and a new heating system and set it 
up on a new foundation.
23
  House asked for enough assistance to bring the Arnold‟s Cove 
school up to the standard of Harbour Buffett and Tack‟s Beach schools which bureaucrats 
had deemed to be substandard. Householders, whose low level of compensation forced 
them into substandard houses, felt aggrieved when the high cost of relocation became 
apparent. The grants were insufficient to compensate for fishing capital and homes left 
behind, or the investments in halls, schools and churches. Burry informed the Director of 
Field Services that families were being placed “in a new environment without the basic 
tools of their trade, namely, fish stages, wharves, and fish plants.”24 He recommended 
that a plan be drafted by the province, in consultation with councils and householders, to 
ameliorate conditions. Merchant and contractor Freeman Wareham, who made a business 
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out of relocating families, claimed the resettlement grant was insufficient to cover the 
cost of developing a lot. 
 Tensions in the settlement area intensified when the government introduced lot 
supplementary grants on a go-forward basis. Most of the families from Tack‟s Beach who 
moved in the fall of 1966 and before 1 April 1967 felt cheated and protested vociferously. 
The new policy caused bitterness among relocatees and intensified jealousy between all 
community residents. Disgruntled relocatees presented Cashin with the names of 38 
householders who failed to qualify for lot supplementary assistance. The MP asked the 
Minister of C&SD to explain why a family moving to Little Harbour East did not qualify 
for the additional $1,000 grant while those who moved to Southern Harbour received it.
25
 
In a memorandum to Cashin, Maloney explained that Southern Harbour was an approved 
growth centre, and the subjects of the query knew in advance of the move that they did 
not qualify for the lot supplementary grants.
26
 But Maloney did not provide the criteria 
the FHRC used to differentiate between Southern Harbour and Little Harbour East. The 
minister simply stated he would not set a precedent by extending supplementary 
assistance for anyone to purchase lots outside growth centres.  
 Nonetheless, families who resettled to the isthmus prior to 1 April pressured 
government MHAs to make the supplementary grant retroactive to 1965.
27
 MHA G. A. 
Frecker warned Maloney that “too much hard drawing of lines is going to create general 
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dissatisfaction.”28 Since the policy affected resettlers in many growth centres, Frecker 
advised the minister to bring the issue to cabinet to head off a potentially “serious 
problem for the government,” and implored the minister to bring the issue to cabinet 
“before the situation creates an unwholesome reaction among the people.”29 Maloney 
directed Sametz to prepare notes for cabinet to determine if the Resettlement Agreement 
provided a solution.
30
 
 In response to pressure from Cashin, Frecker, resettlers, and media reports on the 
wretched conditions in Arnold‟s Cove, cabinet granted conditional approval of lot 
supplementaries retroactively to a specific group.
31
 Only households who moved to 
Arnold‟s Cove between 1 April 1966 and 31 March 1967, and paid at least $300 for a 
building lot, qualified.
32
 Thirty-six householders who moved from Tack‟s Beach to 
Arnold‟s Cove 1967 benefited.33 The cabinet decision denied thousands of householders, 
who moved in the same period to other growth centres, equal consideration. By making 
the lot supplementary retroactive for the households of Tack‟s Beach, Smallwood and his 
ministers set a precedent that was sure to provoke outrage in other growth points. 
Resettled householders at Placentia complained bitterly when they learned that only 
resettlers from Tack‟s Beach qualified. They had a right to demand equal treatment. C. D. 
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Reynolds, Assistant Director of Field Services, reported that relocatees in the Placentia 
area who were content prior to the introduction of a lot subsidy, felt aggrieved over the 
discrimination that had crept into the Agreement. Reynolds did not agree with 
grandfathering in any group. He wrote that “if the Agreement had not been amended 
there would be no complaint.”34 In all but two instances, in Placentia the grant had 
covered the cost of house and land, while at Arnold‟s Cove land and house in a 
subdivision cost $10,000.
35
  
 While householders battled authorities over lot supplementaries, private 
contractors undertook the task of developing subdivisions in Arnold‟s Cove without 
paying much attention to the environment. In winter 1968, J. T. Allston, Director of 
Urban and Rural Planning, raised concerns about pollution in the Arnold‟s Cove 
subdivision. Allston warned the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Arnold‟s Cove not 
to issue new permits to occupy for houses without sewer connections.
36
 The nine houses 
currently occupied without connections to the main sewer line, endangered the health of 
all. Allston ordered the Board to connect the occupied houses immediately, but offered 
no funding. In Phase Two of the subdivision there were 14 dwellings without sewer 
connections as there were no mains to connect onto. Allston advised the Board of 
Trustees to compel the developer to install a sewer main before spring thaw worsened the 
pollution of the land and contamination of wells. His fear that it would create an epidemic 
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was so great that he threatened to withhold permits for any development until the issue 
was resolved to the satisfaction of the Department of Health. Allston asked C&SD to 
delay payment of the $1,000 lot supplementary, which had been assigned to the 
developer, until Wareham or Wadman installed the sewer line and homeowners 
connected their houses.
37
 Acting on Allston‟s directive, C&SD denied 18 applications for 
supplementary assistance. 
 When the District Health Inspector, N. Gosse, visited Arnold‟s Cove 10 months 
after Allston had issued his ultimatum, the situation remained unchanged.
38
 In some 
instances elevation levels prevented a hook-up and in other cases no branch line existed. 
In still other cases poverty blocked progress. Widows, disabled persons and welfare 
dependents could not afford to connect.
39
 When Gosse inquired into the situation, Kevin 
Wadman, town clerk and subdivision developer, informed him that a few householders 
had approached him to get connected, but suspecting some were unwilling to pay the 
hook-up fee, Wadman refused to carry out the work. Consequently, families living in 
homes with fully equipped bathrooms carried pails of human waste to the saltwater daily 
as many of them had done before they accepted the government‟s promise of modern 
amenities. The health inspector ordered the Board not to issue any additional permits to 
occupy before houses were connected to the main. He strongly recommended that 
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occupied homes be connected without delay since some were disposing of human waste 
and other matter by carrying it to the land wash, and warned that the difficulty of making 
the trip in winter could cause the householders to dump human waste within the 
subdivision. The inspectors concluded that there was “no necessity, or justification in a 
planned subdivision where a sewer system exists” for people to live in such awful 
conditions.
40
  
 When health inspectors, J. M. Graham and H. Powell, accompanied by O. 
Bowering, public health nurse for the area, inspected the Arnold‟s Cove subdivision in 
April 1969 they identified 30 homes without connections to a sewer system.
41
 The water 
of two wells, used by 30 families, was unfit for human consumption. The inspectors 
attributed the contamination to improper construction and use of contaminated buckets. 
The report described the situation at Arnold‟s Cove as a catastrophic health risk, but went 
on to state that, except for the possible outbreak of an epidemic, conditions in the 
subdivision were “of a very good standard and people indicated a reasonable degree of 
contentment in their new environment.”42 The health inspectors reported that much of the 
criticism of the subdivision was unfair. The only solution to the water problem was to 
develop a municipal water supply at a cost of a half million dollars.
43
 The report ended 
with a familiar refrain: “All dwellings should be connected to the main as soon as 
practical.” The health team recommended that the Board of Trustees request special 
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assistance from the Department of Welfare to connect hardship cases and run a line to the 
saltwater for houses with elevation problems.  
 J. L. Seymour of NLHC informed the FHRC that topographical conditions pushed 
the cost of providing minimal services beyond the capacity of most resettlers. Seymour 
warned of the consequences of permitting growth on anything but serviced land. He also 
warned that unless a more orderly scheduling of moves was adopted and assistance was 
made available for relocating schools, churches, halls and recreation centres the managers 
of resettlement could expect already deplorable conditions to worsen.
44
 The FHRP 
managers had lost control, and the reports of other departments and agencies were more 
attuned to the weaknesses of the program than the senior bureaucrats who were 
responsible for running it. When the FHRP was first considered, the Rural Development 
Branch of ARDA envisioned “well-planned communities” and saw the centralization 
program as “a golden opportunity to plan for economic and pleasant settlements.”45 
Arnold‟s Cove was the antithesis of a well-planned economic and pleasant community. 
 Donald Burry felt that more accurate demographic data could allay some of the 
problems arising in reception communities. He suggested a demographic survey to gather 
relevant data should precede the movement of families into growth points.
46
 Burry 
cautioned planners against concentrating too many resettlers into any one area to avoid 
the creation of enclaves of unemployment that the media referred to as welfare ghettoes. 
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The FHRC did not investigate the employment opportunities in the Arnold‟s Cove area, 
or assess its potential for growth before approving it as a growth centre. In Burry‟s 
opinion the failure to plan ahead resulted in unemployment, overcrowding of community 
facilities, and increased friction between new and native residents. By sheer force of 
numbers, the balance of power switched to the newcomers and long-time residents 
became powerless bystanders as the resettlers began to exert control over political 
organizations and demand a fair share of local resources. In larger growth centres, such as 
Harbour Breton, Placentia, and Trepassey, relocatees settled in clusters, refusing to join 
community organizations. Two resettled merchants, Freeman Wareham and Kevin 
Wadman, dominated commercial activities, controlled political organizations, and erased 
the old power structure. 
 The influx of new settlers altered more than the balance of power. It increased the 
competition for fishing berths and scarce construction and service jobs. Following a visit 
to the once prosperous commercial centre of Harbour Buffett, Ray Guy contended the 
“real jobs [were] wasted and destroyed for imaginary jobs. And dole piled on top of 
dole.”47 The prosperity of Spencer‟s Cove, Tack‟s Beach, Harbour Buffett, and Bar 
Haven depended on fishers from the surrounding communities supplying Alberto 
Wareham, Ltd., H. C. Brown, W. W. Wareham, Ltd. and Wadman Bros., respectively, 
with salt cod, lobster and herring. When communities in the hinterland resettled, jobs in 
the herring packing plant, lobster pools, salt fish plants, and collector boats disappeared. 
Guy proclaimed that “the death of Harbour Buffett wasn‟t a sacrifice of the old 
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Newfoundland toward bringing in the new. It was senseless murder.”48 People of the 
islands left real jobs for imaginary jobs on the isthmus. Journalist Ron Crocker postulated 
that “assisting the movement of 2,000 wage-earners per year from areas of 
underemployment into semi-urban areas already beset by chronic unemployment is what 
resettlement has done.”49 
 Competition for jobs, shore space, fishing berths and control of local government 
led to increased tension in the community of Arnold‟s Cove. While households suffered 
the former merchants of Spencer‟s Cove and Bar Haven developed  profitable transport 
and real estate businesses. Freeman Wareham and Kevin Wadman used their vessels and 
a barge to transport houses, chattels, fishing gear and equipment, and resettlers to the 
various growth points and chartered vessels to civil servants. When they added 
subdivision development to their other enterprises, their status increased substantially and 
the newcomers elected them to top positions in the local government. Long-time citizens 
resented the power of the resettled elites who dominated business and civic affairs. The 
merchants led the fight to organize Arnold‟s Cove into a Local Improvement District 
against the wishes of the old residents. And when elections were held they were elected 
to the two key positions.
50
 Charges of election rigging were debated in the House of 
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Assembly but when a protest petition reached the floor of the House of Assembly, 
Smallwood dismissed it and declared the process legal. The long-time residents accused 
settlers of forcing local government and taxes on them. They felt usurped. 
 The conditions at Arnold‟s Cove garnered local and national media attention and 
dissuaded some relocatees from moving to the reception centre. A native of Woody 
Island informed the Minister of C&SD, William Rowe, that he would not relocate to 
Arnold‟s Cove due to health and safety concerns.51 He advised Rowe to stop 
development. The CTV public affairs program W-5 created a stir that reverberated in the 
corridors of Confederation Building and prompted the citizens of Arnold‟s Cove to 
defend the town. The Anglican rector and several high school students came to the 
town‟s defence. In letters to the Evening Telegram they accused the W-5 program of 
focussing on disease and mud while ignoring the positive features of the community. The 
W-5 documentary had compared conditions in Arnold‟s Cove to those in a medieval 
town during the Black Death. The students charged the reporter ignored the fact that 85 
percent of homes had water and sewer and that wells passed health inspection. The 
sensational documentary encouraged politicians to visit and make “erroneous statements” 
when they left.
52
 The town‟s defenders attributed the disorganized state of affairs in the 
town to growing pains, asked critics to give them time to get organized and suggested 
that no one should “expect a utopia overnight.”  
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 House admitted there was room for improvement, but denied conditions were as 
bad as the W-5 documentary alleged. He claimed the program focussed on “mud and 
medicine and threw the community into the political arena without regard to truth or 
sanity, or morale. Here is the real injustice!”53 In the House of Assembly the Premier 
attacked the W-5 program for depicting his administration as a “criminal government” 
that was trying to “murder an unspoiled way of life.”54 In the same speech he launched an 
attack on academics who studied resettlement and warned the Opposition not to be 
deceived by their “useless” studies and reports. Smallwood argued “economic” and 
“natural” forces pushed people to leave behind a primitive lifestyle where they lived 
without benefit of radio, television, electricity or roads in a malnourished condition. In 
typical rhetorical style he charged: “Only a fool, only an ignoramus, or a complete 
romantic would think that it was wrong to help them move out.”55 In his rant he chose not 
to mention that in the communities of Merasheen, Tack‟s Beach and Harbour Buffett 
there were lobster pools, fish plants, electric lights, television, and other modern 
amenities, many of which had been recently installed. Nor did he mention the large 
homes, the fine churches and schools equipped with grassy playgrounds that could not be 
reclaimed, except at the expense of resettlers who were now asked to pay the cost of 
constructing new halls, schools, churches and recreational facilities.  
 The reports by journalists and academic researchers provided the Opposition in 
the House of Assembly and the House of Commons with ammunition to attack the 
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FHRP. Walter Carter, MP, met with 29 resettled householders of whom all but six spelled 
water in buckets.
56
 In an effort to relieve the pressure, Municipal Affairs Minister John 
Nolan announced an agreement had been signed between his department and the 
Arnold‟s Cove Board of Trustees for the completion of water and sewer services.57 The 
provincial and federal governments had assisted families into a centre with insufficient 
services and infrastructure to handle the growth, and now expected the Local 
Improvement District, which had been born in controversy, to assume responsibility by 
incurring a debt that could only be repaid by increasing the municipal taxes on all 
householders. Long-time residents resented paying taxes to what they considered an 
undemocratic local government that had been forced on them by “outsiders.”58 A 
proposal to change the structure of municipal government was debated in the provincial 
legislature. Opposition leader Gerald Ottenheimer alleged voters had been forced to 
disclose their identity on the ballot. Smallwood declared it was not a referendum, but a 
petition circulated by the town to determine the form of local government they wished to 
have. According to an Evening Telegram article, residents returned only 25 percent of 
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ballots, 90 percent of which favoured continuing with the Local Improvement District. 
Once more it was a battle of wills between natives and settlers.
59
 
 In 1970 it was clear that many of the problems that plagued the FHRP would take 
time to resolve. House appealed to the Minister of Education to provide financial 
assistance to construct a gymnatorium for 265 students enrolled at St. Michael‟s school. 
House estimated that the population of Arnold‟s Cove had increased five-fold since 1966 
forcing the board to add four classrooms to the school at great expense to parents who 
had to pay 30 percent of the cost.
60
 The pastor reminded Rowe that many of them had left 
behind adequate schools without compensation. House argued that the province had a 
duty to provide recreational facilities and spaces. He reminded F. W. Rowe that school 
and recreation facilities government forced parishioners to leave behind at Harbour 
Buffett and Tack‟s Beach were superior to those in Arnold‟s Cove.  
 P. J. Hanley, Deputy Minister of Education, informed members of the Federal-
Provincial Advisory Committee that most resettlement took place in Arnold‟s Cove 
between 1965 and 1967, a time when inadequate schools created much dissatisfaction 
among all parents.
61
 He advised the Committee to slow the pace of resettlement and 
establish a special fund to rectify the problem. Hanley stated that parents moved to 
improve the education of their children, and “one can imagine their disappointment to 
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arrive at a reception centre and find poorer facilities or none at all. The Department of 
Education feels strongly that people should not be moved until adequate educational 
facilities have been provided in the receiving town.”62 In Hanley‟s view the success of 
the FHRP depended on the will of the Committee to slow the the pace of resettlement to 
give the parties time to put in place adequate schools and housing.
63
 E. P. Weeks, 
Assistant Deputy Minister of DREE, emphasized the importance of not approving moves 
that strained the absorptive capacity of the reception centre and the financial capacity of 
governments. The bureaucrats wanted a more cautious approach. They realized that the 
Resettlement Committee, two thirds of whom represented the province, had lost control. 
The Deputy Minister of Public Welfare conceded that resettlement may not help the 
parents or the grandparents, but it was the “only salvation of the children.”64 Ray Guy, 
who spent his formative years in Arnold‟s Cove, claimed the Minister responsible for 
resettlement declared “the old must suffer for the sake of the young.”65 The Arnold‟s 
Cove example demonstrates that parents and children suffered the effects of ill-advised 
moves. 
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 The case of Arnold‟s Cove provides insight into the effects of relocation on 
children.  Peter M. Godfrey, a Social Welfare student at Memorial University, surveyed 
and interviewed students to determine the effects of resettlement on children.
66
 Godfrey 
found that half of those surveyed had not wanted to move. Their desire to stay stemmed 
from friendship ties and concern about starting over in a new school. Friendships were 
also an important part of adjusting to new environments. Most reported they had close 
friends who had moved to the Cove at about the same time. Church gatherings and 
weekly dances, and movies brought them together. Asked if they would like to return to 
the old community, over half believed it would be hard to get used to living that way 
again. Although students were mostly content, nearly two-thirds wished for more 
recreational facilities. They thought governments should give more consideration to 
recreation facilities in growth centres before the move.  
 Throughout the fall of 1970 youth attempted to effect change by appealing 
directly to politicians and engaging in letter writing campaigns. Helen Best wrote W. N.  
Rowe to  request funds to build a school gymnasium. The former resident of Tack‟s 
Beach pointed out that one objective of FHRP was to bring people from areas of 
disadvantage to centres with better services, especially education and recreation. Best 
charged there were no recreation facilities within the school walls and outside there was 
only a “parking lot and a bog.”67 Another informed Rowe that her family moved from 
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Woody Island to find better opportunities for education and recreation.
68
 The students 
made it clear that the school and environs were substandard and the government had a 
moral responsibility to keep its promise. The Minister shifted blame to householders who 
“insisted on moving ... before adequate provision could be made for schools.”69 But 
government ministers and their agents who approved petitions had a responsibility to 
control the pace of settlement and ensure services were in place in the reception centre. 
The FHRC approved and assisted all moves, and were responsible for managing the 
centralization plan which Guy referred to as “Smallwood‟s blitzkrieg destruction of 
communities.”70 
 Geographer Howard Brown, a son of the main merchant of King‟s Island, 
provided a snapshot of life in Tack‟s Beach in the 1960s.71 The 450 residents worshipped 
in a church that could seat 400, children attended a four-room school, and Orangemen 
met in a new hall. Communication services included a radio telephone, a post office, and 
a public wharf. Mail arrived twice a week by coastal boat. In addition to the retail and 
supply trade, herring packing plant, salt cod plant and lobster business, H. C. Brown 
operated a private ferry capable of making the 12 mile crossing to Arnold‟s Cove in less 
than two hours. The hospital ship Lady Anderson called bi-weekly and doctors treated 
emergency cases at Come-by-Chance. The general store, church, hall, and many homes 
were powered by private generators. Taking advantage of electrification seven 
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households purchased televisions and several had electric washing machines. Those 
without televisions crowded into neighbours‟ homes to watch popular programs like 
wrestling.
72
 
 The migration of young people pushed the average age upward, but it remained a 
large community with 47 household heads employed in the inshore fishery. The next 
largest group worked aboard government-owned vessels and Great Lakes ships. The 
balance of the labour force worked in service jobs in the community. The fishermen 
enjoyed near year-round employment harvesting lobster from April to June, cod from 
July to October, and herring in late fall and winter months. It appeared to be one of the 
most stable communities in the Bay, but its Achilles heel was the 17 household heads 
who worked off the island.
73
 
 Although Tack‟s Beach appeared to have a viable economic base, there were 
warning signs. The decline of the inshore fisheries and the evacuation of nearby 
settlements undermined the economy and the morale of the community.
74
 Matthews 
claimed that rumour followed by visitations from resettlement officials and the Burin 
plant manager led to the community‟s extirpation. I argue that Arnold‟s Cove fit the bill 
for those with secure jobs outside the community, fishermen who did not want to change 
occupations, and the retired who wished to be near medical services. Furthermore, the 
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age structure of the population was trending upward.  According to Brown most young 
people left before celebrating their twentieth birthday. Older residents began to feel 
lonely and persons who commuted regularly to Come by Chance for medical treatment 
found the trip financially onerous.
75
 The aging population, increasingly concerned about 
access to health services wanted to relocate to a place with a road connection and in close 
proximity to a hospital. By shifting to the isthmus seamen and loggers could cut expense 
and reduce travel time.
76
 Brown contended that the resource base could provide 47 
fishing families with enough employment to qualify for Unemployment Insurance, but 
not enough to earn a good living.
77
 The decline in cod and herring fisheries at a time 
when expectations were rising also came into play. 
 Government announcements of new industries stimulated interest in moving. A 
few families left King‟s Island unassisted, but a land freeze on the isthmus delayed the 
evacuation of the community. Furthermore Arnold‟s Cove was not yet selected as a 
growth centre, nor did the FHRC intend to designate it as one of the organized reception 
centres until the majority of householders in Tack‟s Beach insisted on moving into the 
small village. They rebuffed all attempts to relocate them to Burin where there was a 
labour shortage.
78
 When the Committee approved moves to Arnold‟s Cove the flood 
gates opened. Households from Port Anne in the west to Harbour Buffett in the east and 
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Woody Island to the north rushed to the isthmus before the necessary infrastructure was 
in place to handle the influx.
79
 Responding to the expressed concerns of the students, 
Rowe admitted the planners had been caught off-guard by the number who opted to 
relocate to communities on the isthmus.
80
 The Resettlement Committee seemed to have 
lost control over the process of identifying growth centres and directing resettlers into 
offshore fisheries bases.  
 Wretched conditions and high unemployment rates in many growth centres led to 
allegations that government forced people out. In response Harnum outlined the process 
that was followed at Tack‟s Beach.81 On 11 February 1965 P. J. Canning presented a 
petition in the House of Assembly on behalf of residents who were seeking financial 
assistance to relocate. Canning said just over 80 percent signed the petition. In June Rev. 
House wired Newfoundland‟s Minister of Fisheries seeking information on the FHRP 
and Lane replied that details on policy had not yet been formalized. In October, House 
chaired a public meeting that elected a local resettlement committee, and shortly 
thereafter the local committee reported that 90 percent signed a resettlement petition 
which the FHRC rejected because the majority of householders indicated they wished to 
move to Arnold‟s Cove, a community under a land freeze. Subsequent correspondence 
indicated residents were anxious to move. House wrote: “Personally I do not think the 
people of Tack‟s Beach should be forced to remain on the Island longer than this year.”82 
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When the Resettlement Committee approved the Tack‟s Beach to Arnold‟s Cove move, it 
set in motion events that brought the FHRP into disrepute. 
 F. W. Rowe‟s contention that the people moved too quickly has merit, but there 
were other factors in play. According to Iverson and Matthews, lack of official 
information and counselling allowed rumour to take root.
83
 Especially disconcerting were 
rumours that services were about to be downgraded or eliminated. The evacuation 
occurred so suddenly that in September three of four classrooms remained closed. 
Iverson and Matthews interviewed only one householder who claimed to have left 
because the school was substandard. Many respondents said they left because they feared 
the school would close. Iverson and Matthews wrote: “The decision to abandon Tack‟s 
Beach was accompanied by uncertainty, animosity and dismay - magnified by rumour.”84 
Matthews reported four of the 16 households surveyed gave the following reasons for 
leaving: “forced out,” “had to leave,” “too few left,” “others were leaving,” or “no other 
choice.” In his PhD thesis Matthews concluded that most left because they were tired of 
an isolated way of life and transportation was too expensive.
85
 In an  address to the 
Canadian Institute of Planners he claimed that the quick evacuation of Tack‟s Beach 
resulted from inadequate counselling services which allowed gossip and rumour to create 
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panic in the population.
86
 Matthews alleged that when the director of resettlement 
followed up a request for information with a personal visit, he added to the “collective 
hysteria.”87 The sociologist suggested that overzealous bureaucrats described life in 
growth centres in “glowing terms leading to unrealistic expectations” and ignored the 
20% unemployment rate.
88
 Furthermore, the carriers of the petition became purveyors of 
misinformation. Overzealous locals convinced householders that anyone refusing to sign 
the petition when it was circulated would be denied assistance when the Resettlement 
Committee approved the move. Fear of being left alone in an abandoned community 
without services placed reluctant voters under duress. 
 Fisheries policymakers believed in the benefits of centralization and considered 
the mixed economy of rural Newfoundland to be antiquated and drafted legislation to 
reform it. Legislation is rarely neutral and usually incorporates the biases of those who 
write it. The Act stacked the deck by permitting householders who had left the outport to 
sign the petition if the move took place after 1 April 1965 or within 18 months of the 
petitioning date. By offering the grant retroactively to relocated households, the 
legislators tilted the scales in favour of resettlement. Occasionally, the actions and votes 
of ex-residents decided the fate of communities. The Tack‟s Beach merchant tried to 
salvage the community by assuring the people his store and the school would remain 
open, but the arrival of officials with promises of a good life in growth centres 
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undermined his once respected position.
89
 When the merchants left, the rest were likely to 
follow.  
 Disillusioned fishers competed for limited jobs in growth centres, or returned to 
the abandoned communities, former grounds, facilities and perhaps houses, often without 
the comfort and benefit of family.
90
 In 1969, 95 percent of the salt cod produced in 
Placentia Bay was caught by men returning from growth centres.
91
 Harry Wareham, who 
relocated from Harbour Buffett to St. John‟s, informed Guy that he received calls from 
fishermen begging for credit to obtain supplies to return to the islands. At Isle Valen Guy 
encountered a crew living aboard a longliner. The fishermen complained of nothing to do 
on stormy days, “not like in the past when gardens could be tended, fences and property 
repaired.”92 With no alternate employment available, they were one crew among many to 
choose isolation over welfare.
93
 
 Arnold‟s Cove attracted criticism from all sides - locals, resettlers, politicians, 
print and electronic media, and social scientists. The problems that arose in this reception 
centre demonstrate the social upheaval that resulted from lack of planning. Because of the 
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When I visited Port Anne in August 2010 there were two longliner crews present. Both 
had substantial wharves and stores in excellent condition. I chatted with Mr. Pevie who 
spent April to November in the abandoned community which was now lined with cabins 
equipped with indoor plumbing, electricity, VHF radios, cell phones and internet access. 
He said he and his son returned to Port Anne every year since it was resettled in 1966. It 
was resettled after the petition was referred to the Minister for approval. 
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goals of the program were contradictory, relocatees were able to negotiate moves to less 
viable centres from which they could more easily commute to wage employment or 
return to fish old grounds. Matthews, Brox, and Wadel suggested the state forced outport 
people into designated growth centres, but in many instances the tail wagged the dog and 
households set the terms. Households of Tack‟s Beach made a sudden exit, but the 
majority made it plain that they were not going to resettle into offshore fisheries bases. 
After receiving multiple petitions FHRC relented and approved the move.
94
 
Southern Harbour 
 Southern Harbour is another example of how things can go awry when the FHRC 
approved moves without a study. Only after households had moved from the islands to 
the Isthmus did C&SD send two field officers to investigate conditions in Arnold‟s Cove 
and Southern Harbour and to survey attitudes toward resettlement in the remaining 
settlements of Placentia West. It was a case of moving people first and attempting to 
resolve problems after the fact. When the Resettlement Committee approved Southern 
Harbour as an organized reception centre there was little evidence of organization. 
Receiving communities rarely had any form of municipal government at the time of 
designation. Southern Harbour had limited means to tackle water and sewer projects or 
build new schools without special funding from Ottawa or St. John‟s. Burry and Shirley 
reported on the deplorable condition of the school at Southern Harbour. Here a small 
two-room chapel served 117 pupils and four teachers on a rotating basis. In a single 
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academic year enrollment doubled and children were forced to learn in an overcrowded, 
unsanitary structure that the field workers condemned.
95
 The school under construction at 
Southern Harbour had all the modern conveniences, including an auditorium, but only 
one classroom. In reality the town needed four or five classrooms to accommodate the 
burgeoning population. Shirley considered the old school unfit and recommended against 
reopening it in September. Furthermore, the impetus for municipal government came 
from the newcomers. John Wadman, a former Bar Haven merchant, chaired the Board of 
Trustees of the local improvement district of Southern Harbour. The council had a small 
tax base to fund water and sewer projects and roads without assistance from the 
provincial or federal governments. The province attempted to resolve the problem by 
assigning lot supplementary grants to the municipality. It was a strategy the provincial 
government employed to get the federal government to pay 70 percent of the cost of 
municipal infrastructure as I will demonstrate in a later chapter. 
 Both levels of government had much to gain from the close-out of rural 
communities. The post office, Canadian National Telegraph (CNT), Canadian National 
Railway (CNR) coastal boat service, and harbours came under the purview of the national 
government. It was customary for federal ministers to consult with the province before 
investing in new infrastructure. When G. E. Knight, District Engineer, Department of 
Public Works asked the Director of Resettlement if the FHRC planned to resettle 
Southern Harbour, Harnum assured Knight that Southern Harbour was a community with 
a future. He stated 25 families were in the process of moving into Southern Harbour and 
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was confident many others would follow.
96
 This exchange between the two bureaucrats 
indicates the degree to which resettlement officials could influence development in a 
coastal community. A negative response to a federal inquiry could doom a settlement. By 
virtue of its location near the Trans-Canada Highway and its proximity to medical 
facilities, and the site of a proposed industrial complex, Southern Harbour met the 
requirements of a growth centre. While governments approved of plans to build wharves, 
they made little effort to prepare for the anticipated influx of relocatees. J. F. Rogers, 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs advised the Deputy Minister H. U. Rowe 
that Southern Harbour and Arnold‟s Cove were in no position to install a community 
water and sewer system.
97
  
 In 1968,  G. A. Frecker, MHA for Placentia East, informed Harnum that 
resettlement had transformed Southern Harbour from a very small village into a large 
town. To alleviate financial hardship for the 24 resettled families awaiting approval of 
their applications for assistance, Frecker asked the FHRC to designate Southern Harbour 
a growth centre. Frecker touted the community‟s strategic location near the Long 
Harbour Electric Reduction Company (ERCO) plant and the proposed paper mill and 
petrochemical industries at Come-by-Chance.
98
 The chairman of the Board of Trustees of 
Southern Harbour, John Wadman, listed nine reasons why the Resettlement Committee 
should approve the request: excellent harbour; small fish plant; proximity to Long 
Harbour and Come-by-Chance; a new school; a new church planned; and a new 
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subdivision being laid out by Municipal Affairs. Wadman stated the number of 
households had increased from 33 in 1964 to 90 and 20 others were in the process of 
resettling.
99
 Frecker, in concert with the Local Improvement District, wanted the FHRC 
to approve Southern Harbour as an Approved Organized Reception Centre to qualify 
resettlers for grants and lot supplementaries. Frecker‟s intervention illustrates the degree 
to which politicians interfered with the program at the instigation of local groups.  
 Late in 1968, the FHRC classified Southern Harbour as an organized reception 
centre.
100
 Harnum reported he had visited the community to meet with Board of Trustees 
and check on the subdivision being laid out by the Division of Urban and Rural 
Development. Cognizant of the media reports alleging growth centres were welfare 
ghettoes, he reported that only two resettled households were on able-bodied relief. All 
families that moved after 1 April 1967 were eligible for lot supplementary grants 
provided they connected to the town water and sewage system. But settlers, who had 
spent the resettlement grant to relocate homes, could not afford to hook up to water and 
sewer mains until FHRC approved the lot supplementary. Letters poured into the 
Resettlement Division and the Office of the Premier from residents complaining of 
contaminated wells. Mrs. Henry Hickey wrote:  
We were moved to this dirty dive of a Southern Harbour with not a drop of water of any 
kind always going around with a bucket trying to Beg [sic] a drop of water from the few 
people here that got a drop and no one had very much. There is six of my family after 
having Hipatitis [sic] this winter from the dirt of the water. They are sick most all winter. 
Not a drop of water to wash the Bed [sic] Cloths [sic] not a drop to wash your floors not a 
drop to flush the toilet and there are some people on this hill with no toilet.
101
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Earl Hickey, formerly of Petite Forte, also complained to Smallwood: 
My problem is that I moved from Petite Forte to Southern Harbour. My reason for 
moving was to get school for my children as I was told there would be no school 
at Petite Forte. Mr. Premier I may have made it better for my children as far as 
school goes, but worse for myself and my wife. We have no water and sewerage, 
my wife have [sic] to bring a pail across the high road down to a beach where 
men are working, she is getting fed up with it all. We don‟t have any water. We 
have to go to a neighbour to get a bucket of water to drink and our neighbour have 
[sic] very little for himself.
102
 
 
A year later Hickey informed the Premier that he still “had not a drop of water, only in a 
bucket from a friend” and his circumstances were now worse than they had been in Petite 
Forte where he had plenty of water and a toilet.
103
 Hickey contended  his family was in a 
worse state than before the move.
104
 He wrote: “It was a terrible mistake on someone‟s 
part to put people in these kind of places [and he did not] want to spend the last of [his] 
years in misery begging for a bucket of water.”105 
 John Whiffen, who moved to Southern Harbour from Bar Haven, also appealed to 
the Premier for a safe, reliable water supply. He had resided in the Blind Hill subdivision 
for five years.
106
 Whiffen, who was unable to move his house, spent all resettlement 
money and savings buying land, building a home and replacing fishing premises. The 
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provincial government had drilled an artesian, but did not supply a pump. Peter 
Mulrooney, who was also from Bar Haven, had similar complaints.
107
 Others advised 
Smallwood ther were no facilities to accommodate new fishermen.
108
 One relocatee 
suggested that if government would not improve facilities at Southern Harbour, it ought 
to shift them back to their old communities where they would be less dependent. Gerald 
Murphy wrote that he lived without water and sewer on a very windy hill, in a “mud 
puddle” and condemned the Smallwood government for resettling people to places where 
they were forced onto welfare.
109
 Since all the letters included similar complaints, one 
can assume that the writers had legitimate grievances. 
 As deplorable as the conditions in the Blind Hill subdivision were, a dozen 
households from St. Joseph‟s, Placentia Bay, were in worse circumstances. These 
families used the basic resettlement grant to cover moving expenses. They anticipated 
using lot supplementary grants to pay for land which they now occupied. Families found 
themselves in a predicament when they learned that the FHRC could only provide 
supplementary assistance after the homeowner connected to sewer mains and, in this 
case, the local road. The town‟s Board of Trustees attempted, without success, to pressure 
the FHRC to assign the lot supplementaries to the town.
110
 Meanwhile the landowners 
were threatening to evict the trespassers. The settlers were in a Catch-22 situation. The 
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vendors alleged that they could not afford to extend sewer mains or the road. Both parties 
were caught up in bureaucratic red tape. 
 Lloyd Powell, RDO and D. Ryan, Urban and Rural Development met with John 
Wadman, chair of the Local Improvement Committee, to try to end the stalemate. They 
hoped to mitigate the crisis by asking the town to install the services and later recoup the 
cost from lot supplementaries.
111
 C&SD agreed to ask each family to assign their $1,000 
supplementary grants to the town to finance the project, but the Board of Trustees balked, 
fearing the project would overburden taxpayers.
112
 In the meantime the families were 
fenced off from the community and the salt water, the traditional place to dispose of 
waste.
113
 The rights of social citizenship which entitled people to a decent standard of 
services did not apply to those families from St. Joseph‟s. 
 Municipal Affairs argued that since the Board of Trustees had issued occupancy 
permits, it was up to the local government to resolve it. How the Board would solve the 
situation, Allston had no comment. He absolved the province of all responsibility for the 
families who were not only forced to live without services, but also had to contend with a 
hostile landowner who threatened to evict them.
114
 Neither the local government, settler, 
nor vendor had the means to rectify the problem. The Resettlement Committee, unwilling 
to set a precedent, allowed a dozen families to live with a constant fear of expulsion. The 
end to isolation and the dream of “the good life” appeared more distant than ever. The 
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stranded householders opined that they were worse off than before the move “because 
now we only got our house.”115 
 Matters became worse when council split on the issue. Two councillors who 
opposed buying the land and servicing the lots circulated a petition to have council 
dissolved and called for a public meeting to discuss the “evils of council.”116 At the heart 
of the dispute were the high taxes all residents would have to pay to purchase and service 
the disputed land. The matter had reached a stalemate. One of the landowners said it was 
another example of government discriminating against rural Newfoundlanders. No one in 
St. John‟s, he allowed, would be expected to have houses hauled up on their land and be 
waiting a year for payment.
117
 He insisted that he would not undertake construction of a 
road, or provide any services, until he received payment in full for the lots. Whiffen 
warned that any attempt by any other party to install them, before he received payment, 
“could result in very serish [sic] truble [sic] and if the Wadmans is [sic] doing any 
bluffing all you have to do is send they [sic] along to me and I will handle them.”118 He 
claimed his lawyer advised him“to order them off his property [and] tear down the 
houses.”119 Whiffen blamed resettlement officials for  “putting them [the relocatees] on 
the bum,” by which he meant impoverishing them.120 Harnum tried to placate the 
landowner by promising that as soon as the homeowners became eligible for 
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supplementary grants the issue could be resolved amicably.
121
 The Director hoped to 
persuade the householders to assign lot supplementaries to the community council. The 
FHRP was already under siege and the minister wished to avoid the public furore that 
moves to Arnold‟s Cove had stirred up. By May, 1969 a resolution appeared likely.122  
 A resolution could not come soon enough for the resettlers. Robert Ryan, one of 
the resettlers, described how stressful the experience was for the families who lived under 
threat of eviction.
123
 The landowners added to the stressful situation by fencing them off 
from the saltwater and the rest of the community. The households who moved to escape 
isolation were more isolated in the growth centre than they were before the move.  To 
illustrate the hardship, Ryan described the arduous task of getting heating oil to his home. 
The delivery process began by placing drums at the end of the road. From there two or 
three men rolled the drums, with considerable difficulty, down a steep grade to the 
houses. Robert Ryan sympathized with the unfortunate landowner and chastised the 
minister for holding up payment of the supplementary grant which he had been promised 
before he agreed to move.  
 One cannot overlook the irony of the situation. The state encouraged families to 
leave ancestral homes by extolling the virtues of modernity. At Southern Harbour a dozen 
families found themselves more isolated than before the move, fenced off from the 
community and the sea, under threat of eviction. The resettlers argued it was unrealistic 
for government to expect a poor man to allow an unhappy situation to continue until the 
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landowner, who had not been paid, serviced the land. They felt that if government did not 
assume responsibility for correcting the mess that they were shifted into, no one would.
124
  
 Lloyd Powell reported in September 1970 that four houses had sewage 
connections and wells, four others had sewage connection but no wells, while four had 
neither sewage nor water connections. In his report, Powell stated the council charged 
$1,000 for each sewer hook-up but refused to dig wells or purchase water pumps.
125
 
Although the regulations required connections to water and sewer before the FHRC could 
approve lot supplementaries, the town received the grants. The Resettlement Division 
was willing to leave households without water to flush toilets, but they would not risk 
driving a growth centre into bankruptcy by withholding supplementary grants assigned to 
the town. The bureaucrats feared that the burden of debt might ruin the newly formed 
council and expose the FHRP to more negative publicity. Harnum recommended that 
C&SD provide debt relief for the municipality, but offered no further relief to the 
beleaguered families.
126
 The Director of Resettlement remained silent on the matter of 
wells and water pumps for families. 
Conclusion 
 The Fisheries Household Resettlement program attracted widespread criticism 
when the Resettlement Committee approved moves to growth centres in which there were 
few amenities or opportunities for employment.  Reports appended to the Minutes of 
Annual Meeting of the Federal - Provincial Advisory Committee identified problems in 
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reception centres as the major cause of criticism of the FHRP.
127
 The administrators 
succumbed to political pressure groups and lost control over the pace and direction of 
resettlement. Municipalities granted permits to occupy before water and sewer systems 
were complete thus precipitating reports from health inspectors warning of possible 
epidemics of typhoid, diphtheria or hepatitis. Overcrowded schools without indoor 
plumbing or sufficient ventilation, also threatened student health. When school boards 
requested extraordinary funding for new schools, the Minister of C&SD informed the 
board that he was passing the request on to the Minister of Education. The Education 
Minister, who was father of the Minister of Community and Social Development, 
informed the school boards that, since the FHRP created the overcrowding, C&SD should 
provide additional classrooms. When the conditions in the reception centre caught the 
attention of local and national media, it created a public relations nightmare for the 
federal and provincial governments. The exaggerated reports spurred Reverend Edward 
House and some high school students to mount a public defence of their community, but 
more privately they wrote letters to the Premier, ministers of the crown and resettlement 
officials complaining of inadequate, or non-existent, facilities and services. 
 The conditions at Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour had parallels in other 
reception centres as well as the industrial fisheries growth centres. Department of Health 
inspectors told resettled householders at Rushoon to dig pit toilets to reduce pollution in 
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the unserviced subdivision.
128
 Induced by resettlement grants and lot supplementaries, 
families moved into growth points with a paucity of modern amenities and few 
opportunities to change occupations. Many householders became welfare recipients. 
Inexperienced and divided local governments, with a limited tax base, could not meet the 
needs of burgeoning populations. Government moved households and then abandoned 
them. The Department of Municipal Affairs left housing to private developers who had 
no experience in real estate. The rapidity of the moves from the islands of Placentia Bay 
surprised the resettlement officials, but the FHRC approved the moves and the 
destination. To relieve the housing crisis the province purchased a motorized barge in 
1968 to salvage houses from evacuated outports, but by this time most householders had 
moved into the isthmus. Some hired private barges which added to the cost of relocating 
and sometimes left families in dire straits. 
  Reports appended to the Minutes of the Federal - Provincial Advisory Committee 
meeting illustrate how unprepared the FHRC was to deal with troubles in the growth 
points. Four years into the household resettlement program the Committee realized the 
need to pay more attention to integrating households into reception centres. Among the 
most pressing concerns identified in the report was the need to redress the educational 
problems brought on by the unanticipated pace of resettlement. One report recommended 
that, where possible, the FHRP should underwrite the cost of transferring schools from 
the evacuated communities to reception centres as a less expensive alternative to building 
new classrooms. Adopting a policy of moving schools required an admission on the part 
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of resettlement planners that schools in some vacated communities had not been as 
substandard as the resettlement officials had suggested. The Committee adamantly 
refused to underwrite the cost of moving buildings which they labelled social capital. The 
well-maintained schools at Harbour Buffett and Tack‟s Beach could have been 
dismantled and rebuilt as we shall see in Chapter VIII. The school boards‟ requests for a 
special funding formula to build additional classroom only resulted in government 
ministers passing the buck. Resettlers remained responsible for mortgages on abandoned 
buildings while they shared the cost of new schools in the new community. The 
Committee should not have approved reception centres until services and facilities were 
in place, and refrained from saturating the area with new settlers. Furthermore, it was 
unrealistic to expect inexperienced local councils to deal with the fallout. Municipal 
governance was in an infant state and lacked the resources, the unity of purpose, and the 
expertise to address problems foisted upon them by the FHRP. The federal and provincial 
governments, which had entered into a resettlement agreement to improve the welfare of 
a disadvantaged population, failed to keep their promise to improve their well-being.    
 Nonetheless, bureaucrats continued to embrace the program. V. P. Rossiter, Task 
Force Director, Federal Department of Fisheries, reported that the centralization plan was 
a basic component for development of a viable and dynamic twentieth-century 
Newfoundland fishing industry.”129 Rossiter considered the FHRP to be “an essential 
vehicle” for the transfer of a large portion of human resources from an inefficient inshore 
fishery into more productive employment in one of the offshore fishing centres or another 
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industrial town. He admitted housing and education were two major problems, but 
maintained the program was effective. Rossiter ignored the anguish of families who 
struggled to establish homes in a polluted environment that made children ill. The Task 
Force Director tied success of the program the numbers evacuated. He reported that to 30 
January 1970, 98 communities had been evacuated under the joint program and 50 others 
were in the process of moving.
130
 While civil servants might accept these numbers as 
proof of progress, statistical data do not reveal the trials and tribulations endured by the 
householders. Resettled people bought the official line that government was assisting 
them to a place that offered better opportunities for employment, better opportunities for 
education of children, and better medical services for all ages. Resettlers agreed to forfeit 
to the crown all rights to ancestral homes and land in return for the promise of a better 
life for their children, jobs and modern amenities. However, the “good life” remained a 
distant prospect as they emptied slop pails in a subdivision. 
 It is easy to blame officials in distant offices for the pain of resettlement, but in 
some cases coastal people pressured the FHRC to approve  moves that offered better 
access to medical services and an easier commute for those who worked on CNR coastal 
boats. It also held out the possibility of home ownership after the move. Interventions by 
politicians, who responded to requests from constituents in reception and growth centres, 
undermined the authority of the Resettlement Committee. Rural development officers 
warned of the dangers of concentrating too many people in one area, but their warnings 
went unheeded. Dr. A. W. Needler was wrong when he told the Federal/Provincial 
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Advisory Committee that no one could have predicted the housing crisis. The social and 
economic that arose in Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour were predictable and the 
people suffered the consequences of government ineptitude. 
  
 168 
Chapter V 
Segregation and Social Alienation in Growth Centres: Placentia, Trepassey, 
Harbour Breton, and Stephenville - St. George’s 
  
Introduction 
 A study of the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program should 
include intangibles. Statistics on the number of families moved and communities 
evacuated do not measure the psychological or social trauma resettlers endured in 
reception centres. This chapter examines the forces that shaped resettlers‟ lives in four 
urban growth centres of Placentia, Trepassey, Harbour Breton, and Stephenville. I 
selected Trepassey and Harbour Breton, two major fisheries growth centres, and 
Placentia and Stephenville, two towns whose growth was fostered by the railway and US 
military bases. Fishery Products Ltd. converted its seasonal plant in Trepassey to a year-
round plant supplied by offshore draggers in 1966 while BC Packers of Harbour Breton 
wanted additional workers to expand production of frozen fish in this period. While the 
two offshore fisheries bases were short of labour, the economies of the two service towns 
were shrinking due to the downsizing of US and CNR operations.  
 Quality of life, satisfaction with the move, and whether a household felt alienated 
in a new environment are as important as economic security in weighing the success of 
FHRP. Studies of resettlement identify lack of counselling in sending and receiving 
communities, before and after the move, caused unnecessary trauma for both resettlers 
and long-time residents. The Resettlement Committee, which concentrated on evacuating 
outports, ignored the psychological and social impact of moving families from  
household production to a market economy. There were no regional field offices in place 
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before C&SD took control of the program in 1967. A. W. Needler, chairman of the 
Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee advised the Committee that fisheries 
development was the primary reason for federal government‟s involvement.1 The goal 
was to raise incomes of rural households, and to benefit the next generation. Needler 
preferred to stress the objectives of the program and ignore the social cost, particularly 
for the elderly. However, E. M. Gosse, Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Newfoundland, 
declared that the mechanics of moving people and laying out subdivisions was a “simple 
process”  compared to making resettlement centres viable.2 He asked the Committee to 
consider the benefits of revitalizing the inshore fishery through a process of 
diversification and modernization and to decrease the pace community evacuations. 
 In the previous chapter I discussed moves to two minor reception centres wherein 
the underemployed resettled fishing households could choose to join the ranks of the 
unemployed in the growth centre or return each year to the old community to prosecute 
the fishery as before. In this chapter I examine how resettlers integrated into urban 
environments. It brought about a radical change in the lifestyle for all ages, but for the 
older generation and those who left houses behind, it was especially painful. The older 
generation longed for the social connections that were lost in the transition to modernity. 
The social, cultural and economic fabric of the ancestral community became a painful 
memory for those who were unable to adjust to an economy that devalued their skills and 
forced them to accept the responsibilities and expenses of urban life. This chapter 
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examines how resettled households in four urban reception centres managed cultural 
change. 
Placentia 
 Placentia, once the capital of the French fishery in Newfoundland, was 
transformed into a service centre by a railway construction boom in the late nineteenth 
century and construction of US military bases at Argentia in the 1940s. At the time the 
Household Resettlement Committee, in response to political pressure, approved Placentia 
as a growth centre the two main employers were laying off workers. Placentia is a prime 
example of how politicians interfered with the selection of growth centres. The Placentia 
East Association of Towns and Community Councils saw resettlement as a means to get 
federal and provincial governments to improve infrastructure in the area and reverse the 
economic downturn. At a meeting of the Association G. A. Frecker and Richard Cashin 
promised support for the Association‟s proposal to make the Placentia area a reception 
centre for the Placentia Bay East outports.
3
 Frecker made a case for approving the 
Association‟s request in a letter to F. W. Rowe. Frecker pointed to plans for a new 
regional high school, the existence of several clubs and organizations in the area, the 
area‟s water and sewerage system, and the town‟s proximity to the TCH and Long 
Harbour, the site of the Electric Reduction Co. as reasons why the FHRC should give 
serious consideration to the proposal.
4
 Frecker was preaching to the choir since Rowe and 
Cashin had informed Harnum that they were anxious to have the Placentia area 
                                                          
3
Meeting of Placentia East Association of Towns and Community Councils, 10 March 
1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S70, PANL. 
4
G. A. Frecker to F. W. Rowe, 5 April 1967. GN39/1, Box 126, File S70, PANL. 
 171 
designated a growth centre.
5
 When an application had the backing of a provincial cabinet 
minister and the Parliamentary Secretary to the federal Minister of Fisheries, it placed a 
lot of pressure on the FHRC to ignore economic realities and approve growth centres. 
The Committee approved moves from Port Anne, Great Paradise, Little Paradise, 
Southeast Bight, Red Island, Port Royal, and Merasheen to Placentia, Dunville, 
Jerseyside, and Freshwater. 
 The Rural Development Branch of ARDA encouraged a “carrot and stick 
approach,” but reminded resettlement administrators that “many people would be 
unprepared sociologically and psychologically to live [where] they [would] be strangers 
to their own neighbours and where they [would] have new commodities they [had] never 
dreamed of.”6 The Rural Development Branch suggested the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Centralization should send social animators and counsellors into sending 
communities to prepare residents for life in the new centre. Nonetheless, resettlement 
proceeded with minimal counselling before or after moves. 
 M. Elaine Duggan, a social welfare student at Memorial University, conducted a 
questionnaire-interview study of 27 resettled households at Placentia.
7
 The majority of 
resettlers interviewed felt content before resettlement. Three out of four respondents said 
they were satisfied to live out their lives in the old community if the resettlement program 
had not intervened. Discontentment among the older generation began to set in with the 
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departure of the young people when assistance was offered. Resettlers identified 
difficulty recruiting teachers, removal of parish headquarters from the islands, rumours of 
post office closures and the departure of merchants as push factors. Seventy-four percent 
of the sample interviewed felt compelled to relocate. They reported that they felt “real 
scared” when the merchant closed shop. Not surprisingly, respondents who were unable 
to move homes experienced the greatest social disconnect.
8
 The loss of churches, schools, 
and halls haunted them. They now worshipped in a place that had no connection to their 
past. Weddings, baptisms, and funerals had taken place in another setting. People could 
be moved around, but the sense of community was lost in growth centres where 
neighbours were strangers. Many householders commented on the loss of gardens and the 
significant increase in the cost of living. Others regretted being forced to live away from 
family during the fishing season. Lack of harbour facilities at Placentia forced resettled 
fishers to return to old fishing grounds. Loyola Pomeroy and his wife, the last household 
to leave Great Paradise, returned each April to the old community. Asked by a CBC 
reporter why they returned each year, Mrs. Pomeroy replied: 
I mean to leave a place where you can earn plenty for your family and go to some 
place where you can‟t do that it‟s frightening [sic]. Can‟t you understand that?9  
 
Several Great Paradise families removed their children from school in April and 
remained in the old community until November. Concerned that this practice disrupted 
their children‟s education, they asked government to reopen the school. 
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 The households who moved to Placentia competed with townspeople for jobs in a 
declining economy. The two biggest employers were scaling back operations as resettlers 
were moving in. Duggan reported 70 percent of householders interviewed at Placentia 
were on social assistance. Householders felt that resettlement offered more opportunities 
for the young people, but did not feel the parents gained anything. A former resident of 
Davis Cove reported that his children had benefited from the move, but he was 100 
percent worse off himself.
10
 Many respondents found the people of Placentia unfriendly. 
They felt a “coldness” and “loneliness” in Placentia that they had not heretofore 
experienced.
11
 To buffer the hostility relocatees generally resettled in clusters, which 
Duggan described as welfare ghettos. Only about a quarter of households interviewed 
considered resettlement a success.
12
 The remainder identified lack of counselling as the 
cause of their distress. All subjects claimed that “no one helped them to prepare to meet 
the many difficulties encountered in adapting to a different way of life.”13 Duggan 
concluded that if officials had treated the people more humanely much of the bitterness 
could have been avoided. Rev. Philip Lewis, former parish priest at Merasheen and a 
strong advocate of resettlement, alleged government put families into very poor homes in 
Placentia.
14
 Duggan concluded that government should have taken a more active role in 
providing decent housing.  
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 Parzival Copes claimed the lack of counselling services resulted in moves to 
centres with fewer opportunities for employment than the community they abandoned.
15
 
Perhaps politicians feared that more direct intervention was likely to intensify attacks on 
the program, but lack of information created unhappy people who blamed government for 
placing them in such circumstances. Most of the interviewees stated that they felt more 
isolated and less happy than before the move. Some questioned the rationale for 
evacuating communities a short time after constructing a wharf, a community stage or 
installing a diesel generator. A fish plant, a public wharf, and a power plant lost its utility 
when the FHRC approved the evacuation of Merasheen. Evacuations often occurred 
suddenly and caught the householders unprepared for life in a new community where 
they struggled to find jobs and decent housing. While welfare recipients were the most 
likely to claim government forced them to move, unemployment reduced the morale of 
all resettlers. Some unemployed fishers informed Duggan that they felt “useless.” Others 
expressed anger at the government for misleading them. They blamed themselves and the 
government for their ignorance of conditions in Placentia. Duggan concluded respondents 
felt a degree of isolation and alienation unknown in the old community. 
 There was political pressure from Cashin, F. W. Rowe and Frecker, who were 
under pressure from the Placentia East Association of Towns and Community Councils, 
to persuade the FHRC to designate the greater Placentia area a growth centre. The port 
was an unlikely choice. It did not have a fish plant, community stage or any facilities to 
accommodate inshore fishers whose stages were still in the old community and could not 
accommodate longliners. Cashin wanted to improve the facilities at Southern Harbour, 
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Arnold‟s Cove, and Jerseyside by salvaging community stages from Oderin, Merasheen, 
and Harbour Buffett.
16
 A bitter pill for the fishers, who had resisted relocation, to 
swallow. If life on the islands was substandard, the Duggan study demonstrates that 
unless planners carefully appraised the assets of the sending community and the potential 
of the reception centre, the move was unlikely to benefit anyone. Resettlement officials 
needed to get to know the people before deciding if they ought to be moved, and having 
determined that they could benefit from resettlement, ensure they had enough information 
to make rational decisions. In most cases the resettlement official made a hasty visit, 
talked to the elite classes, and left it up to the local committee to organize the move. 
Counsellors needed to work with families for several months before the move and follow 
them into growth centres to help them adjust to the new environment. It was equally 
important for field workers to prepare the growth centre for the influx. In 1967 C&SD 
began to set up Regional Development Offices (RDO) to mediate the transition. 
 Unemployment was the greatest single problem facing uprooted families at 
Placentia.
17
 Some sought relief by commuting seasonally or weekly between Placentia 
and the old community. When vandals, thieves, and/or rodents destroyed buildings and 
gear, fishers lost the opportunity to return to the old community to work. Resettled 
families were not only the victims of an ill-managed fisheries modernization program, 
but also victims of crime. Burry advised Harnum to request the RCMP to patrol 
abandoned harbours in order to discourage vandalism. Some families lost so much gear 
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and equipment that they faced mortgage foreclosures and eviction from homes.
18
 The 
Department of Public Welfare refused to assist families that moved under the FHRP. 
Burry advised Harnum to meet with Welfare officials to sort out the problem.
19
  
 Approximately 200 fishing households moved into the Placentia area from 21 
different outports. The greatest number came from Merasheen (20), Bar Haven (12), Red 
Island (15) and Harbour Buffett (10).
20
 The Placentia  Fishermen‟s Development 
Association worried that unless the Department of Fisheries built a  breakwater and a 
community stage equipped with cutting lines, the resettled people would become chronic 
welfare cases.
21
 F. J. Evans, Director of Rural Development, identified three categories of 
fishermen at Placentia, each with their own special needs: longliner fishermen who would 
be selling their catch fresh to a plant at St. Bride‟s; the fishers of Placentia who used local 
grounds; and the resettled fishermen who had premises on the islands. A real drawback 
for the latter group was lack of access to gear during winter months when gear 
maintenance normally occurred.
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 Some of the 200 fishers who moved to Placentia were older and incapacitated 
men, but most were able fishermen hobbled by lack of facilities.
22
 Harnum felt 
“everything possible must be done to utilize the fish resources of the [Placentia] Bay for 
the benefit of the people of the area and the province.”23 It was galling for fishers who 
moved from communities in which public wharves, breakwaters, fish plants and collector 
stations existed, to listen to officials suggest that they should volunteer their labour to 
build new facilities and plants.
24
 They reminded Evans that government had moved them 
and it was government‟s responsibility to make facilities available.25 Harnum warned 
Sametz that unless corrective measures were undertaken soon, independent, productive 
fishers would be forced into dependency and become social outcasts.
26 
 
Trepassey 
 Most problems at Placentia were related to the high rate of unemployment as 
CNR and the military base downsized, but in the case of Trepassey employment was not 
an issue for relocatees. The fish plant needed their labour. In 1966 Fishery Products Ltd. 
converted the Trepassey plant from a seasonal to a year-round operation and was anxious 
to acquire a stable workforce for the plant and trawlers as well as increase the number of 
inshore fishers fishing into Trepassey. Gus Etchegary informed Aidan Maloney that 90 
percent of plant workers and inshore fishermen selling fish to the plant lived outside 
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Trepassey.
27
 The company vice-president hoped to correct the imbalance by recruiting 
employees from al parts of the province. Harnum met with Father F. J. Mullowney, 
parish priest, and Gordon Shea, plant manager, at Trepassey. During the meeting 
Mullowney offered church land for a housing development and Fishery Products agreed 
to build  35 houses.
28
 The province agreed to develop 115 lots to accommodate relocated 
families.
29
 Meanwhile, some workers, unable to locate suitable accommodations, quit the 
plant and the town.
30
 Initially interest in company houses was high, but when resettled 
families learned a lot supplementary grant would soon be available they delayed making 
a commitment. Edgar Hoskins, Herbert Oram, Robert Crocker, Thomas Young, and 
Darius Crocker wanted the Resettlement Agreement amended “to allow families to be 
together in areas where work is available and decent homes in which to live.”31 Etchegary 
warned Albert Vivian that uncertainty over supplementary grants put the whole 
centralization program at risk.
32
 
 In February 1968 Cashin announced that CMHC and NLHC were assembling 
land for the proposed Fishery Products development.
33
  By November 1968 21 families 
occupied company housing, 13 of which were Protestants from Hampden and Change 
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Islands. Field worker L. N. Woolfrey was not impressed by the size or quality of the 
company houses. He predicted the three bedroom bungalows were unlikely to last longer 
than five years due to poor grade of materials. Leaky roofs accounted for some of the 
discontent among resettlers, but much of their dissatisfaction can be traced to the 
workplace.
34
 
 Working conditions in the plant were far from ideal. Workers stood for ten hour 
shifts six days a week earning minimum wages. After working more than 50 hours a 
trimmer netted little more than $50 and women earned considerably less on the packing 
line. Male filleters or „cutters‟ were at the top of the wage structure. They were 
considered the most skilled and the discharge hands who toiled in the hold of the dragger 
shovelling fish were an underclass. Work in the fish factories was gendered and 
hierarchical while the pluralistic family-based and more egalitarian. The fishermen-
loggers accustomed to less structured workday had difficulty adjusting to the monotony 
of feeding the industrial machine. When the company introduced an incentive program, 
some were unable to maximize bonuses. Management, when possible, demoted them to 
lower paying jobs where maximum performance bonuses were lower than for cutters. 
Introduction of an incentive program boosted productivity in the plant, but it widened the 
gap between the classes of workers. The pay differential between cutters and discharge 
hands and the difference between the earnings of males and females broadened. The 
increased efficiencies allowed management to reduce hours of work, eliminate overtime 
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and keep hourly wage rates minimal.
35
 Rent, which was deducted from employees‟ pay 
cheques at source, remained unchanged. Left with little disposable income, workers 
became demoralized and quit their jobs and the town.
36
 The rural development officer 
alleged Fishery Products saved $150 per worker per month by adopting the incentive 
program, but it created tensions in the workplace and undermined workforce stability.
37
  
 Resettled families considered returning home. Some typical comments Woolfrey 
heard were: “Plan to get out of this place in the spring and not coming back; can‟t save a 
cent; worst [sic] off than before; would stay here if I was getting enough money; we‟re 
working for nothing, just able to feed the family; the water here is not fit to drink, but we 
have to drink it, and every family here have had children sick with diarrhea and vomiting; 
I‟m satisfied with the house now, but it‟s not going to stay that way - it‟s built poorly.”38 
The allegations regarding unsatisfactory drinking water were confirmed by Department 
of National Health and Welfare inspectors.
39
 
 Woolfrey found fault in the character of the people. He attributed their financial 
predicament to weak moral character, singling out their propensity to spend money on 
alcohol and cars rather than invest in houses. He failed to mention that the plant was 15 
kilometres from the subdivision and the company offered no alternative transportation.
40
 
He alleged that many of problems arose from a long history of dependence on able-
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bodied relief which challenged householders‟ ability to cope with the routine of industrial 
employment and their ability to cope in a cash society.
41
 He surmised that years of living 
on relief orders and merchant credit left them unprepared for integration into a cash 
economy. Woolfrey did not question why they were not more prepared or why Fishery 
Products had to recruit 90 percent of its plant employees from areas outside Trepassey. 
 Protestants found living in an all Catholic community troublesome. A typical 
comment heard from them was along these lines: “There‟s no church and we‟re not going 
to stay without a church. No church is ok for so long but not for a lifetime.”42 Religious 
differences could account for some discontent in a province in which denominationalism 
remained so entrenched that it divided communities and influenced hiring of public 
servants long after the practice had been supposedly abolished.
43
 The Catholic settlers 
from Placentia and St. Mary‟s Bays adjusted more easily to life in Trepassey. The 
transition from outport to growth centre was less traumatic was left out of the equation. 
The families from Change Islands and Hampden had to send their children to a school in 
which Protestant children, labelled infidels, remained outside classrooms during morning 
prayer.
44
 The overcrowding of schools interfered with the education of all students.  
 Shortage of classroom space plagued all categories of growth centres. Trepassey 
was no exception. The baby boom alone overtaxed many community schools in the 
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1960s. Mullowney, who recorded 163 births from 1967 to 1969, contended that 
centralization without provision for schools created a serious problem for the local board 
and the centralization program.
45
  The priest noted that children attended classes in 
inadequate schools, condemned buildings and a parish hall without bathrooms. 
Mullowney stated that in September 1970 there would be no space for 40 children. The 
frustrated priest asked government to support construction of a new elementary school.
46
 
If the Catholic board was unable to accommodate all students, it could be assumed that 
the board would give priority to Catholic children. It was unfair of Woolfrey to fault 
resettlers for moving back to Change Islands or Hampden where their children were 
guaranteed a place in the school system. The second five-year federal-provincial 
Household Resettlement Program approved only communities with sufficient classrooms 
as growth centres and DREE constructed new schools in urban centres. Sametz urged the 
Deputy Minister of Education, John Acreman, to complete the half-finished school at 
Trepassey and remove what he considered to be a hindrance to development.
47
 
 Schools and housing were impediments to resettlement in all growth centres. 
Fishery Products Ltd. invested in new home construction and bunkhouses in Burin and 
Trepassey. The bunkhouse at Trepassey was a single room with two tiered iron cots and a 
single bathroom for all. It was designed to house male workers only. Young women were 
expected to board in a private home or commute. All of the company houses were 
identical three-bedroom prefabricated bungalows. The subdivision resembled a 
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temporary camp set in a barren, gray landscape. I lived in the subdivision for four months 
in 1969 and was struck by the sameness and lack of colour throughout the neighbourhood 
which was shrouded in fog on most days. It was a colourless place for people accustomed 
to brightly painted homes. Throughout the neighbourhood there was not even an alder to 
break the monotony. There were no playgrounds for children or a common area for 
neighbours to mingle as they had in their home communities. Men and women, who had 
put in a mind-numbing ten-hour shift at a noisy, stinking plant, were confined to their 
homes. Segregated from the main community, and cut off from their pastor, tensions 
within families sometimes boiled over into disputes that required RCMP intervention.
48
 
 A few resettled families purchased homes but most continued to rent. Fishery 
Products hoped families would buy houses, and become permanent citizens and 
employees. Woolfrey observed that “as long as the householders lived in rental units and 
remained strangers, they could easily throw off the frustration of an insecure job and 
return to the security of a familiar environment.”49 Some threatened to give back the 
resettlement grants and return home. Religion played a significant part in keeping the 
new settlers strangers. If Protestant and Anglican families from Hampden, Bear Cove and 
Change Islands had stayed they might have overcome their sense of alienation. Catholic 
families from St. Mary‟s and Placentia Bays suffered less trauma but former residents 
Merasheen regretted having to leave a fine church building and way of life behind.
50
 
Religious affiliation played a significant role in relocatees‟ choice of reception centre. 
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But the Protestant and Anglican families who resettled to the predominantly Anglican 
Harbour Breton also had difficulties adjusting so one should not place too much emphasis 
on religion. The settlers from the northern bays had the option of returning to the old 
community but the Resettlement Act barred relocatees from permanent residence in 
vacated outports. Tension in Harbour Breton resulted more from competition for jobs 
than religion.  
Harbour Breton 
 Education and housing crises were present in every category of growth centre and 
Harbour Breton was not exempt. Rural Development Officer L. C. Shirley identified 
housing as the biggest hurdle.
51
 He reported that families were living in trailers on the BC 
Packers parking lot, and estimated 40-50 new homes were needed immediately, but 
NLHC had no plans to construct any in 1967. Mayor Coady and Rev. Edward Marsh 
favoured moving houses from evacuated communities into a land assembly area, but 
Shirley doubted the older homes could survive the rigours of the launch.
52
 BC Packers 
manager, W. R. Murdoch, invited representatives of NLHC, Community and Social 
Development and Municipal Affairs to visit Harbour Breton to discuss resettlement with 
householders wishing to make permanent moves. Murdoch hoped the housing crisis 
could be resolved through new construction, relocation of existing houses, and provision 
of subsidized rental units.
53
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 The shortage of classrooms in the Anglican school was particularly acute due to 
the prevalence of Anglican communities on the south coast. Rev. Edward Marsh, notified 
F. W. Rowe that overcrowding of the Anglican school system in Harbour Breton had 
reached a critical point.
54
 He, like other priests, asked for special funds to offset the cost 
of providing healthy classrooms for all children.
55
 One of four teachers assigned to the 
church basement notified Marsh that due to being required to work in an unhealthy 
workplace he would be resigning.
56
 The Society of United Fishermen, a Protestant 
fraternity, also requested special funding for new school construction.
57
 
 The arrival of new families not only overcrowded community schools, but also 
created a surplus of labour in the plant. Plant workers from Harbour Breton questioned 
why the government was bringing new workers into the community when townspeople 
were capable of processing all fish landed. Tension between the long-time residents and 
resettlers intensified when fresh fish markets declined in the late 1960s. The union 
president, Lawrence J. Mahoney, described that the labour situation at the plant as 
“desperate.”58 He contended the influx of settlers depressed wages and reduced hours of 
employment. He claimed that workers had earned only $45 over a two week period and 
the labour leader anticipated that when the company reduced its trawler fleet and 
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concentrated on harvesting ocean perch, hours of employment would decline even 
further. Mahoney warned that conditions were certain to deteriorate unless the company 
procured more trawlers or the government intervened to provide alternate jobs for the 
new arrivals.
59
 The message from the union was clear: the labour market is saturated, so 
stop relocating outport families to Harbour Breton. 
 Disillusionment and discontent among the resettled families arose from a feeling 
they had been misled by government officials who promised them more money than the 
resettlement program allowed. Some householders alleged resettlement officials gave 
them false information about the lot supplementary allowance.
60
 A householder from 
Jersey Harbour named three field workers who promised residents the maximum 
supplementary grant of $3,000 if they moved to Harbour Breton. Under the Agreement a 
householder was limited to the cost of a lot plus cost of installing services. Nonetheless 
resettlers appealed to the Premier to intervene on their behalf.
61
 They accused the field 
workers of using fraudulent tactics and misinformation.
62
 It is likely that confusion arose 
when overenthusiastic and inexperienced functionaries felt their supervisors would rate 
their effectiveness by the number of communities resettled. 
 The Anglican Parish of Harbour Breton included several designated outports and 
the rector was concerned by the “great problem of resettling families on the south 
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coast.”63 Edward Marsh wanted assurances that when the communities of Red Cove, 
Little Bay West, Sagona Island, and Jersey Harbour were evacuated, the transition from 
outport to growth point would take place “systematically and with as little inconvenience 
as possible for those involved.”64 He stressed the importance of transporting houses from 
these places to minimize the capital and social cost for the affected families, and 
contended many houses were in good condition and built to a higher standard than most 
houses in Harbour Breton.
65
 
  W. R. Murdoch, BC Packers manager at Harbour Breton, also hoped for a 
resolution to the housing problem.
66
 Like plant managers at Burin, Grand Bank, and 
Fortune, he questioned how NLHC could construct 350 units at Marystown and neglect 
other growth points.  Murdoch advised Vivian that the Harbour Breton plant might be 
forced to operate at less than maximum capacity unless the housing authority cleared the 
bottleneck. In May 1968 BC Packers met with representatives from Community and 
Social Development, Canada Manpower, and the Housing Commission at Harbour 
Breton to discuss problems that interfered with recruitment of plant workers and trawler 
crews.
67
 Murdoch was aware that the Lake Group of Companies, John Penney and Sons, 
and Fishery Products were competing with BC Packers for the same labourers. Etchegary 
was especially eager to recruit workers for the Trepassey plant. He informed Harnum that 
there were houses available in Trepassey for families who wished to resettle from south 
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coast settlements.
68
 He did not consider religion or the school situation at Trepassey to be 
a deterrent.  
 Nonetheless, the schools crisis was discussed at a meeting of division heads in 
Confederation Building. Harnum informed the group that schools in Harbour Breton and 
all growth centres were “becoming a real problem and threatened to become more acute 
in the next couple of years if planning did not start immediately.”69 Fred Kirby, 
Superintendent of Education, proposed construction of an amalgamated high school to 
accommodate Anglican and Roman Catholic students.
70
 Kirby also proposed a new 
funding arrangement in which the province would pay 90 percent of the cost rather than 
the usual 70. But it was not until the governments entered into a second household 
resettlement agreement that Ottawa began to finance new school construction. Ed 
Nugent, Director of Field Services, noted the hospital was inadequate to meet the needs 
of a growing population and the absence of a facility to care for the aged.
71
 The senior 
bureaucrats met at Harbour Breton with an elite all-male group. In attendance were 
Father Grace, Rev. Marsh, the plant manager, the mayor and other local leaders. It was 
clear to all that the labour shortage could not be corrected until adequate schools and 
affordable houses became available. Evans reported that NLHC was preparing an initial 
50 lot layout and had plans to develop another 120 lots in the second phase. With no 
serviced building lots available, the Town Council, adopting the attitude “that people 
must have somewhere to live,” turned a blind eye to the construction on lots that would 
                                                          
68
Etchegary to Harnum, 2 August, 1967. GN39/1, Box 129, S201, PANL. 
69Memorandum “Re: Meeting Concerning Planning Visit to Harbour Breton.” GN39/1, 
Box 130, S261, PANL. 
70Memorandum “Re: Meeting Concerning Planning.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL. 
71Memorandum “Re: Meeting Concerning Planning.” GN39/1, Box 130, S261, PANL. 
 189 
be difficult to service in the future.
72
 The shortage of carpenters contributed to the 
construction of houses that were of a lower standard than the well-kept houses left in 
places such as Miller‟s Passage. Within a few months of the visit, cabinet authorized 
NLHC to construct 20 subsidized rental units at Harbour Breton.
73
 
 When the visiting delegation met with representatives of the Anglican school 
board, Marsh informed them that the local board was operating a school in a condemned 
building and classes met in spaces that were poorly lit and poorly ventilated.
74
 The plant 
manager considered the situation to be so dire that the offered to donate $25,000 to the 
two school boards to help resolve the classroom shortage that was hindering recruitment 
of workers from Sagona, Red Cove, and Miller‟s Passage. The provincial delegation 
visited the three communities and at Sagona met with 11 Catholic householders whose 
children had no teacher.
75
 Parents informed the officials that the Anglican teacher refused 
to admit them to the one-room school. The meeting with the distressed families in Sagona 
affirmed bureaucratic convictions that families must be moved for the sake of the 
children. It is also an example of inefficiency and unfairness of the denominational 
school system. A remote community could possibly attract one teacher but not always 
one for each denomination. 
 In many instances families moved without improving their condition. The fishery, 
regardless of the sector exploited, had historically produced uncertain incomes due to 
vagaries of the catch, markets and weather. During the winter of 1968 BC Packers 
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purportedly had a labour shortage, but in the fall of 1968 the union leader alleged a 
surplus of labour created by the influx of resettlers caused underemployment and 
depressed wages.
76
 The company was down to a three-dragger operation and evacuation 
of neighbouring outports would lead to a further reduction of incomes. Sametz replied 
that Harbour Breton was a designated fisheries growth centre and the resettlement 
committee had authority to assist households who wished to move from any designated 
outport. The Deputy Minister attempted to appease Mahoney by alleging that the 
householders moving from neighbouring communities intended to continue fishing in the 
traditional way and were moving to Harbour Breton to take advantage of superior 
services.
77
 There was an admission that the industrial offshore fishery needed the inshore 
fishery to survive and this gave the people in designated outports a degree of control over 
moves.   
 Aidan Maloney doubted that Harbour Breton had greater potential for growth.
78
 In 
fact, production numbers indicated the BC Packers plant was in decline. Bill Rowe 
informed the town that the Resettlement Division no longer supported moving additional 
families into Harbour Breton.
79
 He argued static wages and declining production figures 
for the plant precluded assisting more moves to the town. Harnum and Sametz disagreed 
with Rowe. In June 1970 the Director of Resettlement and the Deputy Minister proceeded 
with plans to resettle Jersey Harbour into Harbour Breton as soon as possible.
80
 The 
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divergence of opinions among ministers and bureaucrats indicated that people in the halls 
of power operated at cross purposes and sent conflicting messages. 
 It was easy for a deputy minister with responsibility for reducing the number of 
coastal communities to dismiss problems in the fishery as temporary and to forge ahead 
with resettlement of families from marginal communities. A cost-benefit analysis of the 
FHRP presented to the Annual Meeting of the Federal-Provincial Advisory Committee 
Newfoundland Household Resettlement Committee 12 June 1969 purported that 
relocatees had little idea of the cost of living in the reception centre.
81
 A. L. Robb and R. 
E. Robb identified lack of information as a major concern. Some interviewees alleged 
government officials provided misleading information. They suggested that people 
should be counselled on the cost of housing, employment support, moving costs, and 
about government‟s obligation under the program. They also suggested moving too many 
too quickly into a reception centre could create a catastrophic situation similar to 
Arnold‟s Cove. Ralph Matthews, Iverson, and Copes agreed.82 
 The town manager emphasized the necessity of solving the housing shortage, but 
residents contended disorderly development created a new set of problems. One 
complained that the construction boom destroyed hay meadows and vegetable gardens 
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which had sustained the older residents for generations.
83
 The Branch Manager of CMHC 
criticized the town council for allowing householders to construct houses in “a haphazard 
way on unserviced lots” while serviced lots remained vacant.84 But chaotic development 
occurred mainly because the resettlers arrived before the province had completed a 
municipal plan and the inexperienced council was left to respond to the crisis on an ad 
hoc basis. Settlers claimed they had traded comfortable homes for a dilapidated house in 
Harbour Breton. To expect low-income workers to construct houses to CMHC standards 
was unrealistic, and the resettlement planners knew it. The chaos was not created by 
locals inexperienced in local governance but by short-sightedness of planners in Ottawa 
and St. John‟s who had no plan except to close out as many settlements as possible as 
quickly as possible. Resettlement planners reacted rather than led.  
 The 79 householders who moved into Harbour Breton to the end of 1969 were 
accustomed to building homes without permits or bank financing on a site selected by the 
homeowner. Traditionally the aim of most was “to have a cheap house on cheap land and 
nothing owed.”85 They valued freedom over order and refused to succumb to the dictates 
of modernist planners who James Scott purported preferred straight lines and grids.
86
 
Town plans, permits and building inspectors were foreign to outport people. Deborah 
Jackman, formerly of Grole, recalled how her mother always worried about money to pay 
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the school tax, water tax, property tax and all the additional expenses.
87
 She believed 
resettlement officials never realized the full impact of uprooting families to a place 
wherein the cost of living was so much higher and subsistence activities were curbed by 
regulations and lack of farmland. Jackman‟s parents, unable to find employment and 
unfamiliar with the fishing grounds in the area, survived on social services.
88
 
 G. W. Porter, a native of Harbour Breton, described the Household Resettlement 
Program as a “topsy turvy affair” and not an economic development program.89 He 
argued that Harbour Breton had been permitted to grow without a co-ordinated plan. He 
advised MP Donald Jamieson that the 40 households who were about to move to Harbour 
Breton should be resettled at Deadman‟s Cove, a location close to fishing grounds. Porter 
suggested that government supply the newcomers with charts of local grounds, rather 
than expect them to rely on landmarks as local fishers did. Here was an opportunity to 
modernize the inshore fishery by allowing fishers to specialize in harvesting. Inshore 
fishers could supplement the catches of offshore vessels, increase the profitability of BC 
Packers, and increase incomes of plant workers. The manager of the Booth Fisheries 
recognized the importance of preserving a viable shore fishery to reduce dependence on 
highly capitalized offshore trawlers.
90
 Porter outlined the advantages of Jersey Harbour 
over Harbour Breton, but the Director of Resettlement remained convinced that the 
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moves to Harbour Breton were successful.
91
 He did not address the other issues such as 
distance from fishing grounds, financial and emotional stress or the low incomes of plant 
worker. 
 Dan Tate, a Frontier College worker at Harbour Breton, informed Sametz that the 
people of Harbour Breton viewed “the program with suspicion, and ask[ed] why people 
are moving here when there are not enough jobs for the town‟s citizens.”92  If people 
were as ignorant of the resettlement plan as Tate professed, then Harnum‟s assertion that 
householders voluntarily petitioned is questionable. Letters to the CBC and the Burin 
Peninsula Post professed “the resettlement program was the centre of inquiries and the 
centre of confusion - en masse” at Harbour Breton.93 The authors demanded a full-time 
field worker to answer the many questions raised by the relocatees daily. Harnum‟s 
urgent request to the Power Commission to extend electrical service to lots before 
families arrived from Jersey Harbour provides insight into just how mismanaged the 
FHRP was.  Despite Rowe‟s assurances to the town that his department would not be 
resettling more people to Harbour Breton, in the summer of 1970 it was business as 
usual. CMHC manager, J. P. Ryan, was anxious to fill unoccupied lots in the land 
assembly.
94
 Nonetheless, he advised Harnum that “a potentially dangerous health hazard” 
existed if families moved into a subdivision without water and sewer services or 
electrical connections 
95
 With 20 households en route he demanded immediate attention.  
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 G. J. O‟Reilly, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Co-operatives felt the 
evacuation of Jersey Harbour was rushed.
96
 O‟Reilly felt the community‟s potential for 
agricultural development was superior to Harbour Breton where the 25 to 30 acres of 
farmland had been used for housing, and municipal by-laws prevented animals from 
roaming inside town limits. Owners had to shoot horses and sell off sheep and cattle.
97
 
The Deputy Minister believed that the fishery would remain the mainstay of the south 
coast economy, but warned Newfoundland‟s herring fishery might be short-lived due to 
overfishing. The closure of the herring fishery would have a devastating effect on the 
south coast, particularly Harbour Breton, Burgeo and Isle aux Morts where herring 
reduction plants were a major employer.  
 Jean Marchand, Minister of DREE, issued a directive to W. N. Rowe: “I strongly 
urge that the Resettlement Committee approve no more moves to Harbour Breton until 
the capacity of educational facilities have been examined.”98 The Anglican rector, 
William Noel, informed Rowe that the Resettlement Division was responsible for a 
desperate school situation that had dragged on for three years.
99
 Noel contended that 
centralization had “upset the order of things,” and created much “concern and  
frustration” for the people of Harbour Breton, especially for the school board which was 
forced continue to accommodate some children in a church basement without 
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windows.
100
 The rector informed Marchand that the resettlement program created a high 
rate of unemployment in the town and wretched conditions for resettled families.  
 By 1970, 500 people had been assisted from Grole, Jersey Harbour and Little Bay 
West to Harbour Breton.
101
 A. Godwin, town clerk, claimed the high price of CMHC lots 
consumed lot supplementaries leaving resettled families with no money to cover the cost 
of water and sewer connections.
102
 Godwin argued that the cost of removing bog, 
surveying lots, and correcting elevation problems increased lot prices from $2,350 to 
$3,000, thus absorbing the full amount of the lot supplementary.
103
 Embarrassed by 
mistakes committed by government planners, the province agreed that C&SD should 
cover the cost of connecting relocated houses to water and sewer mains.
104
  
 In 1971 field worker, Sharon Driscoll had a mandate to assess “the degree of 
social adjustment among families who resettled into Harbour Breton and to determine 
some of the social problems they may have incurred.”105 Driscoll, whose study took place 
from 15 May to 15 August, aimed to measure the degree of social integration that had 
occrred by comparing the degree of religious involvement before and after the move, and 
by examining resettlers‟ attitudes towards Harbour Breton and whether length of 
residency affected attitudes. She noted that of the 674 who moved to the town from 1965 
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- 72, just under half moved prior to 1969, and the balance resettled thereafter. Resettlers 
constituted one-quarter of a total population of 2,600. The post 1969 group moved houses 
onto lots in a land assembly located about a kilometre from the main town. Driscoll 
selected 20 householders for the study: 10 from 1965-8 cohort whom she labelled long-
time resettlers (LTR); and 10 from the 1969 and 1971 group whom she classified as 
short-time resettlers (STR). She discovered that no one in the long-time group exceeded 
the age of 59 while 30% of  the subjects selected from the 1969-71 cohort were over 60 
years old, an indication that older householders were the most reluctant to leave. 
 In her effort to determine if length of residency influenced attitudes, Driscoll 
asked which place they considered home. Three-quarters of the STR cohort named the 
sending community, while half the LTR group named Harbour Breton. About half of all 
resettlers stated they would move to another town if given the opportunity. One third of 
LTR said they disliked living in Harbour Breton compared to half of STRs.  When 
Driscoll asked what the relocatees liked best about Harbour Breton there was a marked 
difference in the responses given. Sixty percent of LTR chose “increased school 
facilities” compared to only 30 percent of the STR selected education as the most 
important reason for moving into the town. One-third of both groups considered 
increased medical services to be the most important. Surprisingly only five percent of 
STR and 10 percent of the LTR said they moved for economic reasons. One-third of STR 
linked increased cost of living to dissatisfaction with life in Harbour Breton. The long-
time resettlers identified difficulty integrating into the town as the greatest handicap. Half 
of all the LTR cohort said they experienced difficulty while none of the short-time 
resettlers considered integration to be a concern, likely because they lived in a land 
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assembly a half mile from the main town where they formed a separate community. All 
of them were of the Anglican faith, and even though they moved into a predominantly 
Anglican town, church attendance of STR declined from 100 percent attendance in the 
old community to 30 percent in Harbour Breton. Attendance among  LTR fell from 100 
to 80 percent. Driscoll reported membership in church groups also declined for the two 
cohorts of Anglican resettlers. One woman, who said she had been an active member of 
her church prior to resettlement, felt “she didn‟t fit in” due to cliquishness of the 
congregation.
106
 In the sending communities the church and affiliated organizations such 
as the Anglican Church Women‟s Association (ACWA) and the Society of United 
Fishermen (SUF) formed the core of social life. The sense of pride welled up in a place 
when the congregation, which often meant the community, worked collectively to cut the 
timber, organize fundraisers, and come together as a team to build their church, schools 
and halls. In their new setting they felt they were strangers and outsiders. 
 Driscoll reported that none of the relocatees joined the local Lion‟s Club, the only 
secular men‟s social organization in town. Their reluctance to participate in any group 
activities created a rift between townspeople and resettler that was as real as the half mile 
of road that separated the subdivision from the main community. Outside school there 
were few opportunities for the younger generation to intermingle. There were very 
limited recreational activities for youth. A softball league provided the only organized 
recreational activity for youth. Driscoll concluded that Harbour Breton was a socially 
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segregated town in which there were several communities, or clusters, which seemed to 
physically separate themselves from the total community.
107
 
 Driscoll reported that the first four households who had arrived from Sagona 
Island felt no more at home in Harbour Breton than when they moved there in 1967. 
Lance C. Shirley, Director of Field Services, alleged families moved from Sagona due to 
poor educational and medical services, and downplayed the role of the sole merchant, C. 
W. Keeping. Keeping was eager to leave but would not leave before the FHRC 
designated Sagona an evacuated outport.
108
 He offered to move the process along by 
closing out his business and demolishing the buildings.
109
 In the end approval was 
obtained by less drastic, if irregular action. On 5 November1968, Harnum informed RDO 
Carl Evans that the Resettlement Committee had declared Sagona an evacuated outport 
without calling a public meeting or circulating the resettlement petition .
110
 In fall 1967 
“well equipped independent fishermen” traded “comfortable homes” for  uncertain 
employment and expensive housing in Harbour Breton.
111
 Here they confined their 
activities to a single neighbourhood and clung so strongly to each other that Driscoll 
declared:  “the nucleus of Sagona Island [had] been maintained to the exclusion of 
Harbour Breton.”112 She believed it would take at least a generation to subdue feelings of 
alienation.  
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 Each cluster refused to fraternize with other clusters of resettlers, or become 
members of the community at large. Conditions at the plant, where competition for jobs 
was keen, did little to encourage fraternization. The union executive blamed resettlers for 
depressing wages and reducing hours of employment in the plant. The townspeople 
ignored weak US markets for cod blocks and attributed underemployment to the influx of 
new settlers. The situation was exacerbated by the existence of several community 
clusters, each group intent on preserving lifelong social connections. Introversion stymied 
social integration of newcomers and townspeople and kept relocatees bound to a cluster. 
Driscoll purported that only a full time field counsellor could dissipate feelings of 
personal and social alienation among the new residents of Harbour Breton. In 1972 
Community and Social Development appointed her as rural development officer for the 
area. 
 The sharp rise in population taxed the human, financial and physical resources of 
towns that were in the process of forming municipal governments. The Harbour Breton 
council had little time to prepare for the influx of resettlers. The arrival of 650 settlers 
over a five-year period in a one-industry town overwhelmed facilities and increased 
competition for jobs.  Historically, surrounding communities shared a negative attitude 
toward Harbour Breton.
113
 After they resettled they saw no reason to change their 
opinion. The union executive, which ignored the contribution shore fishers made to the 
viability of the plant and the town viewed the settlers as a liability.
114
 It was a sentiment 
found in other growth centres. Nor was Harbour Breton the only place in which resettled 
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households identified difficulty integrating into the new community as the greatest 
drawback to resettlement.
115
 Growth centres became places of resentment and, 
sometimes, hostility. 
Stephenville-St. George‟s 
 Resentment against resettlers in the receiving community discouraged integration 
and kept newcomers strangers. In the St. George‟s Bay region the old residents felt the 
people from the small settlements had inferior moral standards and work ethics. Clyde 
Smith, the RDO at Corner Brook, commented on the resentment of Robinsonians to the 
settlement of  “undesirables” from Fischells and Heatherton into Robinson‟s.116 Smith 
summed up the relationship: “The true Robinsonian has a reputation for being above 
average in terms of efficiency and ambition and inclined to look down his nose at this 
less proud and prosperous folk from Fischells and Heatherton.”117 The RDO stressed the 
importance of alerting department field staff to the sensitivities of the people in receiving 
communities. Smith also felt that awareness of community attitudes by field staff and 
greater interdepartmental co-operation in the resettlement process could deflate tensions 
and resolve problems before conflict damaged relations between newcomers and 
residents.
118
 In 1968 C&SD did not have regional offices across Newfoundland to 
facilitate moves. The  Fischell‟s River to Heatherton move demonstrated the need for a 
trained field staff. An inexperienced rural development officer, R. L. Loder, unwittingly 
informed the community that householders relocating to Heatherton were eligible for lot 
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supplementary assistance.
119
 The RDO‟s assurance tipped the scales in favour of leaving. 
After the move householders learned that the FHRC had refused their applications 
because Heatherton was not a designated growth centre. Following a disappointing 
meeting with Harnum, a group of very irate relocatees stormed Loder‟s office demanding 
he honour his commitment to them.
120
 One householder and his spouse hired a Corner 
Brook law firm and threatened to haul the civil servant before the court.
121
 Sametz, who 
reviewed the case, concluded the resettlers were “well justified” and placed the blame 
squarely on Loder‟s inexperience and lack of training: 
Unfortunately Loder was new and had not realized that Heatherton had not been 
designated as an approved organized reception centre for purposes of 
supplementary assistance. Since the people undertook commitments on the basis 
of this information, the Department is vulnerable. Accordingly we must live up to 
the commitment and indicate to the people that we will cover the commitment as 
a special case without establishing precedents because of special needs.
122
  
 
The FHRC approved Heatherton as an organized reception centre for Fischell‟s River 
only. The case of Fischell‟s River may not have set a precedent but it is another example 
of how people at the margin, whether from Tack‟s Beach or Fischell‟s River, forced the 
FHRC to designate a growth centre. Mrs. Donald Whelan and her legless husband stood 
up to the state, demanded what the state had promised, and forced the bureaucrats to meet 
their commitment to the householders of Fischell‟s River. 
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 The Gallants to Stephenville move is another example of the mixed feelings in a 
sending community. The Stephenville RDO commented on the “apprehensiveness” of 
those who wished to remain.
123
 Loder reported rumour was taking its toll, and the 
questions uppermost in the minds of the 50 at the meeting were: “Are we forced to 
move?” and “Will services be discontinued?.”124 Some informed him that they had signed 
the petition to support their neighbours who wanted to move, but they did not wish to 
resettle. Loder reported 16 households opposed moving while 23 voted to go. An earlier 
petition recorded 25 of 31 householders in favour moving. Apparently those who signed 
to help out neighbours decided to withdraw their support.
125
 The softening of support for 
resettling might also be due to Keough‟s opposition to the move. The MHA made his 
position known to Bill Rowe.
126
 Keough informed Rowe that there was a danger the 
householders would be moved to places of unemployment. James Collier Sr., who owned 
the grocery store, a woods contracting company and the school bus and operated the post 
office, was firmly opposed to the move.
127
 Loder encouraged the move on humanitarian 
grounds. He admitted most were employed but their jobs were in Bowater‟s woods camps 
and required a difficult weekly commute. He also pointed out that the nearest medical 
services were at Stephenville, a distance of thirty miles. It was common for residents of 
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Gallants to walk five miles to the TCH to get the CN bus to the lumber camps or medical 
services. The only telephone for the whole community was located in Collier‟s store. 
Keough suggested a community with only a few welfare cases should not be resettled. He 
hinted the RDO was anxious to begin removing houses before the benefits of moving 
were known. Loder admitted that there was full employment, but argued the logging 
camps were closer to Stephenville and the loggers could commute daily. He was 
convinced the “many fine expensive homes” could be moved down the road.128 
 J. A. G. Macdonald, an engineer with the Department of Highways, confirmed the 
houses were suitable for relocating by road to Stephenville.
129
 Loder advised Harnum that 
there were no obstructions blocking the route to a site on the outskirts of Stephenville. 
The town council, enthusiastic at first, balked at the idea of a subdivision filled with 
relocated houses of questionable quality. Loder assured the council the town staff had the 
right to inspect the house before locating them in the subdivision.
130
 The Stephenville 
council invited Loder and the welfare officer to a special meeting to discuss the move. In 
the meeting the council adamantly opposed admitting any new resettlers into the town, 
especially a subdivision that would require the extension of the town‟s water and sewer 
mains. During the meeting councillors advocated shutting the doors to all resettled 
families. Municipal governments of Fortune, Grand Bank, and Stephenville were 
beginning to exercise greater autonomy within their jurisdiction. 
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 Municipal objections to filling subdivisions with salvaged houses in Stephenville 
may have been motivated by a desire to cut capital costs, but one can speculate they were 
aware of problems that arose in growth centres when large numbers of relocated 
households were concentrated on a town‟s perimeter. The Stephenville council decided to 
defer the matter until they had consulted with Community and Social Development. It 
stressed that “from a sociological point of view it would not be good planning to place all 
the new entrants to the town in the same neighbourhood.”131 According to Loder, they 
preferred the infilling option over “pocket concentration” which encouraged segregation. 
Stephenville‟s experienced municipal government had the confidence to proceed more 
carefully than a newly elected Board of Trustees. The town council was aware of 
sociological problems that emerged in Harbour Breton when settlers were concentrated 
on the perimeter. The FHRC  seems to have been more preoccupied with closing outports 
than helping coastal people integrate into the new community.
132
 Municipal leaders had 
different priorities.  
 The resettlement programs attracted criticism from clergy, municipal 
governments and some rural development specialists when it assisted moves to centres 
without planning. Inevitably tensions arose in reception centres wherein newcomer 
competed with old residents for scarce jobs and resettled children overcrowded schools. 
Resettlement created a distressful situation which benefited neither resettlers nor 
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townspeople. The inflow of new people created a surplus of labour which increased 
underemployment and unemployment and kept wages stagnant. All too often relocated 
householders, who were promised a better life, found themselves mired in conflict living 
in polluted subdivision in a town in which they were strangers.  
Conclusion 
 A goal of the FHRP was to create a modern, industrial fishery by transferring 
labour from small coastal communities at lowest economic cost. The planners accepted 
the subdivision model of development and seemingly learned little from past mistakes, 
perhaps because resettlement involved so many government departments and agencies. 
Bureaucrats in C&SD and Municipal Affairs ignored the trauma resettlement created for 
the older generation and gambled that a better educated and trained younger generation 
would transform the rural economy. C&SD continued to use the development models 
used  in Harbour Breton and elsewhere with very questionable results. Governments 
expected coastal people, accustomed to a lifestyle based in household production, to 
adjust to life in subdivisions with minimal services. Separated from extended family and 
traditional activities, householders drifted into dependence in a sometimes unfriendly, 
alien environment where they competed against resentful townsfolk for limited 
employment. Not surprisingly, they confined social relationships to those resettlers with 
whom they shared a common history. 
 The FHRP attracted criticism from clergy, municipal governments and some rural 
development specialists when it assisted moves to centres without any plan. Inevitably 
tensions arose in reception centres wherein newcomers competed with long-time 
residents for scarce jobs, and resettled children overcrowded schools. Resettlement 
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created a distressful situation which benefited neither settlers nor townspeople. The 
inflow of new people created a surplus of labour which increased underemployment and 
unemployment and kept wages stagnant. Too often a householder, who was promised a 
better life, found himself living in polluted subdivision in a town in which he remained an 
outsider. 
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Chapter VI 
Church and State: Detractors and Promoters of Resettlement  
Introduction 
 Throughout Newfoundland and Labrador‟s history as a colony, country and 
province churches exercised great influence over spiritual, social, educational and 
political institutions. Historians who explored sectarian themes contended the Roman 
Catholic and Anglican bishops controlled political parties in the nineteenth century and 
influenced the vote on Confederation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
1
 When 
Newfoundland joined Canada , the negotiators enshrined a century-old denominational 
school system in the constitution out of deference to church hierarchies. In so doing the 
negotiators weakened the foundation of small communities that supported two or three 
denominational schools. An amendment to the British North America Act guaranteed the 
Anglican, Roman Catholic and the Salvation Army churches control over education. 
 As chairs of school boards, male clergy had the power to approve new school 
construction or close a school, which often meant the closure of a settlement. By virtue of 
their position as rectors of parishes and chairs of school boards, priests controlled the 
institutions that, to a large degree, determined the social vitality of a community. In post-
Confederation Newfoundland political leaders and parents accepted education as the key 
to progress and the good life. A threat to education was a threat to the community, 
especially for those who saw education as a means for the next generation to break the 
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cycle of hardship and dependence. It freed children from dependence on a declining, 
marginal industry and gave girls an alternative to going into domestic service. 
Educational success depended on the efforts of clergy to recruit teachers for remote 
schools. In the post-war era, Newfoundland had the highest birthrate in Canada and 
recruitment of teachers for one-room all-grade schools was especially difficult. A rumour 
that there was no teacher hired for September was enough to destabilize a settlement, 
particularly when a centralization program made moves to centres with better schools 
possible. 
 Rural sometimes encompassed a half dozen points. Since these settlements were 
seldom linked by road to parish headquarters, it is not surprising that the priest took 
advantage of the state-sponsored centralization programs to consolidate far-flung 
parishes. Reports of school closures and movement of parish headquarters to the 
mainland struck at the core of island communities. Reduction of church services rumours 
of school closures created a state of uncertainty and anxiety that intensified when these 
events were followed by a visit from the Director of Resettlement.
2
 The church, which 
was a very gendered space, had the power to control the fate of communities. One 
resettler proclaimed: “Nar one of us didn‟t want to move but we never had no other 
                                                          
2
H. R. V. Earle, MHA, to Harnum, 6 September, 1966 and L. Shirley, RDO, Community 
and Social Development, Report on Visit to Point Rosie, 24 August, 1967. Point Rosie, 
GN39/1, File S143, Box 127, PANL. Earle informed Harnum, who had completed a visit 
to Point Rosie two days previous to Earle‟s arrival, that the majority supported 
resettlement, “especially the majority of women who wished to move for the sake of the 
children.” Shirley also acknowledged the importance of education shared by the parents 
in Point Rosie. He reported that “no teacher hired for September and this may force them 
to resettle in the fall.” 
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choice. Young Steve was a year and a half without school. We had no other choice. We 
couldn‟t get no teachers.”3  
 Sociologist R. L. Dewitt contended the clergy played an important role in shaping 
attitudes of Fogo Islanders towards centralization. He maintained that applicants relied 
more on relatives and clergy than on government officials when choosing a reception 
centre. The Anglican clergyman discussed the move with individual households, chaired 
meetings, and discussed resettlement at informal gatherings.
4
 According to Dewitt he 
advised high school graduates to leave the island. The Roman Catholic priest found 
himself at odds with his congregation when tried to consolidate parish communities. He 
was a founder the Fogo Island Improvement Committee (FIIC), a group that promoted 
consolidation island communities as opposed to relocating households to the near 
mainland. The United Church minister, a newcomer to the province and member of the 
FIIC, tried not to influence parishioners‟ choices. This chapter investigates the role 
Roman Catholic, Anglican, United Church, and Apostolic Faith hierarchies played in 
resettlement. 
The Roman Catholic Church 
 In 1957 the clergy, along with welfare officers, school supervisors and teachers, 
and medical personnel, assisted in the compilation of a list of outports that they believed 
ought to be evacuated. Eight years later Rev. Philip Lewis, Roman Catholic parish priest, 
recommended the evacuation of St. Leonard‟s, St. Kyran‟s, Red Island and Isle au Valen 
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to Merasheen, his parish headquarters.
5
 Lewis recommended the wholesale evacuation of 
Placentia West as a cost-saving measure for government, but was aware of the benefits of 
consolidating parishes. To speed up the process, Lewis proposed government reduce the 
90 percent requirement to 50 and increase monetary assistance to $10,000 per household 
to speed up resettlement.
6
 The archdiocese promoted centralization of parishes to reduce 
costs and ease the burden on parish priests. 
 The parish priest at Bar Haven was also a centralization enthusiast who endorsed 
Lewis‟ recommendations.7 Father W. P. Collins suggested the government should 
concentrate on persuading key people to relocate in order to get the remainder moving. 
Collins informed Harnum that people would soon leave poor places like Clattice Harbour 
Northwest and Clattice Harbour Southwest if government accepted the clerics‟ advice.8 
Citing humanitarian concerns, he informed Smallwood that he had vacated Iona (The 
Rams), Indian Harbour, Toslow, Big Brule, and Island Harbour on his own accord and 
with great sensitivity. In one instance Collins claimed he rescued a  family from an 
evacuated outport and purchased a house at parish expense.
9
 But in the same letter the 
priest described a less humane mission. When Prowseton refused to evacuate, Collins 
tried to force people out by refusing to visit the community and threatening to close the 
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school for a year.
10
 In the end, the Minister of Fisheries approved the move on 
humanitarian grounds.
11
 
 In outer Placentia Bay, Rev. Denis P. Walsh expressed some concerns with 
respect to the FHRP, but offered conditional support. Walsh‟s main concern was 
compensation for abandoned church buildings. He wrote to Harnum from his new parish 
headquarters at Rushoon: 
I think you realize that in this position I can hinder or further the cause [of 
resettlement], and it would be in the best interests of all concerned for me to 
further the cause of centralization when the reasons for the same are plainly 
evident.
12
 
 
Walsh, who had recently moved parish headquarters from Oderin to Rushoon, ministered 
to seven communities, most of which were petitioning to resettle. The church stood to 
lose schools, halls and church buildings without reimbursement. Walsh advised Harnum 
the FHRP should provide a minimum $1,000 in compensation per building. He proposed 
to use these monies to relieve the financial burden imposed on his parish by the joint 
centralization program. Collins, Lewis and Walsh‟s support for resettlement was strong 
when it accorded with the objectives of their church, namely to enhance parish efficiency 
and viability through consolidation.  
 Lewis and Collins hoped to persuade the FHRC to designate Bar Haven and 
Merasheen organized reception centres for communities within their respective parishes. 
Collins, who had been willing to deny a congregation the sacraments of the church and 
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withhold a teacher to promote centralization of his parish, was anxious to get the Premier 
to construct a road to the Burin highway to encourage settlers to move to Bar Haven. He 
predicted that if Smallwood kept his promise to build a road to Monkstown, Presque Arm 
and on to St. Kyran‟s families from the islands would move into the area.13 Collins also 
argued the road would make Merasheen a viable reception centre. Collins and Lewis 
were willing to close communities to consolidate parishes, but accused the Resettlement 
Director of using propaganda to lure people out of the region. They favoured 
centralization of parishes, but opposed wholesale evacuation of Placentia Bay, which, if it 
occurred, would make the priest redundant. 
 Father Desmond (Des) McGrath, best known as a co-founder of the 
Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied Workers Union (NFFAWU), was so anxious to 
move his New Ferrole congregation into parish headquarters at Port au Choix that he 
protested the construction of a power line and road to that community.
14
 McGrath 
suggested electrification and improvements in transportation would encourage 
householders to stay and interfere with his plan to consolidate the parish. Furthermore, 
Fishery Products Ltd. was constructing a seasonal fish plant at Port au Choix to process 
                                                          
13Collins‟ message of 22 November 1965 was in response to a public meeting chaired by 
the merchant, John Wadman, 21 October. Although the priest‟s message stressed Bar 
Haven‟s economic viability, Harnum stated the Division of Resettlement had received a 
petition signed by 30 householders requesting assistance to resettle. See Harnum to 
Collins, 23 November, 1965. GN39/1, S95, PANL. See also Memorandum from A. G. 
Stacey, Secretary Fisheries Household Resettlement Committee, to Harnum, 3 December 
1965, “Re: Approval to Evacuate Bar Haven.”GN39/1, S95, PANL. Stacey informed 
Harnum the Committee had approved household moves to Dunville, Placentia, 
Freshwater, Holyrood, Marystown, Long Harbour and St. John‟s. Stacey directed 
Harnum to ask five undecided householders to choose a reception centre. 
14E. P. Nugent, “Report on Northern Peninsula Visit, July 15-18 1969.” GN39/1, Box 
131, File S356, PANL. 
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material supplied by inshore fishers. Harnum, who visited New Ferrole, reported that a 
majority of the15 households might be prepared to move, but not to Port au Choix. 
Nonetheless, McGrath and his predecessor, Father Murphy, were determined to evacuate 
New Ferrole. The rationale for the priests‟ actions was the same on the northwest coast as 
it was in Placentia Bay. When the interests of the church merged with state policy, the 
threat to rural communities intensified. 
 The case of New Ferrole demonstrates how overbearing clergy could be. Father 
Murphy and his replacement, McGrath, resorted to extreme measures to consolidate the 
Parish of Port au Choix. Catherine Hynes explained to the Premier why her family was 
resisting the move to parish headquarters. She and her husband and their seven sons 
shared a new three-story home that they were not willing to dismantle or abandon. Rather 
than forsake a viable family fishing enterprise Hynes vowed to defy her priest and live on 
berries and fish in New Ferrole rather than move to Port au Choix. She alleged Father 
Murphy threatened to close the school for the next three winters. Hynes claimed Murphy 
moved seats and stove from the New Ferrole school to Bartlett‟s Harbour. She informed 
Smallwood that Murphy‟s promise to supply a teacher for the summer was not practical 
due to the employment of older children in the fishery. It was customary for older 
children in the outports to help process and cure the catch. The traditional salt cod fishery 
had relied on the unpaid labour of women and children from the 1830s onward.
15
 
 Hynes asked Smallwood to intervene “because we are not shifting out of it [New 
Ferrole] until God takes us” and charged that “our parish priest are [sic] all for money in 
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big settlements that is why he wants us to move to port au choix [sic].”16 She promised 
that her husband and seven sons were not going to tear down their home and stage to 
move to Port au Choix where there was no space for gardens. She declared she would 
challenge anyone, including the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, to defend her 
family‟s right to live in New Ferrole. She vowed priests would never force them to 
abandon their homes and independent life to become slaves in Port au Choix.
17
 
Smallwood referred the Hynes letter to Harnum. In his reply to Hynes, Harnum ignored 
Hynes‟ allegations of clerical misconduct and focussed on the right of anyone, who 
wished to relocate, to apply for assistance to move to an approved growth centre.
18
 The 
premier, whose views on resettlement of outports were well known, was silent. With 
church and state arrayed against it, New Ferrole was on shaky ground. According to 
Hynes requests for a community wharf and breakwater had been ignored as had a request 
for a water system that would end the practice of trucking water from sources located 
miles from the community. Catherine Hynes is an outstanding example of how women 
fought for the survival of their community and the preservation of the family home, the 
family fishing enterprise, and the right to continue subsistence farming. 
 Despite Hynes‟ impassioned appeal to the Premier, the evacuation of New Ferrole 
appeared imminent. In the fall of 1968 the Northern Regional Development Association 
(NORDA) asked C&SD to make the dumb barge available to transfer nine of the fifteen 
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houses in New Ferrole to Port au Choix.
19
 Sametz informed the Development Association 
that the barge was unavailable, and the road was too narrow to permit land transport.
20
  
 Harnum asked L. N. Woolfrey to assess attitudes towards resettlement and 
compare the physical aspects of the communities in question to the designated reception 
centre.
21
 His report on the physical attributes and services in the town cast aspersions on 
Port au Choix.
22
 Woolfrey reported that unless one understood Port au Choix as a 
reception centre, one could never understand the attitude of the residents of neighbouring 
settlements towards resettlement. He described Port au Choix as a backward place run by 
an inexperienced, inefficient council which the majority of townspeople disparaged.
23
 
The town had no public water and sewer system and the majority of homes were not 
connected to a private septic system; telephone service was restricted to five-party lines; 
no television service; and a low standard of education due to shortage of teachers and 
classroom space. Woolfrey recommended against resettling more fishers into the growth 
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Martin Lowe, Northern Regional Development Association (NORDA), to Sametz, 1 
October 1968. GN39/1, Box 128, File S162, PANL. A year later a report prepared by 
Peter Hoddinott for NORDA advised against the resettlement of Bartlett‟s Harbour, 
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23Woolfrey to Harnum, “Report on Visit.” GN39/1, Box 131, File S280, PANL. 
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centre. There was not enough electricity or water to supply the new fish plant and the 
inshore fishery was declining. Woolfrey‟s report on Port au Choix was as damning as the 
Burry and Shirley report on Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour. When the resettlement 
planners ignored the advice of field they exposed households to unnecessary risks.      
 It is little wonder that Catherine Hynes and her neighbours defied the 
representatives of church and state when they tried to force them into a growth centre 
where the pluralistic economy would cease or be restricted. Woolfrey recommended 
giving the small communities of the region time “to let rational thinking overcome 
sentimental attachment to their community and to proceed with caution.”24 His advice 
went unheeded. When 70 percent of householders applied for assistance to resettle to Port 
au Choix, the FHRC asked the minister to use discretionary power to designate New 
Ferrole an evacuated outport.
25
 The residual population would then be forced to choose 
between living in a place in which all normal services provided by the state would cease 
or submit.
26
 
 James Chalker, Minister of Public Works and MHA for St. Barbe North, and Jack 
Marshall, MP, inquired about the evacuation of New Ferrole. Harnum informed them that 
resettlement officials had discussed the matter with the community council and 
“especially Father McGrath, who was involved in their decision-making.”27 One can 
assume from this communication that the priest not only exerted great influence in his 
parish, but also with Mahoney who approved the evacuation of New Ferrole when only 
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70 percent of householders signed the petition.
28
 The main stumbling block was finding a 
way to transport houses. While awaiting the arrival of the barge, the nine householders 
who had voted to leave reconsidered the move. Consequently when Harnum arrived in 
September 1969, the households who had voted to move in June informed him that they 
no longer wished to resettle anywhere and now stood in solidarity with those who wanted 
services, not resettlement.
29
  
 Despite the considerable effort of church and state to resettle New Ferrole, the 
community survived. The pole line that McGrath so strongly opposed is an outward 
symbol of their success. Their victory is evidence that coastal communities were building 
up immunity to the moving fever that had swept through Placentia Bay in the first two 
years of the joint resettlement program. But the wolf was still at the door. In February 
1970 Harnum informed G. E. Knight, Director of Public Works, that a barge was 
available to move houses, and that McGrath still wanted to move New Ferrole to Port au 
Choix.
30
 The will of the people to resist resettlement would again be tested when water 
and sewer systems were completed in Port aux Choix and the “dumb” barge was 
available to move houses.
31
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Father Desmond McGrath organized the fishermen of Port au Choix into a union which 
McGrath and Richard Cashin turned into the Newfoundland Fish Food and Allied 
Workers Union with Cashin as president. The union represented inshore and offshore 
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 219 
The Anglican Church 
 The Anglican Church hierarchy supported resettlement in principle, but expressed 
concerns about the way was administered. Like their Roman Catholic counterparts, 
Anglican ministers felt the program should provide compensation for church buildings, 
halls and schools which bureaucrats termed social capital. The controversy arising from 
efforts of the Parish of Burin  to salvage a church to meet the needs of the resettled 
community in Marystown illustrates the complex nature of the FHRP. NLHC‟s refusal to 
approve a site in the subdivision to accommodate delayed the move. Approval was 
eventually obtained to to place the church on crown land adjacent to the NLHC 
subdivision.
32
 C&SD agreed to provide the motorized barge free of charge, but informed 
Rev. Owen Coffin that the parish was responsible for all other related expenses. Coffin 
argued C&SD should cover all costs from launch to setup from resettlement funds, 
particularly since the congregation consisted  mainly of resettled families.
33
 When Coffin 
claimed that the barge operator had overcharged, Rowe dismissed it as a civil matter and 
advised him to launch a civil suit to enforce the oral agreement and denied government 
moved social capital free of charge.
34
 Rowe did admit there were “some shortcomings 
and inadequacies” in the resettlement agreement but alleged the federal partner was 
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Rev. Owen Coffin to William Rowe, Minister of Community and Social Development, 
15 July, 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL. Coffin sent a copy to Premier 
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33
Coffin to William N. Rowe, 15 July 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL. 
34
Rowe to Smallwood, 21 August 1969. GN39/1, Box 125, File S5, PANL. 
 220 
responsible.
35
 The Minister of Resettlement and Housing considered free use of the barge 
fulfilled governments‟ obligation to the parish.36 
 To suggest that clergy were interested only in capital losses is misleading. In the 
bishop‟s charge to the Anglican Synod in 1969, Bishop Seaborn recognized the human 
cost of resettlement and appealed for special assistance to replace structures left behind as 
well as increased funding to replace houses.
37
 Seaborn contended the resettlement 
program should provide sufficient funds to allow relocatees acquire houses equivalent to 
those abandoned in terms of size and quality.
38
 Rev. Edward House spoke of the trauma 
arising from the abandonment of rectories, churches, halls, schools, and teacher 
residences.
39
 The Newfoundland Churchman “Viewpoint” columnist opined the attitude 
of government planners was “cold, callous, and hard-hearted” in respect to the movement 
of people.
40
 He claimed resettlement officials showed up in a community and made 
empty promises to entice people to sign petitions. After they resettled they received no 
guidance from government bureaucrats who retreated to their offices where “they stick 
another pin in [the map] to signify the great achievement of creating another ghost 
town.”41 O. W. C.‟s assertion that except for services of clergy, councils, and citizens of 
growth centres, the resettlers were bereft of support or guidance is supported by the 
findings of several studies. Perlin, who commented on the Churchman article, denied the 
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FHRP was sinister, but agreed with O. W. C. that arbitrary resettlement officials created 
unnecessary problems by treating people and families with indignity.
42
 Perlin was very 
critical of the manner in which Tack‟s Beach was resettled. He accused officials of 
wearing down householders‟ resistance by circulating several petitions. In fact the FHRC 
delayed approval of the petition because the majority of householders insisted on moving 
to Arnold‟s Cove which was not a designated growth centre and in which the government 
had imposed a land freeze. 
 Rev. R. Hatcher, rector of the Anglican Parish of Grand Bank, accused 
government of ignoring a Synod resolution on resettlement and continuing to ignore the 
needs of transplanted families.
43
 Hatcher used the experience of Rencontre West families 
to illustrate the cavalier treatment of relocatees. He claimed a party that included “one 
mentally deficient woman, one half-blind woman, a man with one hand, [and] a woman 7 
months pregnant arrived in Grand Bank late at night without accommodations or anyone 
to greet them.”44 The government had not moved their homes to Fortune as promised. 
The pastor accused government of using deceptive practices to lure people from remote 
communities. Hatcher, who claimed he was writing on behalf of the Parishes of Grand 
Bank, Burin and Harbour Breton, rebuked the authorities for treating “people as pawns in 
the great sinister game of resettlement,” and asked them to treat people with honesty and 
dignity.
45
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 Bill Rowe contended his officials were making an effort to eliminate the most 
offensive features of the FHRP.
46
 A departmental report, prompted by Hatcher‟s letter 
and the Churchman article, refuted many of the allegations.
47
 Rowe provided Hatcher 
with a chronology of the Rencontre West move which deflected blame away from his 
department and onto the town of Fortune and the resettlers. The report explained that 
arrangements were made to relocate several houses to a land assembly in Fortune, but in 
the middle of the move, the town decided to place an embargo on salvaged houses. 
C&SD offered to relocate the homes to Grand Bank but the families arrived before 
arrangements were complete. He alleged the resettlers‟ decision to visit relatives in 
Fortune created the need for Hatcher to work late into the night arranging transportation 
to Marystown. Furthermore, Rowe maintained that it was the duty of clergy to work with 
other local leaders and counsellors to help families adjust to new environments. 
 Seaborn appointed a diocesan committee to prepare a report on resettlement for 
the 1969 Diocesan Synod. The Synod committee considered adjustment to life in growth 
centres was especially problematic for the elderly and disabled. The Churchman 
published the report, together with a National Film Board photo. The subjects in the 
photo were a group of small children and a senior citizen reading a newspaper. The 
caption posed the question: “They will adjust to their new surroundings ... BUT CAN 
HE?”48 Rev. Mark Genge, rector of the Parish of Burgeo-Ramea led a discussion on 
resettlement. Genge pointed to the need for government to make available special grants 
for the disabled and the elderly, two groups that found it most difficult to replace houses 
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left behind due to inability to work or build homes. Owen Coffin spoke of the plight of 
people in growth centres whose source of income disappeared. A lay delegate, who was 
also Deputy Minister of Welfare, identified ending isolation and the improving 
opportunities for education as “the most powerful reasons for resettlement.”49 Following 
the discussion Synod passed a resolution calling for additional grants for the aged and 
disabled and an in-depth assessment of employment opportunities in growth centres. The 
delegates asked government to maintain services throughout the moving period to ensure 
the children‟s education was not interrupted. 
 The Synod resolution, The Churchman article, and Hatcher‟s letter drew a sharp 
response from Bill Rowe. He replied that hiring too many field workers, “who found 
themselves with too much free time on their hands,” could lead to “an overzealous 
attempt to persuade people to resettle, perhaps against their own wishes.”50 He proposed 
that the onus was on teachers to help the children to adjust to the new schools. Rowe 
suggested female church groups could help women integrate into urban environments. He 
denied resettlement officials “lured” people out of the small communities and suggested 
that the biggest problem was preventing households from making irrational moves.
51
 
Implicit in his patriarchal statement is an assumption that expert knowledge is superior to 
local. On the other hand patriarchal clergymen underestimated the degree to which 
relocatees resisted moves to industrial growth centres. 
 In 1971 the Diocesan Council for Social Services presented a Resettlement 
Survey Report to the Synod. The report was based on responses to questionnaires 
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distributed by rectors to collect data on services and facilities that existed in the sending 
communities prior to resettlement and problems resettlers experienced after the move. 
The diocesan committee received reports from 39 sending communities. Five had a 
school with more than three rooms, 31 received mail less than three times per week, 17 
had no telephone service, and 37 were without a road connection. Respondents to the 
survey declared that very few wished to move, and when asked why they had moved they 
were uncertain. The report attributed the confusion to the lack of counselling and to poor 
communication between the many government departments and agencies responsible for 
administering the program. In addition to the housing and unemployment problems, the 
Council listed: insufficient compensation when everything was left behind; placing new 
families in parts of town where it was difficult to integrate into the receiving community; 
not recognizing that older people, who were used to a freer way of life, would have a 
greater difficulty adjusting; and moving people from more viable communities to less 
viable reception centres; and failing to provide sufficient counselling before and after the 
move.
52
 
 The Diocesan Resettlement Committee made six recommendations to overcome 
some of the most undesirable aspects of the Household Resettlement Program: first, 
before evacuating a community, the inhabitants should be fully informed about all 
aspects of the program and be psychologically prepared for the move; second, people 
should be moved to centres where they could find work; third, the growth centre should 
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be equipped in advance with adequate services and facilities to accommodate the 
increased population; fourth, the assistance being given should be under continuous 
revision to ensure that it met the needs of the household involved; fifth, the sending 
community and the character of the inhabitants should be evaluated thoroughly before a 
decision is made to resettle; and, sixth, the committee offered  support for resettlement if 
government addressed concerns identified in the report. Implicit in the recommendations 
was an assumption that resettlers were unable to cope with, or adapt to, change without 
expert guidance. 
 Perhaps influenced by the Iverson and Matthews study, the Synod report 
highlighted the need for affordable housing and offered an opinion on the layout of 
subdivisions. The authors feared development of apartment blocks and row housing 
would create ghettos and stigmatize the occupants. The report condemned ribbon 
development along highways and “shack development” on the fringe of growth centres. 
The Council maintained that such development projects that isolated and stigmatized 
settlers should be discontinued. The Synod promised wholehearted support for 
resettlement provided government addressed social justice issues, most notably housing 
and employment. 
 The Anglican rector at Burgeo was a political and social activist. Mark Genge 
lobbied on behalf of his parishioners for improvements in communication, transportation, 
medical, education and recreation services. Genge, fresh from ministering to 
congregations on coastal Labrador, was shocked by the paucity and low quality of public 
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services.
53
 Attributing backwardness in the region to government negligence, the rector 
engaged in a political action campaign. He helped community groups prepare briefs and 
petitions, and participated in meetings with the Premier. Genge was involved in political 
action from the day he arrived in Burgeo. He supported the people of Small‟s Island, who 
were seeking a bridge to connect them to the town. He reminded Smallwood that the 
families on Small‟s Island resettled to Burgeo from Red Cove for the sake of the children, 
but their children lost weeks of school when inclement weather and ice made crossing the 
narrow tickle unsafe.
54
 The families, having moved once, did not wish to move again. 
Smallwood, who admitted that the southwest coast had received the least benefit from 
Confederation, agreed to provide a bailey bridge to connect them to the town.
55
  
 Throughout his term at Burgeo, Genge remained a committed social activist. Most 
of his parishioners lived in Burgeo and Ramea, but his parish also included Grey River. 
Genge favoured resettlement, but felt government had an obligation to provide necessary 
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and humane services to all communities.
56
 In an effort to place attachment to place in 
context, he suggested that the federal government would support moving the population 
of the underdeveloped Atlantic region to central Canada, but Atlantic Canadians‟ 
identification with place bound them to a region characterized as backward in Ottawa. 
Knowing Smallwood‟s opposition to assisting Newfoundlanders to leave the province, 
Genge‟s analogy was poignant. Genge argued intra-provincial migration was just as 
painful for people as the alternative. He wrote: “I appreciate your good intentions about 
relocating the people on the south coast, but I do disagree with your methods and 
philosophy.”57  
 Genge supported the residents of Grey River who called on government to 
improve services. The community requested restoration of the doctor‟s clinic, 
introduction of a ferry service, lights, and installation of new telegraphic equipment. The 
elimination of these necessary and humane services made residents question 
government‟s motive for closing the medical clinic, and issue a declaration that they 
would not be forced out. Resident spokesperson, Frank Young, advised Smallwood that 
Grey River was an ideal site for the inshore fishery and the people had a right to better 
services.
58
 Like Fogo Islanders they wanted development, not resettlement. 
 Genge, dissatisfied with the quality of services in Burgeo and Ramea, felt that 
until these growth centres were adequately equipped with schools and other infrastructure 
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the resettlement program could not be considered successful. It was crucial to develop a 
water system and mitigate the housing crisis in both centres. J. C. Penney & Sons, 
operated by Marie Penney, initiated a housing program at Ramea., an island town with an 
historic connection to deep-sea fishing. There were no resident medical personnel to 
respond to an industrial accident aboard trawlers or in the processing plant and no doctor 
had visited in more than a year. The doctor‟s boat that served Ramea and Grey River was 
no longer in service. Genge opined: “Is there any surprise writers like Harold Horwood 
and Farley Mowat should take up the cause of these forgotten places?”59 When 
Smallwood replied that it was more difficult to persuade doctors, nurses, and teachers to 
serve in remote locations,
60
 the clergyman implored Smallwood to provide a ferry to 
bring patients to the doctor.
61
 He also reminded Smallwood that Mowat‟s new book on 
the southwest coast would be soon released and advised Smallwood that he had “left 
himself open for any criticism he [Mowat] may make, about your policy on 
centralization. You know it is not sufficient to get people to move, they still have to live 
afterwards.”62 He believed the lack of recreational facilities in Burgeo, which left 
children with no place to play except on the roads, was bound to lead to increased 
vandalism. The children had at least space to play in their old communities.
63
 Genge 
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warned Smallwood that if funding for a playground was not approved within a week, he 
would be “taking further steps.”64 He was a forceful advocate.  
 Mark Genge‟s actions caught the attention of Walter Hodder, MHA for Burgeo-
La Poile. Hodder attributed the public furore over the lack of services in Burgeo to 
statements made by the Anglican rector. Hodder advised the Premier to visit Burgeo, 
Ramea and Grey River to restore confidence in the government and bolster Liberal 
support. The MHA alleged Genge‟s remarks were so inflammatory that the community 
council was threatening to resign en mass. Hodder also asked the Anglican rural dean at 
Port aux Basques to reign in the troublesome priest. Hodder asked the Premier to visit 
Burgeo and reassure the people of Burgeo-La Poile that the Liberal government had not 
abandoned the people of the south west coast.
65
 
 The release of “A Productivity Study of the Frozen Fish Industry in 
Newfoundland” prepared by Inbucon Services Ltd. fuelled discontent.66 The Inbucon 
Report recommended dismantling and relocating fish plants at Burgeo, Ramea and 
Gaultois to the Burin Peninsula where more productive plants operated.
67
 Angered by the 
proposal, Genge accompanied a delegation to St. John‟s to present a brief to the Premier 
refuting the Inbucon Report. Industry leaders Marie Penney and Spencer Lake assured 
Smallwood that the populations of Burgeo and Ramea had increased rapidly in the 
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previous five years, and advised Smallwood that neither the Lake Group plants at Burgeo 
and Gaultois, nor John Penney & Son‟s operation at Ramea suffered from a shortage of 
experienced workers as the Inbucon Report suggested. The population of the three 
growth centres was sufficient to supply companies with skilled workers ashore and afloat. 
The brief also alleged local companies were better equipped to respond to crises in the 
fishery than the multinational food corporations whose boards were located in distant 
cities. They argued that companies embedded in the community were more likely to ride 
out the rough periods than transnational corporations. The delegation contended that a 
road link to the TCH would attract medical personnel and teachers while the removal of 
the plants from Burgeo, Ramea and Gaultois would precipitate a mass migration out of 
the region.
68
 Whether a road to Burgeo was the ultimate solution region‟s problems is 
debatable, but the dismantling of the plants would surely speed up out-migration from the 
area. 
 Churches were much concerned over the way governments were implementing 
the centralization program. The Anglican clergy questioned government policy and 
issued reports that identified areas of concern and put forward recommendations to 
address them. The Bishop of the Diocese of Newfoundland and parish rectors demanded 
resettled families be treated with dignity and respect. They participated in committees, 
helped prepare written briefs, accompanied delegations to St. John‟s and denounced 
government for not providing adequate schools in the growth centres. Both the Anglican 
and United Church clergy drew attention to the need for more counselling. 
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The United Church 
 Rev. J. Burke, the United Church pastor at Burgeo, expressed concern that 
rumours that had caused a mass exodus from the islands of Placentia Bay were now 
taking root on south west coast. Burke evinced the need to counter rumour with factual 
information to enable householders to make rational decisions about their future. The 
Burgeo council requested a field worker who would work with municipal councils to 
prepare the growth centre for the influx of people. The clergy and council stressed the 
necessity of providing affordable housing and the need to enlarge or construct new 
schools to allow householders to integrate into a new setting with minimal stress. Along 
with Dr. Ann Calder, Deputy Mayor of Burgeo, they complained that neither C&SD nor 
the Department of Municipal Affairs were providing sufficient funds to develop 
affordable housing to accommodate the resettled families.
69
 
 The United Church (UC) viewed the centralization movement as an effort by 
people to seek a better standard of living and better services for the family. The report on 
centralization presented to the Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Newfoundland 
Conference of the United Church of Canada recognized that resettlement affected very 
differently members of the three-generation family - children, parents, and 
grandparents.
70
 Each cohort faced its own challenges. The parents moved to a growth 
centre to enhance their children‟s education, and when the wage earners and their 
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dependents moved, the elderly were forced to follow because the sending community 
could no longer maintain essential services. In the new location the wage earner found it 
necessary to acquire a whole new skill set and cope with setting aside past experience and 
parents had to cope with financial demands that are beyond their means. The 
grandparents found themselves severed from the church, lodges and places they gathered 
to reminisce. In the reception centre the long-time inhabitants had to tolerate 
overcrowding of facilities and adjust to living next door to strangers.  
 The report asked the Conference to reflect on the role of the church in all of this 
“social change and turbulence occasioned by resettlement.”71 The authors suggested that 
clergy and laity must step outside their normal role as spiritual leaders and extend it to 
include concern for the “whole man.” The report recommended Sunday school 
superintendents and teachers take on responsibilities outside the church walls by asking: 
How can we help our people to realize that reasonable standard of living? To 
improve their situation in life? To realize for their children that equal opportunity; 
that sense of belonging to a new community? To experience for themselves a 
greater sense of fulfilment and to acquire a sense of worth in the scheme of 
things?
72
 
 
The questions raised in the report did not challenge resettlement policy. The focus was on 
how members of the United Church could ease the transition of resettlers into a new 
cultural milieu. The authors knew the shortcomings of the household resettlement 
program, but, nonetheless, alleged that it had benefited the majority of people. The 
Conference urged government to continue and extend the program. The United Church 
considered that changes brought about by resettlement created adjustment difficulties for 
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only a minority of resettlers, and saw it as another opportunity for expanding social 
ministry. The report called for a greater role for the church in the advising and planning 
phase to reduce the trauma of leaving home. The Conference urged governments to 
maintain services in communities that were designated evacuated outports. The delegates 
expressed concern for the families who continued to live in abandoned communities 
deprived of church, school or communication services.
73
 
 The UC Conference Report on Resettlement was less critical of the centralization 
program than the report of the Anglican Synod Committee. The United Church 
commended government for assisting household moves and recommended extending the 
resettlement program. The authors felt counselling programs run by church groups could 
overcome many of the difficulties in reception centres. At the same time that Bishop 
Seaborn was taking government to task for providing inadequate services and housing for 
resettlers, the UC Conference commended government for its efforts and advocated 
expansion of the resettlement program where possible. The UC, although it 
acknowledged the trauma brought on by resettlement, saw it as an opportunity to enter 
into a new era of evangelism to make the church more relevant. The 1960s was a decade 
during which many questioned the relevancy of organized religion.
74
 The UC responded 
by engaging in outreach programs to help resettlers and the citizens of receiving 
communities to adjust to a new reality. 
 
   
                                                          
73“Reports,” 139. 
74
See Pierre Berton, The Comfortable Pew: A Critical Look at Religion in the New Age, 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965). 
 234 
Apostolic Faith Church 
 While the Newfoundland Conference of United Church focussed primarily on 
easing the anxiety of resettlers through outreach ministry, Booth Reid, a woods contractor 
and Apostolic Faith pastor, directed the move from Hooping Harbour to Bide Arm. Reid 
was a powerful political and spiritual presence in the district and the patriarch of Hooping 
Harbour. The pastor first tried to convince the FHRC to approve Hooping Harbour as a 
growth centre for the area, and when he was convinced that appeared unlikely, Reid 
decided to apply his energy to moving the community en masse to a site at the head of 
Bide Arm. Reid controlled not only his followers, but also exercised considerable 
influence over the whole community.
75
 His company built the local road, constructed the 
pole lines for electrification, and supplied the equipment to install the community water 
and sewer system. Reid was pastor, contractor, and unchallenged patriarch of Hooping 
Harbour, a community of 200 souls located in White Bay North electoral district. His 
reputation as a man who could deliver the vote for the Liberal Party gave him access to 
the Premier, and through Smallwood, access to ministers and senior bureaucrats. 
 At first Reid put his energy into modernizing the community. In 1968 Hooping 
Harbour had more services than most organized reception centres. Residents enjoyed the 
benefits of electrification and a water system. Located close to good grounds, it was one 
of the more prosperous and progressive inshore fishing communities in the province. 
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Throughout 1966-7 Reid led the fight for a community stage and a road connection to the 
Roddickton Highway.
76
 He insisted that Hooping Harbour had potential for expansion 
and had the capacity to accommodate the residual populations of Little Harbour Deep and 
Williamsport. He was so persistent that the Director of Resettlement opined: “Reid 
cannot be convinced that Hooping Harbour is not approved as a reception centre.”77 The 
pastor believed that government should permit people to move to a place of their 
choosing without penalty. He purported the FHRC forced families to live in poverty in 
government selected growth centres while the planners overlooked the benefits of 
resettling households to Hooping Harbour.
78
 Reid emphasized the industrious character 
of the people and refused to accept Harnum‟s assessment that Hooping Harbour was just 
one of 650 communities with less than 200 persons.
79
 The major drawback was limited 
communication and transportation services. Mountainous terrain interfered with 
telecommunication and made a road connection a very costly project. When rumours 
reached Ottawa that Hooping Harbour was on a list of communities to be resettled, 
federal bureaucrats questioned whether government should invest in harbour 
improvements and telecommunications. When Edward Roberts, MHA, asked Canadian 
National Telegraph (CNT) whether it planned to install a telephone service for Hooping 
Harbour, J. A. Donich replied that he understood the community was “slated for 
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resettlement.”80 The MHA assured Donich that the people of Hooping Harbour were 
adamantly opposed to moving in the next few years and in the meantime were entitled to 
rudimentary services.
81
 They families vowed to live in isolation rather than live on 
welfare in Englee or St. Anthony.
82
 Roberts assured Reid that he was in full support of a 
community stage and a road to the outside.
83
 But Roberts knew it would be a difficult 
task to persuade his cabinet colleagues to approve expenditure for  a road that would only 
serve 200 persons. 
 When several families applied for assistance to relocate residents feared the 
community would dwindle away. The residual population, fearful of the future, raised a 
storm of protest that reached Confederation Building.
84
 Roberts contacted Harnum to see 
what had caused the brouhaha.
85
 The pastor and the local roads committee feared that this 
was the beginning of a decline that the government would use to justify denying requests 
for a road connection. Harnum assured Roberts that C&SD made no attempt to encourage 
or persuade the applicants, or any other householders, to apply for resettlement grants. 
The applicants had identified inadequate medical services and isolation as the main 
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reason for moving.
86
 Government would not commit to a road, but did enter into an 
agreement with Reid for construction of the community stage, which Reid insisted on 
calling a herring plant.
87
 The pastor was aware that if Hooping Harbour had a fish plant, 
the FHRC would be more likely to approve it as organized reception centre. But when it 
appeared the community might die a slow death, Reid decided to lead his congregation to 
Bide Arm. 
 When the FHRC agreed to assist the move, Reid proceeded to turn resettlement 
into a make-work project. All adults were guaranteed employment building barges, 
relocating houses and building a new community on the shore of Bide Arm. All members 
of the local resettlement committee benefited financially from the move.
88
 In addition to 
the economic benefits, Reid was able to keep his congregation intact and operate a school 
independent of the UC school board. By orchestrating the move to a new community he 
would be in full control of church and school.
89
 When the UC householders objected to 
relocating the Hooping Harbour school to Bide Arm, Reid constructed a new school at 
Bide Arm despite warnings from F. W. Rowe that government would not fund it.
90
 Reid 
kept the children out of school for a year before Education Minister relented. Rowe 
agreed to pay $20,000 toward the cost of the school after he learned government had 
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promised to provide for resettled families all the services that they had enjoyed in 
Hooping Harbour.
91
 It was a extraordinary agreement that paid relocatees resettlement 
grants plus a daily wage.
92
 “Concerned” wondered why government rewarded the 
relocatees with wages and grants, but ignored the needs of the 12 United Church 
householders who “had poor regard for the Apostolic Faith Group.”93 
 The abruptness of the move caught resettlement planners by surprise. The 
Department of Community and Social Development had little time to attend to problems 
of the residual population of Hooping Harbour. A flustered Sametz wrote: “unfortunately 
this is another case of an almost instant move, where we have little prior indication of 
intent, yet when the community suddenly decides to move, it expects everything else to 
be instantly ready.”94 Reid assured Sametz that due to his experience moving houses from 
Williamsport and Little Harbour Deep, he could have two barges ready to commence 
moving houses in May. He asked Municipal Affairs to act immediately to prepare a lot 
layout so that the community could be resettled while offshore pack ice made inshore 
waters safe for towing houses.
95
 Reid informed the Premier that the people were anxious 
to start moving and he was willing to start work on the strength of a telegram from 
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Smallwood.
96
 He asked the Premier to arrange financing with the bank so he could pay 
the men bi-weekly and “stamp books.”97 Approximately 50 men who received wages 
during the construction season which extended into December, earned higher incomes 
and unemployment insurance benefits than the fishers who stayed in Hooping Harbour.
98
 
 Reid challenged any person who stood in his way. Bureaucrats in the Provincial 
Planning Office (PPO) were among the first casualties. Two planners from the PPO 
recommended a go-slow approach. They stressed the importance of careful site selection, 
thorough evaluation of the cost of developing a water system, and the importance of 
doing a proper survey and lot layout so that the relocation of Hooping Harbour to Bide 
Arm could proceed in an orderly way in spring 1970.
99
 J. T. Allston, Director of Urban 
and Rural Development, agreed.
100
 But Reid was too bullish and impatient to heed expert 
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advice. By August he had houses, a church, and stages on the beach at Bide Arm 
awaiting expropriation of private land. He urged Smallwood to secure the co-operation of 
each department involved so the land ownership issue could be speedily resolved and 
allow the men to begin moving houses from the shoreline onto assigned lots.
101
 
 Reid‟s refusal to heed the advice of expert planners, and his insistence on moving 
the community as an entirety into the wilderness, created unnecessary hardship for the 
resettled families. E. P. Nugent, Director of Field Services, C&SD cautioned the Director 
of Rural Development that while Booth Reid gave “the impression no project was too 
complex for him to undertake there was a need to broaden the leadership base.”102 In a 
confidential memo Sametz lamented: “We have conducted a large number of successful 
resettlement operations ... but none have posed the difficulties of this move.”103 
 While many of the difficulties of this community relocation can be traced to the 
impatient, aggressive nature of Pastor Reid, a memo from Sametz to Bill Rowe indicates 
senior bureaucrats overruled the Director of Urban and Rural Planning.
104
 Sametz 
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indicated that since C&SD had agreed to provide the resettlers with all the services they 
enjoyed at Hooping Harbour, the province would have to extend water and sewer services 
to every householder in Englee at great cost to the province. By allowing the move from 
Hooping Harbour to “North Englee,” which was the official name of the new community, 
to proceed, the majority of the cost of developing water and sewer systems was 
transferred to the federal government. By eliminating the need to construct a road to 
Hooping Harbour the province saved millions of dollars according to engineers‟ 
surveys.
105
 On a cost-benefit basis the move made sense. Sametz calculated houses, 
school, two churches, herring factory, and power supply could be moved, and roads 
constructed at Bide Arm for less than $300,000, most of which would be paid by the 
Canadian government. 
 Wick Collins, an Evening Telegram journalist, compared the suddenness of the 
evacuation to the speed of “fire through dry brush.” The reporter was disturbed by 
eagerness of resettlers to condemn Hooping Harbour and everything in it.
106
 How had this 
complete reversal of attitude come about? Perhaps it can be attributed to the influence of 
the businessman/fundamentalist sect leader, who had run the Apostolic Faith mission and 
dominated economic life in Hooping Harbour for a dozen years. When Collins 
questioned workers about future employment they replied “You‟ll have to ask Pastor 
Reid.”107 They seemed to have blindly followed their pastor, who the journalist said 
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considered himself a modern-day Moses leading his people from bondage into the 
promised land.
108
 The settlers left Hooping Harbour without any plans beyond 
resettlement employment. When Collins asked if they would return to old grounds, they 
were evasive. They did not know whether they would return to Hooping Harbour to fish, 
try fishing from Bide Arm, or look for woods work in Roddickton.  
 Collins thought Reid was motivated by profit and the desire to maintain spiritual 
leadership. Hayward Canning, who was still at Hooping Harbour, told the reporter that at 
first some families intended to move to Englee, others to Roddickton and St. Anthony, 
but “Pastor Reid told us we have been together for a long time now and if we all go to 
Bide Arm we can stay together as a flock.”109 When Collins interviewed Reid in Corner 
Brook, the pastor insisted the committee decided.
110
 Regardless of who made the 
decision, Bide Arm seemed to have little to commend it. The Arm froze a month earlier 
in the fall than Englee and remained frozen one month later in the spring, thereby 
shortening the fishing season. In addition the site chosen for the new community was 
distant from fishing grounds where fishermen would have to compete with locals whose 
knowledge gave them a comparative advantage over the newcomers.
111
 Wesley Pollard, a 
fishermen, who had no intention of moving from Hooping Harbour, told Collins that Bide 
Arm was no place to fish. The well sheltered Arm was home to millions of flies that 
made life almost unbearable, and the lack of wind made it difficult to cure fish. The 
modern amenities that existed in the old community would not be available in the new 
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settlement for some time.
112
 But despite these drawbacks, those interviewed were more 
interested in condemning their former community than questioning the pastor‟s 
judgement. They seemed to forget that Hooping Harbour was a good fishing port 
inhabited by an industrious people who were their neighbours. Reid succeeded in keeping 
his congregation together, resettlers earned wages and received resettlement grants and 
lot supplementaries, and accumulated enough “stamps” to collect unemployment 
insurance benefits for two winters. The province saved the price of a road to connect 
Hooping Harbour to the highway. Everyone came out a winner except the Government of 
Canada which paid 70 percent of the cost, and the 12 United Church households who 
forced out of the evacuated outport. 
Conclusion 
 The decision to entrench the denominational education system in the Terms of 
Union between Canada and Newfoundland gave churches control over the province‟s 
schools. The clergy, who chaired the local denominational school boards, decided 
whether a community school would survive or be closed. When a priest decided that a 
community was no longer viable, he was sometimes prepared to use the full force of his 
spiritual power and civil authority to deny necessary and humane services to the people 
of that community. In Placentia Bay and Port au Choix, Roman Catholic priests used civil 
authority to pressure congregations into parish headquarters. New Ferrole and Prowseton 
are two extreme examples of abuse of church authority. 
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make-work project and was determined to keep it going s long as possible.    
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 Church leaders were a diverse group who responded to local conditions. Most 
clergy favoured resettlement, and fought for a more humane approach. Church leaders 
battled ministers of the crown and resettlement planners to get adequate and affordable 
housing for resettlers, and new and larger schools staffed by professionally trained 
teachers to provide children with the very best educational experience. Rev. Mark Genge 
openly challenged the premier‟s policy and philosophy of resettlement by organizing 
citizens‟ committees and accompanying delegations to St. John‟s to meet with 
Smallwood and senior bureaucrats. Genge fought as hard to improve and restore services 
in Grey River and Ramea as he did to get adequate schools and recreational facilities, and 
infrastructure for Burgeo. In direct contrast the Roman Catholic priests of Placentia Bay 
proposed amendments to the Resettlement Agreement that, if adopted, would have left 
half the population of settlements stranded in evacuated outports. In the examples 
discussed in this chapter, the Roman Catholic clergy favoured centralization as long as it 
accorded with their efforts to consolidate and preserve parishes. 
 The Newfoundland Conference of the United Church of Canada called for a more 
humane program that considered the impact of resettlement on all age groups and 
disabled persons. The UC Conference Report on Resettlement shared many of the 
concerns raised in Anglican Synod reports but preferred to view centralization as an 
opportunity to implement outreach programs to make the church more relevant in a 
secular world.  The authors of the report suggested the conditions in growth centres 
provided lay and ordained leaders an opportunity for social ministry. While the Anglican 
bishop and clergy reprimanded governments for not according resettlers the respect and 
 245 
dignity they were entitled to, the Newfoundland Conference of the United Church 
commended government and called for an expanded centralization program. 
 Booth Reid provides the most extreme example of a clergyman using his spiritual, 
economic and political influence to direct his congregation into a new community. When 
he realized that a road would not be forthcoming, and the province was unlikely to 
connect Hooping Harbour to the Roddickton Highway, Reid decided to lead his 
congregation, as he informed Wick Collins, into the Promised Land. He used his political 
influence to negotiate a special deal with C&SD. that turned resettlement into a make-
work project financed largely by the federal government. As the sole contractor on site, 
Reid profited personally as did the other two members of the local resettlement 
committee. His control over the resettlers was so complete that when Collins asked what 
they would do after the move was finished the men replied that he would have to ask the 
pastor. Bide Arm is above all a testimony to the determination, power and political 
influence of a charismatic leader. The Hooping Harbour - Bide Arm move exposed the 
ambiguities and contradictions in the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement 
Program that allowed community and church leaders to orchestrate moves that 
contradicted the principles of the program. 
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 Chapter VII 
Bucking the Trend: Choosing Development  
Introduction 
 Rumours that the government had a list of communities slated for resettlement 
caused considerable anxiety in the outports and raised a storm of protest that resonated in 
the House of Assembly and the House of Commons. In Ottawa Opposition Member of 
Parliament for Gander-Twillingate, John Lundrigan, accused government of maintaining 
a blacklist of outports destined for resettlement and using that list to determine which 
outports would receive funding for capital works. In Newfoundland the issue became a 
headline story and Smallwood asked the Director of Resettlement to investigate. Harnum 
reported that when the FHRP was in the planning stage the Provincial Working 
Committee agreed to prepare a list of communities that should be given every 
encouragement to move to designated growth points where employment was available.
1
 
F. W. Rowe, the first Minister of Community and Social Development, confirmed that 
“the sub-committee drew up a list of 100 settlements that in all probability were places 
whose populations might wish to be moved, but it was never approved.”2 The Federal-
Provincial Advisory Committee believed the decision to resettle ought to be left to the 
people to make and opposed blacklisting. 
                                                          
1
Harnum to J. R. Smallwood, 28 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection 075, File 
3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.  
2
F. W. Rowe to Smallwood, 29 May 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll 075, File 
3.10.078, ASC, Memorial University.  
 247 
 Whether a list existed is uncertain, but it was not unusual for ministers of the 
crown to consult the C&SD before inventing in infrastructure in places like Southern 
Harbour. In May 1970 the Evening Telegram reported that a list existed.
3
 In the early 
stages of the resettlement program such rumours often created enough panic to 
destabilize a community. Four years into the program coastal communities were more 
likely to organize resistance, especially the larger outports with community councils. 
Reacting to Lundrigan‟s allegation that Fisheries Minister Jack Davis turned down a 
request for a public wharf, the Beaumont council sent the following message to the 
Premier: 
People of the community will never agree to resettlement. John Lundrigan 
announced publicly he understands the people of Beaumont and Lushs [sic] Bight 
would be relocated whether they like it or not. Please rush your comments.
4
 
 
The Minister of C&SD and the Premier‟s Office assured the townspeople that there were 
no plans to evacuate Beaumont or Lushes Bight.
5
 However, the announcement of the 
closure of a post office in central Beaumont made the Premier‟s reassurances less 
credible.
6
 Smallwood informed concerned residents that the closure of the Post Office 
was in no way connected to a plan to evacuate Beaumont. The Post Office  had made a 
business decision and nothing more.
7
 Resistance to centralization increased over time and 
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this chapter discusses how it played out on the ground by examining several 
communities.  
 An examination of the communities of Fogo Island, Paradise Sound, Harbour 
Deep, and Point Lance demonstrates the effectiveness of resistance as well as their 
determination to develop local resources and acquire modern services. When Fogo Island 
residents were given a choice between evacuating the island or development the islanders 
chose to assess their strengths and enlisted the aid of outside agents to help them build a 
viable community. They challenged models of development and proved that co-operative 
enterprises could succeed in areas from which corporate enterprises had withdrawn. 
Similarly, three communities in Paradise Sound and Harbour Deep refused to heed the 
voice of the naysayer. They identified the possibilities for resource development and 
economic diversification while residents of Point Lance rallied behind the merchant and 
rebuffed the efforts of their MP to resettle them to St. Bride‟s.    
Fogo Island 
 In 1966 Fogo Island, home to approximately 4,500 residents, living in ten 
communities scattered along its perimeter, experienced an economic downturn in the 
1960s due to the collapse of the Labrador fishery and decline of the local cod  fishery. 
Eric Jones, MHA for Fogo District, stated that the collapse of the Labrador fishery, the 
decline of the inshore fishery, and the closure of fish plants and the departure of the main 
merchant supplier, reduced the island‟s economy to such a  distressful state that 
resettlement of Fogo Island seemed the only option. The closure of the Fishery Products 
Ltd. fish plants at Seldom and Joe Batt‟s Arm aggravated an already serious economic 
recession that would have demoralized a less resilient population. The future of Fogo 
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Island depended on the ability of local groups to rehabilitate the economy and curb the 
migration of educated youths. Jones praised their willingness to act co-operatively “to 
pull themselves up by their own bootstraps,” but predicted much of the population would 
leave.
8
  For a time it appeared Fogo Islanders would choose resettlement over 
development. One householder feared his three children would “never get a chance to 
become of [sic] what god [sic] intended them to become here” due to the poor state of the 
economy.
9
 Fifty-four families had moved, or were in the process of shifting, in April 
1968.
10
 Jones, admitting that a core of inshore fishermen would stay, did not foresee a 
time when Fogo Island would be completely depopulated, but predicted that half the 
population would leave within a decade.  
 But the people of Fogo Island ignored the pessimistic musings of the Minister of 
Highways. In March 1967 the Fogo Island Improvement Committee (FIIC), which had 
been formed in 1964 to lobby for improved roads, asked MUN Extension Services to 
convene a conference to discuss the future of Fogo Island communities.
11
 Out of this 
conference came a proposal to establish the Fishermen‟s Co-operative Movement under 
the umbrella of the United Maritime Fishermen Ltd. (UMF).
12
 The UMF agreed to 
process and market fish if the Fisheries Development Authority transferred the 
government-owned plants at Seldom and Joe Batts Arm and three community stages to 
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the UMF. The Improvement Committee also requested the services of a field officer for 
the island to assist in fisheries development. The Fogo Star, published by the FIIC, 
reported Smallwood had given Fogo Islanders three choices: “1. Drift along as many of 
us are doing at the present time; 2. Take advantage of the FHRP; [or] 3. Modernize our 
fishery and develop any other natural resource in our community, thus becoming self-
sufficient again.”13 The editor noted that while some had chosen the second option, others 
were choosing the third. Eric Jones praised the efforts of the shipbuilding Co-operative, 
“a project unique in the history of Newfoundland.” He suggested that it could possibly be 
a way to get larger boats into the hands of the fishermen.  
 The formation of co-operatives was a big step toward creating a united 
community, but internal jealousies and rivalry between communities stymied co-
operative efforts. An examination of the moves from Nippard‟s Island and Leveret Island, 
two islands in Deep Bay, reveals how committed the residents were to retention of 
community identity. Harnum visited the two islands and advised them to resettle to Fogo, 
Seldom or Joe Batt‟s Arm, but the households insisted on relocating to nearby Deep Bay 
rather than integrate into one of the larger places on the island. In 1966 neither Fogo, 
Seldom, or Joe Batt‟s Arm were approved reception centres. Gander Bay, Carmanville 
and Lewisporte were the nearest designated growth centres. Regional Development 
Officer, Lance Shirley, sympathized with the older generation whom he anticipated 
would experience great difficulty integrating into industrial towns.
14
 He reported that one 
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couple had lived for seven decades in a comfortable home in which they raised four 
children, and in the twilight of their lives were expected to abandon a life‟s work and 
memories to start a new life among strangers. In Shirley‟s opinion, Seldom or Fogo 
offered a modest improvement in services with minimal trauma. He felt people over 45 
years old were concerned they would be considered “misfits” in a growth centre. Shirley 
felt these fears could be assuaged if the FHRC approved moves within Fogo Island. The 
experience of living in Fogo or Seldom would prepare the next generation for entry into 
the modern world.
15
 The development officer proposed that government pay the cost of 
moving houses from Nippard‟s and Leveret Islands to Deep Bay and then pay 
householders the full resettlement grant when they resettled to Fogo or Seldom. He 
recommended designation of Fogo and Seldom as organized reception centres for the 
smaller settlements of Fogo Island. Shirley purported that they had more modern 
amenities, adequate harbours, fish plants, a business history, an available supply of fresh 
water, and potential for expansion. Shirley advised the Director of Field Services, Ed 
Nugent, against moving more settlers into Gander Bay and Carmanville due to the high 
rate of unemployment.
16
 
                                                          
15
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 In 1969 the FHRC designated Fogo as an organized reception centre for the 
communities of Fogo Island.
17
 Householders who were in the process of moving from 
Leveret‟s Island and Nippard‟s Island agreed to go to Fogo, but expressed concerns over 
adequacy of harbour facilities, overcrowded classrooms, and shortage of housing. They 
questioned why they should have to move to Fogo when Deep Bay had a community 
stage and space for private stages whereas Fogo could scarcely accommodate resident 
fishers. Shirley proposed that the Resettlement Committee withhold approval of 
applications until improvements in school and harbour facilities were completed. 
 Meanwhile, the Deep Bay community council and the FIIC intervened on behalf 
of the households that had moved from Leveret and Nippard‟s Islands to Deep Bay 
without assistance.
18
 The Committee outlined the rationale: the Fogo Island Producers 
Co-operative operated a community stage where fishers could sell their catch and family 
members could find employment; the fishermen had moved to improved circumstances, 
i.e., Deep Bay had electricity, the hospital and central school were nearby; and the 
resettlers were content.
19
 While Harnum continued to advocate the growth pole approach, 
government and local organizations agreed that centralization within Fogo Island was the 
best option.
20
   
The drive to reverse Fogo Island‟s fortunes began with the formation of the Fogo Island 
Improvement Committee in 1964.
21
 Throughout the winter of 1965 the FIIC held 
meetings in each settlement to discuss development options and to elect community 
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representatives. The September Issue of the Fogo Star may have singled out 1967 as the 
year of greatest advances, but the FIIC had been active since 1964.
22
 In that year the 
Committee recruited two medical doctors, and in 1965 successfully lobbied for electricity 
for the all communities and telephone services for Fogo, Joe Batt‟s Arm, Tilting, and 
Seldom. Efforts to include Fogo Island membership in the Straight Shore Agricultural 
and Rural Development Association failed, but the Committee convinced Smallwood to 
commit to a development plan, part of which was the Fisheries Conference of March 
1967. Personnel from Memorial University Extension Services served as conference 
facilitators while the National Film Board recorded the proceedings. In September Fogo 
Islanders succeeded in getting government support for a ship-building co-operative which 
oversaw construction of a modern yard for building longliners. They also formed the 
Fogo Island Producers Co-operative to reopen the fish plants.
23
 Owned by community 
shareholders, the Co-operative was prepared to play a high-stakes game from which 
private capital had withdrawn. The gamble paid off. On 18 October 1968 the Fogo 
Islanders celebrated the launch of four fifty-foot longliners at Shoal Bay.
24
 The decision 
not to wait to see what government was going to do for them, or wait for private capital 
to invest, seemed to be the correct one.
25
 The Fogo Island Experiment became a model 
for community development in the regions surrounding Chicago and San Diego and the 
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Canadian Press reported that the experimental use of film in rural development had 
caught the attention of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
26
 
 The FIIC also set about reorganizing education on the island. In 1967 the 
Department of Education approved a request from the United Church, Anglican, and 
Pentecostal clergy to amalgamate schools. In 1969 Rev. Ivan Jesperson lamented the lack 
of progress made by the Amalgamated School Board to implement the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission on Education and Youth.
27
 It would appear that denominational 
bigotry, opposition to community school closures and disagreement on where to locate 
schools impeded consolidation. The Commission, chaired by Memorial University 
Professor Philip Warren, recommended that the school system should consist of no more 
than five elementary schools and one regional high school.
28
 Reform depended on closure 
of several community schools and a willingness of all religious denominations to share a 
common goal. Clearly, there was much work to be done before people thought of 
themselves as Fogo Islanders. 
 The three-day March conference brought together federal and provincial cabinet 
ministers and senior bureaucrats and experts in the field of rural development. Some 
pundits contended that the development program which emerged from the meetings 
saved Fogo Island and downplayed the role of the Improvement Committee. Mayor 
George Oake raised the resettlement issue at the conference. He wanted to know whether 
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the government had plans to evacuate Fogo Island.
29
 Robert Hart, Assistant Director of 
the Industrial Services Branch of the federal Department of Fisheries replied: “I can tell 
you unequivocally that there is no plan to evacuate Fogo Island.”30 He added, there was a 
greater need to evacuate the 500 communities having less than 30 families.
31
  
 Smallwood‟s failure to implement a $3 million scheme for paved roads, water and 
sewer services, a retraining program for fishers, and a plan for construction of fishing 
boats contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty. Jesperson reminded the Premier that 
he had given them the option to develop and asked him to consider the possibilities for 
tourism on the island. The FIIC member touted the benefits of developing tourism and  
handicraft industries.
32
 Other delegates to the three-day March 1969 conference called for 
opening small multi-specie processing fish plants. Fogo Islanders wanted to be included 
in all stages of planning new enterprises. The Daily News reported that the enthusiasm 
expressed at the conference by the over-40 cohort bucked the trend of social thought 
which has been more in favour of evacuating offshore islands than in developing viable 
communities on them.
33
 The reporter, A. B. Perlin, contended that the challenge for Fogo 
Islanders would be to keep young people on an island, no longer a port of call for the 
CNR coastal boat, located 12 miles from the mainland and frequently isolated by ice. 
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There was also the question of how to generate enough wealth from seasonal activities to 
keep families in a comfortable lifestyle. Perlin saw Fogo Island as “a symbol of a society 
in transition” and what happened there might well determine what would happen in other 
places that had flourished when cod was king.
34
 
 Fred Earle, a MUN Extension worker who grew up on Change Islands, appealed 
to islanders to avoid criticizing either the Improvement Committee or the Fogo Island 
Co-operative unfairly. He noted that the NFB would be continuing the film program 
which he considered an important communication link between the policymakers and 
communities.
35
 The films improved lines of communication between local organizations 
and government planners, and provided a medium through which communities could 
share ideas, and think of themselves as Fogo Islanders. Earle noted Co-operative 
membership had increased to 400 members who pledged 5% of their earnings.
36
 Earle 
exhorted them to stick together and above all “do not tolerate rumours - just abide by the 
truth.” The Fogo Star appealed to readers to join the co-operatives, especially the 
Producers Co-operative.
37
 Roger Carter contended that the Fogo Island Co-operative was 
formed in 1967 but most communities had been involved in the co-operative movement 
for decades.
38
 Carter also noted that the Premier was not very supportive of the co-
operative model at this juncture. 
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 Nonetheless, Smallwood promised that no effort would be made by his 
government to evacuate the island as long as the people did everything possible to help 
themselves. Jones assured Sametz that consolidation of communities within the island 
also conformed with federal plans for fisheries modernization. Late in 1969 the province 
requested federal funding to build a wharf and breakwater at Fogo to accommodate 
longliners. He alleged that without the port improvements longliner owners would have 
to operate out of the port of Twillingate and the shipyard would close.
39
 Until facilities at 
Fogo were complete, the future of the whole island remained tenuous.  
 Opposition MP John Lundrigan, an outspoken critic of the FHRP, accused the 
provincial government of adopting “a deliberate hands-off policy,”40 and of trying to 
starve the people off the island by withholding government services.
41
 He alleged that the 
FHRP was part of a deliberate scheme to force the people to accept the idea of 
resettlement. He alleged: 
Government officials throw up their hands at the suggestion of force in the 
administration of the program, giving the impression that the only kind of force is 
police batons and bullwhips. [In the administration of the Resettlement Program] 
force often took the form of denying or neglecting public services and sometimes 
involved holding up a tempting offer of money to entice them to move without 
much thought of the future. If Fogo became a designated outport, it would mean 
the evacuation of 5,000 people with little chance to continue an independent life 
in another community.
42
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Lundrigan contended that the only way resettlement could be avoided was through 
government investment in the fishing industry and community infrastructure. The 
Premier‟s 1967 announcement of a special program to rehabilitate the Fogo economy was 
an important part of discussions at the March 1969 conference. 
 While resettlement officials favoured concentrating Fogo Islanders into two or 
three centres, Father J. K. Barker wondered if the closure of post offices was part of a 
resettlement plan.
43
 Why, he asked, would government wish to move people from Deep 
Bay and Island Harbour, settlements with schools and community stages, into Fogo, a 
place with overcrowded schools and inferior facilities. Lance Shirley and Harnum 
contended community consolidation within the island was the best option for creating a 
viable community.
44
 Centralization would stem the tide of out-migration, encourage 
government investment, and improve quality of life. There was no logical alternative. 
Barker informed Shirley that Roman Catholic schools in Fogo could accommodate more 
students, but he and his parishioners firmly opposed resettling Island Harbour into Fogo, 
a mostly Protestant town. 
 The FHRC also slowed consolidation by their reluctance to designate any Fogo 
Island town as a growth centre, perhaps because they secretly wished to evacuate the 
island. But by this time opposition to resettlement was too strong. By August 1970 the 
town council asked the FHRC to approve Fogo as a growth centre, and the Department of 
Public Works had issued tenders for construction of a breakwater and fishermen‟s wharf 
at Fogo, and the Terra Nova Integrated School Board had approved construction of a new 
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regional high school.
45
 In a spirit of unity the Roman Catholic School Board expressed 
interest in the creating a non-denominational school system for Fogo Island. A new sense 
of community was emerging. 
 The Director of Infrastructure, F. J. Evans, recounted how events unfolded on 
Fogo Island.
46
 The downturn came with the departure of the Earle Company followed by 
the closure of the Fishery Products Ltd. plant at Joe Batt‟s Arm and the Yellow Fish 
Company plant at Seldom in the early 1960s. When these firms closed shop, the 
Improvement Committee approached government for marketing assistance. The Premier 
then paid a visit the island where he gave the people three choices: resettle, develop, or 
stagnate. Shortly thereafter, the Committee asked the Rural Development Division to put 
in place a special program for Fogo Island.
47
 The first step focussed on improving 
productivity by moving fishers into longliners to increase mobility and range. 
Accordingly rural development officials, in consort with the FIIC, decided upon a co-
operative approach as the strategy for developing the economy. The Newfoundland Co-
operative Services agreed to create the corporation and oversee its operation. As 
production increased through the use of longliners, the Producers Co-operative took over 
the government-owned plants abandoned by private enterprise.
48
 The report 
acknowledged the role of provincial and federal governments, but understated the role of 
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the National Film Board and MUN Extension Services, and the FIIC and local leaders in 
reviving the island‟s economy. 
 In contrast Evans, Shirley credited the success of the Fogo Island project to locals. 
He informed Sametz that the success of the Regional Activation Program resulted from 
the effectiveness of “local people‟s initiatives and ability to implement, maintain, expand, 
and modify the programs.”49 On Fogo Island the process had started with the formation 
of the FIIC and takeover of the community stage at Deep Bay along with the plants at 
Seldom and Joe Batt‟s Arm by the Producers Co-operative. Through co-operative action 
fishers took control of the catching, processing and marketing. The Producers Co-
operative assumed all the responsibilities of a highly capitalized integrated trawler-
processing company. In 1972 the Fogo Island Producers Co-operative pressed the Moores 
government to construct a modern diversified plant in a central location. Shirley 
professed that the Fogo Island Shipbuilding and Producers Co-operative had successfully 
challenged the capitalist model of fisheries development, and had now reached the stage 
where it would have to prove it could operate completely on its own.
50
 
 The jury was still out on the Fogo project. Selby Moss informed the Director of 
Social Assistance, M. J. Vincent, that he was less optimistic about the future of Fogo than 
he had been several years earlier. According to Vincent, a native of Fogo, the co-
operative had a debt and cash flow crisis that was “strangling” it after only two years in 
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operation.
51
 Failure of the longliner fishery in 1973 contributed to his growing 
pessimism. Moss informed Vincent that if the fishery failed again in 1974 there would be 
many householders applying for assistance to move away. Vincent replied that from 1966 
to 1971 only 31 households had applied for assistance to resettle off the island. 
 Lance Shirley felt social development had progressed in step with economic 
improvements, thanks to the efforts of local organizations such as the Lions Club, school 
boards, and municipal councils, but most of all through the work of the Fogo Island 
Improvement Committee. The Committee organized conferences, workshops, student 
exchanges, and lobbied for road construction, a ferry service, a community park, 
improved medical facilities, and a regional high school. The Lions Club sponsored a 
variety of community projects including a student exchange with a school in Montreal. In 
an address welcoming the Montreal students to Fogo, Stan Kinden described the 
exchange as a “milestone in our road to success.”52 The student exchange might have 
gone unnoticed in a larger community, but in Fogo it was an instrument of progress that 
not only exposed the students of Fogo Island to the culture and life of a large Canadian 
city, but also created anawareness that Fogo also offered the urban students an equally 
valuable cultural experience. The students and the wider island community learned that 
the way of life in a rural space was not less important, or less valuable, than the urban 
spaces in Canada. But the high school graduates continued to leave rural areas for the 
industrial urban centres of Newfoundland and Labrador and Canada. 
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Great Harbour Deep 
 Author Jack Fitzgerald quipped in an article published by the Newfoundland 
Herald, an entertainment magazine, that it would be cheaper to buy every resident of 
Great Harbour Deep a helicopter than to construct a forty-mile road to link to the St. 
Barbe highway. The effects of isolation were so severe that a boy was unable to draw a 
modern car.
53
 Although Fitzgerald listed some of the community‟s redeeming qualities, 
such as the willingness of the people to engage in communal projects, his allegations of 
backwardness raised the ire of some residents. Chesley Pittman, a prominent merchant, 
informed the Herald‟s readers that residents travelled regularly for medical services, 
employment, business and pleasure.
54
 Nonetheless, he conceded the mountainous terrain 
that separated Great Harbour Deep from the nearest highway interfered with radio-
telephone communication and blocked television signals completely. Isolation became 
more severe when weather prevented mail delivery.
55
 
 The school principal, an outsider, observed that the people were not apathetic but 
[were] “continuously met with frustration.”56 Neither the reports of meetings nor letters 
to politicians and bureaucrats suggest they were a defeated population. In 1971 Harbour 
Deep sent 14 students to Memorial University and they were eagerly awaiting the 
opening of a new school. Residents believed a road connection to Hawke‟s Bay and a 
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forestry access road would ensure a prosperous future for the community. Ed Roberts 
believed that without a road link and access to timber stands, the rights to which had been 
conceded to Price (Nfld.) Ltd., Harbour Deep would die.  
 When a rumour spread that Great Harbour Deep was slated for resettlement, the 
residents contacted provincial politicians and their federal MP to request services.
57
 The 
local merchant, Pittman, lobbied for electricity and a road connection. He invited Roberts 
to a public meeting to tell the people “straight” whether the government intended to 
improve communication and transportation services or if they planned to vacate the 
community in the next four to five years.
58
 The Anglican minister, Eugene Abbott, and 
merchant wanted reassurance that the thousands of dollars raised for the new school 
would not be wasted. Pitman charged that all too often new public wharves and buildings 
wasted away in abandoned harbours. The merchant had much to lose if the community 
dispersed since the FHRP did not reimburse merchants for buildings, wharves or 
inventory. He appealed to Roberts to assist fishers to acquire gillnets, larger boats, and 
engines to make the fishery more productive. 
 Roberts believed that Great Harbour Deep could not survive without a road to 
Hawke‟s Bay.59 Nathaniel Cassel, a community leader, concurred. He considered 
building a house in a community without a road to be as senseless as “putting a new 
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lining in an old coat.”60 Roberts warned that only if a company was found to develop 
timber stands would the federal government subsidize construction of a road link.
61
 With 
timber rights already ceded to Price (Nfld.) Paper company, the odds of attracting private 
capital was minimal. 
 Fogo Islanders organized local development committee and were the beneficiaries 
of National Film Board and MUN Extension expertise, but residents of Harbor Deep and 
most outports were left to their own devices and perhaps the support of a sympathetic 
MHA. The community of 300 lacked the political clout of Fogo Island which had a 
population of 4,500, enough voters to determine district elections. The Local Roads 
Board was the community‟s single civic body. Most of the residents just wanted to end 
the uncertainty.
62
 One attempted to embarrass politicians by listing unfulfilled election 
promises: electricity; a new school; a special grant for the local road; and a road 
connection to the St. Barbe coast. Roberts informed a public gathering at Harbour Deep 
that their community was too prosperous to be resettled and advised them to continue to 
fundraise for a new school. In his letter to Smallwood, Maxwell Pollard alleged Roberts 
promised electrification, a shipyard, and a canning factory, and pointed out the potential 
for developing a woods industry. Pollard assured residents that government would not 
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ask them to leave their “good” houses. The people of Harbour Deep asked Smallwood for 
reassurances.
63
  
 Resettlement formed the content of all conversations. Pollard accused government 
of persecuting the people and forcing them into a condition comparable to the Great 
Depression and predicted that unless an element of certainty was injected into the 
community “in another year half is here will be mental and everything gone to ruin, 
because they are losing interest in everything.” He declared it was not a privilege to move 
to Englee, but “slow murder.”64 It was an emotional appeal to a man whom most coastal 
people believed had rescued Newfoundland from the jaws of hunger and poverty. The 
people questioned why a government, led by a man who had promised jobs and 
prosperity to all, would introduce a fisheries development program that forced people 
from communities with good potential for development into growth centres where they 
would be forced to live on welfare. Like the householders of Petite Forte, the people of 
Great Harbour Deep were in limbo. They did not know whether they should build or 
renovate homes or attend to the upkeep of fishing rooms.
65
 Only a desperate man would 
compare resettlement to slow murder or suggest it would be more humane to bomb a 
community than keep people in a state of suspense until they cracked. 
 Harbour Deep had only the local road board and the merchant to fight for 
improved services. Distance from the capital and isolation compounded the difficulty of 
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attracting the attention of government officials and non-governmental agencies. The 
welfare officer made only infrequent visits during the shipping season. Isolated 
communities looked to the local merchant, who was their chief contact with the outside 
world, for leadership. The Anglican priest, whose headquarters was 40 miles distant by 
water, visited infrequently. He did not engage in political action like the rector at Burgeo, 
but was concerned over the consequences of building a new school in a place with an 
uncertain lifespan. 
 When a clergyman did intervene he caused an uproar. Pastor Booth Reid 
persuaded the Department of Community and Social Development officials that Great 
Harbour Deep was ready to relocate and to send a petition and applications for assistance. 
Reid convinced C&SD he could accommodate all households of the Harbour Deep at 
Bide Arm. Householders, who had expressed no interest in resettlement, demanded an 
explanation.
66
 Samuel Cassell objected strongly to an “outsider” meddling in their 
affairs.
67
 He assured Roberts that residents were capable of running their own affairs and 
challenged the notion Harbour Deep was a declining community. Young families were 
building homes, school enrollment was increasing and the people were satisfied with the 
level of medical services. What Harbour Deep needed were improved roads and 
communications. He neglected to mention that youth who left to get post-secondary 
training seldom returned.  
                                                          
66
Samuel J. Cassell to Roberts, 17 March 1969. Edward Roberts Collection, Coll 078 File 
4.01.014, ASC, Memorial University. 
67
It is perhaps of some import that Booth Reid, a pastor of the Apostolic faith, intervened 
in the affairs of an all Anglican community. They may have seen his intrusion as an effort 
to not only recruit settlers for Bide Arm but also new converts. 
 267 
 Chesley Pittman also accused government of sending Reid to engineer the 
relocation of Harbour Deep to Bide Arm.
68
  Pittman alleged that Reid had informed a 
“certain party” that 90% of Harbour Deep was in favour of moving. He informed 
Roberts: “If government intends to root us out, or ask us to move, some responsible 
person should be sent here to outline what the government has in mind.”69 Roberts denied 
there was any plan to evacuate Harbour Deep, but suggested assistance was available if a 
family wanted to move. He vowed to fight any government or person who tried to force 
them out.
70
 The MHA, who had served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Premier and was 
then Minister of Health, reminded Pittman that government had recently installed diesel 
generators. He restated his commitment to building a road to Hawke‟s Bay and 
considered the debacle to be a “misunderstanding” that arose from a meeting between the 
Apostolic Faith pastor and C&SD to discuss the relocation of Hooping Harbour to Bide 
Arm. 
 Harbour Deep took pride in the number of youth who went on to post-secondary 
institutions. Unfortunately, few of them returned to staff schools or nursing stations.
71
 
But the youth who stayed continued to exploit the resources of the land and sea, get 
married, build homes, and raise families. They believed that if government built forest 
access roads, upgraded communications, and modernized the inshore fishery, Great 
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Harbour Deep could prosper. There was plenty of timber available and the people had the 
skills to build larger vessels. The principal pointed out the accomplishments of school 
graduates and suggested these young men and women would be building up the economy 
at home if they had opportunity to stay.
72
 He advised Smallwood that the town had a 
greater potential for economic growth than any community of similar size. Duncan 
introduced the notion of establishing Great Harbour Deep as a service centre for 
longliners. He alleged a fish storage unit could enhance an already good cod and salmon 
fishery and give impetus to the development of a crab and herring fishery. Duncan also 
proposed relocating the Williamsport whaling station to the port. The school principal 
conceded optimism alone was not sufficient to keep the community alive and households 
knew survival depended on development of forest resources, a road link to Hawke‟s Bay, 
and improved communication services. In 1971 Roberts presented a petition to the House 
of Assembly for installation of a dial telephone service. The petitioners believed that a 
dial service would ease isolation and improve employment opportunities to keep youth in 
the community. The people of Harbour Deep challenged the ideology of rural 
development agencies that considered centralization as the only solution to rural poverty. 
The citizens of Harbour Deep survived the FHRP, but decided to relocate in 2002 when 
the province introduced a new resettlement plan. 
Paradise Sound: Petite Forte, South East Bight and Monkstown 
    
 While the FHRP resettled most isolated communities in Placentia West in just two 
years, communities of Paradise Sound resisted. In 1972 Petite Forte, Southeast Bight, and 
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Monkstown were the only communities without roads that were occupied year-round. 
Altogether thirty communities resettled between 1965 and 1970.
73
 When rumours spread 
throughout Placentia Bay that government was going to resettle isolated settlements, 
communities that had never considered relocating disappeared within a few months.
74
 
The surviving communities lived in the grip of uncertainty, afraid to build a new home, 
repair the existing one, or repair a fence.
75
 Although Petite Forte, Southeast Bight, and 
Monkstown were on the Newfoundland mainland they were separated from the Burin 
highway by 20 kilometres of rugged terrain. The highway, which follows the spine of the 
Burin Peninsula, was not conveniently located to serve the outports of Fortune or 
Placentia Bays. Commission Government wanted to connect the largest towns to the 
provincial highway system at the lowest cost so the road by-passed coastal communities 
on either side. A motorist today can drive a distance of over 100 kilometres from Swift 
Current to Marystown without passing through a single community. The province 
responded to demands for branch roads, improved communications and electrification by 
encouraging people to relocate to growth poles. 
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 The ideology of the MHA sometimes determined the fate of coastal communities. 
Placentia West MHA, Patrick J. Canning, favoured resettling all of the islands and  
isolated communities of his constituency. “Constituents considered Canning to be a weak 
representative, but continued to elect him because he was “Joey‟s man.” Dissatisfied” 
alleged Canning told the people of Paradise: “You will never get a road to this God-
forsaken place,” and Canning advised them that government policy prohibited 
constructing roads to communities with fewer than 50 households.
76
 James Dray, 
Secretary of the Fishermen‟s Local of Little Paradise, informed Smallwood that rumours 
were circulating that the people of “this section of the Bay are going to be shifted to some 
other part of the province, and that economic sanctions will be imposed on them.”77 Due 
to the prevalence of rumours, some householders stopped improving their property. When 
Public Works delayed wharf repairs, disappointed residents lamented “no work will be 
done here, as the people are all leaving here.” Dray asked the Premier to bring an end to 
speculation and rumour. 
 Canning contributed to the uncertainty by refusing to encourage government to 
build roads to the isolated communities in Placentia West.  He asked the Minister of 
Highways to slow the construction of a bridge across Bay de l‟Eau River as a tactic to 
encourage the evacuation of St. Joseph‟s and Little Harbour.78 Canning hoped that all the 
people in this general area would be swept up in the centralization programme and moved 
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to the Marystown area. He predicted  that in a few years all the little settlements would be 
emptied.
79
 Rev. W. P. Collins alleged that the absence of roads to Davis Cove and Petite 
Forte was forcing people of the region to move elsewhere without guarantee of a job.
80
 
Collins suggested a road connection would make communities more viable and attract 
settlers to them. However, in some instances roads in became roads out, but Canning 
denied them that option. 
 One could argue that the completion of the Burin Highway increased the sense of 
isolation in Placentia West. Construction of a branch road to one community fomented 
discontent in neighbouring settlements. Collins claimed government contributed to the 
agitated state by circulating a map showing a road to Presque Arm, Monkstown, and other 
communities.
81
 Election propaganda raised false hopes and when promised roads did not 
materialize the people felt abandoned and betrayed. Increased demands for roads and other 
services contributed to the decision to move people to public services. No doubt the per 
capita costs of a road to the Davis Cove-Monkstown area and Petite Forte would be 
excessive. Assuming a population of 1,000, including Isle au Valen and Merasheen, the 
cost per family would be $7,000 or a total cost of $1.7 million. The average cost of 
moving households under the resettlement program was $2,200 and the provinces share of 
that amount was about $700. Smallwood informed Collins that it was more feasible to 
encourage people to take advantage of a federally funded program to move people, of their 
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own volition, to the services.
82 
Consequently 90 percent of the communities of Placentia 
West relocated, but not always to centres with better services or employment 
opportunities. High unemployment rates in the growth centres on the isthmus ensured 
evacuated communities were never completely abandoned. Some fishers returned the year 
following resettlement and were still present when the author visited Port Anne and 
Oderin in 2010. 
 In 1967 two C&SD field workers surveyed 15 Placentia Bay settlements to 
determine if they were viable communities and to assess their reaction to the resettlement 
program. Lance C. Shirley and Donald W. Burry investigated problems arising from 
resettlement and attempted to establish a closer liaison between the government 
departments and the outports with respect to resettlement.
83
 Burry and Shirley interviewed 
householders, school teachers, and merchants in all 15 communities. They gathered data 
on population, number of schools, school enrollment, number of pre-school children, and 
quintals of salt fish produced. Burry and Shirley also compiled information on 
transportation and communications services and port facilities. 
 In Monkstown they visited thirty-four householders, 90 percent of whom were 
opposed to resettlement. Only two families had relocated prior to May 1967.
84
 It was a 
stable community with an unusually diverse economy. Only half of adult males were 
fishermen, the remainder were employed in lumbering and boatbuilding. No one wished to 
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leave despite not being a port of call for the CNR coastal boat and reliance on mail service 
via Davis Cove, a community contemplating evacuation. They hoped to persuade the CNR 
to make Monkstown a port of call if Davis Cove resettled. The possible reduction of 
services did not shake community morale. Shirley and Burry recognized the potential 
for further development of fisheries, logging, and tourism in Paradise Sound. They 
advised the Resettlement Division that the lobster, salmon and cod fisheries could be 
expanded and pointed out the possibility for developing sports fishing. With two large 
salmon rivers and schools of tuna in Paradise Sound, and a profusion of wildlife in the 
area, Monkstown could be marketed as a prime destination for sports fishing and hunting. 
If the proposed  paper mill for Come By Chance became a reality then local stands of 
timber could be harvested and sold for pulpwood. Although the Shirley and Burry exuded 
optimism over the potential of this community, they remained convinced it could not 
survive without a road. 
 The Salvation Army Officer at Monkstown took a more optimistic view.
85
 The 
pastor also highlighted the tourist potential of Paradise Sound and asked government to 
build a road and approve Monkstown as a growth point for nearby communities. He 
described the torturous trip to Come By Chance hospital. Patients first travelled over a 
rough road to Davis Cove, then took the coastal boat to Argentia and completed the 
journey by taxi. In addition to being circuitous, the journey was expensive.
86
 Lieutenant 
Hiscock asked for a crude gravel road but Smallwood explained that a gravel road was 
                                                          
85
Lorne Hiscock to Smallwood, 9 November 1969. J. R. Smallwood Collection, Coll-
075, File 1.30.023, ASC, Memorial University. 
86
1965 Fisheries Statistics in Burry and Shirley, “Placentia Bay Study (1967),” 
Appendix. GN39/1, File S83, PANL. 
 274 
cost prohibitive and the residents of Monkstown and Davis Cove should not expect a 
road.
87
 
 The women of Monkstown dismissed Premier‟s dictum.88 Women joined in the 
fight for better services and economic development. Hattie and Laura May invited 
Smallwood to visit Monkstown so he could see the resources and hear firsthand reasons 
why Monkstown was a place with potential for growth. The Mays repeated the Salvation 
Officer‟s arguments against resettlement and his proposals for development, and added 
that faithful support of the Liberal Party had left them living like people did in 1930 with 
kerosene lamps and horse and slide. The women drew attention to the unfairness of a 
government that installed three diesel generators at Port Elizabeth while Monkstown 
received none. They sharply criticized their MHA and asked the Premier to fire Canning, 
who won every election from 1949-71, for incompetence. They assured the Premier of 
their continued support, but informed him they had no faith in Canning. With no other 
representative to turn to, Monkstown asked Canning to present their petition for electricity 
and a road.  
 The activities of the Mays demonstrated that women in small, remote locations 
engaged in political action in 1960s. A letter written by Mrs. W. Butler confirms women‟s 
involvement in the political affairs of Monkstown extended beyond the May sisters. In 
1969 Butler warned Smallwood that the householders of Monkstown were committed to 
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staying.
89
 Reports identifying health risks in some growth centres had received widespread 
publicity and Butler was aware of them. Butler said Monkstown was a healthy place 
where there was not one reported case of tuberculosis. She advised the Premier that 
families lived in good quality homes equipped with electricity, water and sewer systems. 
They were satisfied with the school and teachers, and the two stores that supplied all the 
groceries and clothing they needed. Butler again highlighted the potential for turning 
Monkstown into an important tourist destination if it had a road connection to the 
provincial grid. Like so many other letters from outport people to Smallwood, Butler‟s 
ended with a promise to continue to vote for the Liberal Party. 
 Monkstown women took leadership and acted as spokespersons for the 
community. Men led the fight to save Fogo Island and Harbour Deep, but in Monkstown 
women were at the centre of the struggle. They stepped outside boundaries thet confined 
them to the private domestic sphere to circulate petitions and write letter demanding  
political leaders provide the necessary infrastructure to enhance the economic viability of 
Monkstown and the welfare of its industrious citizens. When Frank Moores promised to 
bring services to isolated communities, the voters of Placentia West elected Leo Barry, the 
candidate who promised Monkstown a road. By 1975 a branch road to Monkstown was 
completed, and the community was connected to the provincial electrical grid, which was 
later extended 12 kilometres to South East Bight.  
 South East Bight showed some signs of decline in the 1960s. Population increased 
from 90 to 112 between 1961 and 1967 but the number of inshore fishers decreased from 
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15 to 12 in the same period. In contrast to Monkstown, only three persons were employed 
in non-fishing occupations.
90
 Despite problems in the inshore fishery only one household 
moved out during the period. Thirty-two children were enrolled in the two one-room 
schools, one of which doubled as a chapel. Nearly half the population was under sixteen 
years old and one-third of householders were disabled or retired, but there were several 
industrious young fishing families to anchor the community. South East Bight had a post 
office, a CNT office, mobile telephone, and was a port of call for the CNR coastal boat. 
Twomerchants operated two small grocery stores. With these services in place 
resettlement was a hard sell. 
 Father P. J. Lewis believed South East Bight was unlikely to get larger, but felt it 
would not resettle because “there are some good fishermen and some young fishermen 
who will be harder to convince they should leave because they are fairly independent.”91 
Carmelita McGrath, who conducted a questionnaire-interview study of the economic lives 
of the women in South East Bight in the 1990s, quoted an elderly woman who recalled a 
visit from Father Lewis: 
They were all going out except for a few. Even the priest came to the door one day 
and said to me, “Oh, you‟ll leave too. When the old rooster goes, the old hen will 
follow.” And I said, “Well this is one old hen that‟s staying.” Now my husband he 
was inclined to go along with them [government officials] and leave, but I talked 
him out of it.
92
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Women not only convinced husbands to stay, but also played a key role in keeping the 
community alive. They organized committees whose greatest achievement was to 
convince the provincial government to connect the community to the provincial power 
grid. They succeeded in keeping the school open and persuaded government to install a 
telephone service. When the established merchants left new stores opened, and some 
families who had left drifted back after discovering that government‟s promise of a better 
life had little substance.
93
 When the local resettlement committee circulated a petition in 
1967 only eight householders signed. The families who favoured resettlement had 35 
children in total while there were 19 in the opposing households.
94
 Burry and Shirley 
advised Sametz it would be advisable to approve South East Bight for resettlement 
because the two teachers were leaving. In their opinion the community would not have 
any teachers in September. 
 The experience of William Goldsworthy likely discouraged some from relocating. 
Goldsworthy, who moved to Freshwater, Placentia purchased a house on which the vendor 
owed taxes. The town council refused to issue a permit to occupy until the outstanding 
taxes were paid. Unable to pay the tax bill and with no means to force the previous owner 
to pay, Goldsworthy found himself homeless. A bad situation was made worse when he 
heard his neighbours planned to petition council to banish him from the community.
95
 
Goldsworthy returned to South East Bight where Burry and Shirley found him living in 
“dire circumstances, in a dilapidated shack covered with bags and boughs.”96 When this 
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story circulated throughout Paradise Sound, it must have discouraged others from 
resettling to an allegedly hostile place. Despite reports that resettlement was not living up 
to its promises some households moved out of the region. But others moved from nearby 
settlements to South East Bight and some former residents returned to give the settlement 
renewed life. 
 Petite Forte, situated at the mouth of Paradise Sound, approximately twenty 
kilometres from Monkstown, is the terminus for the South East Bight Ferry. Rev. P. J. 
Lewis described Petite Forte as a proud community, but added that, since it had no hope of 
ever getting a road, it was destined to die.
97
 Leslie Harris, a president of Memorial 
University and native of St. Joseph‟s, Placentia Bay, noted that Petite Forte was 
“distinctive for its entrepreneurial spirit” and a higher than average number of fishermen 
owned schooners.
98
 J. H. Robbins, Division of Resettlement, who considered Petite Forte 
“ahead of most communities in the area,” reported the fishing premises and homes were in 
a good state of repair.
99
 During his visit, Robbins outlined the policy of resettlement and 
left behind all the necessary documents. Robbins felt there was definite interest in 
resettlement, but the people were undecided on where to go. Concern over cost and 
availability of housing in Marystown dampened interest in that growth centre, but 
residents of Petite Forte sent delegations to Marystown and Trepassey to investigate 
availability of land and inshore fishing facilities. Etchegary was keen to attract new fishers 
as well as plant workers to Trepassey. Robbins suggested that only after the households 
                                                          
97
P. J. Lewis to Ross Young, 6 April 1965. GN39/1, Box 127, File S56, PANL. 
98Leslie Harris, “Placentia Bay,” in Encyclopaedia of Newfoundland and Labrador, v.4 
(St. John‟s: Harry Cuff Publications, 1993): 320-330, 324. 
99
J. H. Robbins to Harnum, 7 December 1965. GN39/1, Box 126, File S56, PANL. 
 279 
were convinced government would never build a road link or extend electricity and 
telephone services would householders vote to resettle.
100
 
 Patrick Canning wished to relocate Petite Forte households to Marystown which, 
by this time, had all the modern amenities and services Petite Forte residents were 
demanding. During a radio interview Canning commented that he had promised Petite 
Forte nothing during the election, and now that he was re-elected, he would do nothing for 
them.
101
 During the 1966 election campaign he told the community that they would not get 
electricity, telephones, water, roads or teachers.
102
 The MHA contended a road was not 
feasible due to the rough terrain, and it certainly is rugged. Residents asked for an 
engineering survey to get a cost estimate. They suggested that a road would turn Petite 
Forte into a service centre for Port Anne, South East Bight, Little Paradise, and Great 
Paradise. The residents wanted development, not resettlement. Robbins admitted that if 
Petite Forte had a community stage, a bait depot and a road connection other communities 
might be interested in moving there.
103 
 
 In 1968 a counselling team consisting of representatives from C&SD, Canada 
Manpower, and Atlantic Fish Processors, visited Petite Forte, St. Joseph‟s and South East 
Bight to recruit workers for the Marystown plant. The team left the community convinced 
the households had no desire to resettle, but surmised residents would soon succumb to the 
lure of modernity. The visiting team based its conclusion on two developments. First, the 
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main merchant and supplier, James Flynn, had purchased premises at Placentia and 
intended to move there by fall, and secondly, the resignation of the two teachers left the 
future of the school uncertain. The recruiting team felt the government should make a 
concerted effort to persuade householders to move to a major fisheries growth centres of 
the Burin Peninsula, preferably Marystown.
104
 The province had made a commitment to 
Atlantic Fish to supply the Mortier Bay plant with a large stable workforce. 
 Harnum asked Gerald Barry, a resident of Petite Forte, to make a list of 
householders who had resettled along with a list of those who wished to resettle. Barry 
listed 28 families who had either moved or were contemplating moving.
105
 But when 
Barry circulated a petition, only 10 householders signed and most of them were living 
elsewhere. These resettled families had a financial stake in the outcome. The maximum lot 
supplementary grant households from a non-petitioning outport could qualify for was 
$1,000. If Petite Forte petitioned to resettle, all households moving to fisheries growth 
centres would be eligible for lot supplementaries to a limit of $3,000. Harnum 
occasionally advised those who had made individual moves to let family and former 
neighbours know that by refusing to sign they were possibly penalizing them. One can 
safely assume that these reminders generated dissension within families and placed the 
residual population under duress. 
 The departure of the merchant sometimes triggered community evacuations. Bar 
Haven and Spencer‟s Cove are two examples where people followed the merchants 
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Wadman and Wareham to Southern Harbour and Arnold‟s Cove.106 Flynn‟s forthcoming 
move to Placentia gave the resettlement director encouragement the fishers of Petite Forte 
would follow their example. But instead of leaving the fishers found a new supplier in 
Port Elizabeth. Harnum informed Flynn that when the householders who wished to move 
were combined with those who had moved the total was nearing 80 percent.
107 
The 
Director asked Flynn to submit detailed information on the householders who opposed 
evacuation. He wanted name and occupation of household heads, number in the family, 
and age structure of the families. Presumably, he was preparing a case to take to the 
minister. If community resistance could not be worn down through repeated petitioning, 
then he was prepared to ask the minister to use powers accorded to him by the 
Resettlement Agreement.
108
  
 Spring 1969 Harnum informed Donald Burry, the RDO at Marystown, that FHRC 
approval of 18 individual household moves to Marystown brought the number moved and 
desiring to move to 70 percent.
109
 He wrote: “it would seem that the time is ripe for the 
community to become designated and we further think it is advisable that you visit with a 
view to having a petition completed.”110 He instructed Burry to make sure the people 
understood that their refusal to sign could result in a lower supplementary grant for 
resettled households. 
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 While Harnum strongly supported evacuation of Petite Forte, Newfoundland‟s 
representative in the national cabinet was not convinced. Don Jamieson contacted the 
Minister of C&SD, on behalf of his constituents in Petite Forte, to request electrification. 
Bill Rowe informed Jamieson that the population had dwindled from 183 in 1965 to 41 in 
1971 and was 60% evacuated.
111
 The carrot and stick approach that governments had used 
to evacuate the 29 communities of Placentia Bay failed to persuade the householders to 
leave, but left it more vulnerable. The MHA‟s allegations that they would never get a road 
link, electricity or telephone service were harmful, but not fatal. People were there to 
welcome former residents when they returned to fish old grounds. 
 Peter Gard, a Canadian Geographic journalist, reported that those who stayed did 
as well as those who moved. Gard contended that if resettlement officials had listened to 
dissenting voices, they would not have reduced fewer communities to seasonal fish 
camps.
112
 Earl Hickey, who relocated to Southern Harbour, returned to Petite Forte each 
year to fish because the promise of the good life and better employment opportunities 
never materialized. He told an Equinox reporter that he left because “they were saying the 
coastal boat was going to be taken. They were going to take the school, we‟d be left with 
nothing. They were more or less driving you out.”113 Petite Forte, South East Bight and 
Monkstown survived because they refused to be worn down by Harnum, Smallwood or 
Canning. The three settlements of Paradise Sound insisted on their right to modern 
services in the place in which they resided. South East Bight did not get a road, but it has a  
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ferry and a connection to the hydro grid. When I visited the community in 2013 there were 
longliners moored to a large public wharf and smaller craft tied to a floating dock and 
homes were connected to the provincial power grid and telephone network. Local roads 
were paved with concrete to accommodate all terrain vehicles.  
 In 1972 Premier Frank Moores introduced rural development initiatives. When the 
Placentia West Development Association came into existence, Petite Forte became a 
chartered member. The Association built a community stage, a wharf and a medical clinic 
at Petite Forte.
114
 Community spirit survived. Residents began to build houses and repair 
property. The population increased from a low of 41 in 1971 to 120 year-round residents 
in 1982. In 1977 government installed three diesel generators and in 1980 telephone 
service was extended to the community. According to the criteria set out in J. H. Robbins 
1965 report, all that Petite Forte needed to qualify as a growth centre was a road link to the 
Burin Highway.  Today a motorist can traverse a paved road to Petite Forte and catch a 
ferry ride to South East Bight. 
 
Point Lance 
 Politicians frequently injected themselves in resettlement debates. The federal MP 
for St. John‟s West targeted Point Lance, a St. Mary‟s Bay community with a population 
of 135. Resettlement was a non-issue until Richard Cashin decided to invest several 
million dollars in harbour development in St. Bride‟s, a Cape Shore settlement. Cashin 
wished to boost the population of St. Bride‟s to head off criticism of the project. In 
December 1964, when the FHRP was still in the discussion phase, Cashin asked  
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Smallwood to use the provincial centralization program to move households from Point 
Lance into St. Bride‟s to demonstrate that St. Bride‟s had the capacity to become a growth 
centre for the Cape Shore and St. Mary‟s Bay. Cashin, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Fisheries Minister H. J. Robichaud, was convinced the people of Point Lance, a port with 
a good beach but no harbour, would be better off at St Bride‟s where there was a fish 
plant.
115
 He felt Point Lance met all the criteria of a declining community, and entreated 
Smallwood to undermine the marginal community by assisting individual household 
moves. Cashin volunteered to go to Point Lance to persuade all householders it was in 
their best interests to move. He assured Smallwood that he was prepared to use his 
political influence to the fullest possible extent to evacuate the village.”116  
 In February, Newfoundland Deputy Minister of Fisheries, E. M. Gosse, advised 
Cashin that his representation on behalf of Point Lance had been favourably received by 
the joint Resettlement Committee, but residents did not share the Committee‟s opinion.117  
The regional development officer, R. Loder, attended a public meeting in Point Lance and 
concluded that there was little interest in resettlement.
118
 Nonetheless four families were 
assisted to relocate to St. Bride‟s. According to John Mannion, Point Lance householders‟ 
attitude toward plant work was that it was a low paying, demeaning occupation fit only for 
women and children. Accustomed to working on shore and inshore activities they 
expressed no interest in switching to deep-sea trawlers.
119
  A second public meeting called 
by Loder and attended by Harnum confirmed that the majority opposed relocation. 
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Householders who were interested indicated they would not resettle unless everyone 
left.
120
  
 The meeting demonstrated how divisive the resettlement issue could be. In Point 
Lance it divided the community and families.
121
 One man said he was willing to move, but 
his wife declared she would not be leaving her home under any circumstances. The wife 
of the mail carrier, Richard Careen, said she was willing to go, but Richard was dead set 
against it. A 48 year old fish plant worker with fourteen children said he wished to move 
to a centre where his sons would find employment. The 62 year old merchant - patriarch 
of Point Lance stood four-square against moving. Joseph Careen owned the grocery store, 
the school bus and the trucks used to transport fish to the plant at St. Bride‟s. Careen stood 
to lose his livelihood and all capital invested in real property and transportation 
equipment. Loder was convinced that if merchant agreed to resettle, 90 percent of the 
families would go with him, but until he agreed to go the community would die a slow 
death. 
 When the author visited Point Lance in 2012, it had the earmarks of a modern, 
prosperous settlement. The community boasted comfortable well-kept houses, a new 
community centre, and a large church wherein a wedding was in progress. The fishers 
overcame the restrictions of a poor harbour by beaching smaller vessels and mooring 
longliners at St. Bride‟s. In 1969 outsiders owned half the vessels fishing out of St. 
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Bride‟s.122 Most non-resident boat owners lived in Placentia or Point Lance, but fishers 
from Placentia West also used the port and landed catches at the fish plant. 
 Joseph Careen was undoubtedly a key actor in the drama, but the other 
householders played a part. One should not underestimate their attachment to comfortable 
mortgage-free homes and a slower pace of life. Home ownership was a form of security in 
a society that balanced market and subsistence activities. As elsewhere, resettlement 
created tensions between generations and within households. In Point Lance in Transition 
Mannion observed the older generation had an antipathy towards deep-sea fishing and fish 
plant work while the younger cohort had no interest in participating in the industrial 
offshore sector or the pluralistic economy. They were not interested in occupations that 
offered long work days and uncertain returns. When they graduate from high school they 
follow a well-trod path to the city. In the words of Mrs. Careen “As soon as the finish 
school, they‟re gone.”123 
Conclusion 
 The communities of Fogo Island, Harbour Deep, Paradise Sound, and Point Lance 
survived by using a variety of strategies. Few places faced a bleaker future than Fogo 
Island. The Labrador fishery, on which the island communities were so dependent, came 
to an end in the mid-1950s. A decade later Earle Brothers, who supplied fishers, and 
bought and marketed their production, wound up their business and Fishery Products 
abandoned government-owned plants at Seldom and Joe Batt‟s Arm. Fogo Island was a 
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community in decline that refused to surrender to adversity. When offered a choice 
between resettlement and development, Fogo Islanders created a rural development model 
that melded local knowledge with outside expertise. The National Film Board, Memorial 
University Extension Services, and the Fogo Island Improvement Committee initiated a 
program of development which caught the attention of government and non-governmental 
agencies around the world. The Fogo Experiment, as it is known, broke down community 
barriers and enabled residents to conceptualize the Island as a single community, ready to 
take on projects normally left to companies with deep pockets. The new sense of 
community that came out of the experiment broke through intra-community rivalries and 
opened up new possibilities for consolidating social services. A non-denominational 
regional high school and a hospital were constructed in a central location. Improved 
transportation and telecommunications overcame geography. Through co-operative action 
and self-help, Fogo Islanders created a new framework of rural development and fended 
off resettlement. 
 Harbour Deep was more remote and lacked the political influence of Fogo Island, 
but its industrious population was just as determined to survive as a community. When 
resettlement documents arrived in the community, it aroused the ire of all. Letters of 
protest flooded into Confederation Building. The signatories asked their elected 
representatives for an explanation. They persuaded Roberts to publicly confirm that 
government did not plan to resettle them, and residents, in turn, informed Roberts they had 
no intention of leaving. Like Fogo Island and other places, Harbour Deep chose 
development over stagnation or evacuation. They demanded roads to resources and a road 
connection to the provincial highway system. Community leaders implored government to 
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assist development of land and marine resources. They argued that Harbour Deep had 
greater potential for development than Englee, the nearest designated growth centre. They 
persevered because the residents took a united stance against outside interference. 
Residents refused to abandon large comfortable homes until 2002 when the province 
offered a more lucrative resettlement package. 
 The MHA for White Bay North was less bullish on centralization than Canning. 
Roberts assured his constituents that government had no plan to evacuate Harbour Deep 
unless the people wished to leave. The MHA for Placentia West, on the other hand, 
offered no such assurances to his constituents. During the 1966 election campaign 
Canning announced that the communities of Petite Forte, Monkstown, South East Bight, 
and other places without a road, should not expect improved communication or 
transportation services. The people of Paradise Sound refused to heed the warnings of an 
unpopular, yet oft elected, politician. The women and men of Monkstown wrote letters   
circulated petitions, and participated in public meetings to preserve the communities. In 
South East Bight, the woman of the house told her priest not only had she decided to stay 
but also had converted her husband. The actions of these women refute the thesis that 
mothers were the strongest advocates of resettlement. Petite Forte rebuffed Harnum‟s 
attempts to wear them down by circulating multiple petitions, rejected the overtures of 
plant executives and senior bureaucrats and defied their MHA. The communities of 
Paradise Sound made it clear that a road, telephone service, and electricity were the only 
acceptable prescriptions for isolation and underemployment. The ability to stand together 
as a community and present a common front was key to community survival. When 
community integrity collapsed, evacuation soon followed. 
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Chapter VIII 
Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour: A Contest of Wills 
Introduction 
 Critics of resettlement insist that ruthless bureaucrats and politicians forced 
families into reception centres. The examples in the previous chapter, and the case of Port 
Elizabeth, demonstrate how resettlers resisted relocation. The Port Elizabeth - Red 
Harbour move is a prime example of the inability of state planners to direct labour from 
the inshore sector to the offshore. Port Elizabethans, with the support of the main 
merchant, pressured the federal and provincial ministers of the crown to reopen an 
evacuated community. When the planners named the new community Riverview the 
relocatees refused to accept it. Regardless of the reason for attempting to rename the new 
community, the fact remains that the residents of Port Elizabeth not only forced provincial 
and national governments to create a new reception centre, but also coerced them into 
creating a new community on the site of an evacuated outport.
1
  
 Offers of supplementary assistance and the promises of employment and 
educational opportunities enticed young families to one of the industrial fisheries bases, 
but the older fishers, many of whom had little formal education, with sizeable capital 
investments in the shore fishery, refused to abandon fishing gear and vessels. The 
younger, more educated cohort was better prepared to compete in the industrial labour 
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market. Doubtful of the benefits of resettling to Marystown, Burin, Grand Bank or 
Fortune, the majority of householders petitioned to move to a place where they could live 
out their days as independent fishers in the company of kin. Port Elizabethans fought 
against becoming just another dispersed community in a growth centre wherein the sense 
of community and culture could not be reconstructed.  
 In order to preserve their community in another place, the families challenged the 
principal goal of the FHRP and the Evacuated Outports Act (1961) which prohibited the 
reoccupation of abandoned outports. They overcame the opposition of bureaucrats and 
political leaders who could cite statutes to justify their actions. Port Elizabethans were 
willing to forego lot supplementaries and the comfort of entering a community with 
established schools and churches. They demonstrated a determination, unmatched in the 
annals of resettlement, to remain independent producers and avoid the victimization that 
marred resettlement. The move from Davis Island to Red Harbour, a distance of three 
miles, is a prime example of the difficulties resettlement planners faced when they 
attempted to direct people into industrial fisheries bases. A core of 45 inshore fishing 
households repulsed bureaucratic efforts to disperse them into the major towns of the 
Burin Peninsula where their production would be closely monitored by corporate 
managers. They turned down promises of guaranteed employment and dismissed the 
warnings of government agents and cabinet ministers that they were about to exchange a 
life on an island equipped with many modern amenities and services for a sub-standard 
existence in an abandoned community. 
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Port Elizabethans Resettle Themselves 
 Port Elizabeth belies the theme of persecution that haunts the Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program. The narrative in which a helpless rural population were forced 
from their homes by politicians and bureaucrats, gained traction in the 1960s and became 
hegemonic through media, the arts community and academic works. A series of 
community ethnographic studies conducted by graduate students and published by 
Memorial University‟s Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) were very 
critical of the Household Resettlement Program.
2
 These sociological and economic 
studies, especially the Iverson - Matthews report, fuelled media attacks on resettlement 
that rose to a frenzy in 1968. Both the academics and the media reserved their harshest 
criticism for the growth centres wherein families, crowded into subdivisions, risked death 
by disease and/or fire as they descended into dependence. 
 Accounts of appalling conditions in Arnold‟s Cove, Southern Harbour and 
Rushoon strengthened Port Elizabethans‟ resolve to avoid such traps. These reports were 
reinforced by householders who returned to former settlements that were rapidly 
becoming seasonal fish camps. Resettlement spawned a new type of migratory fishery 
which Port Elizabethans sought to avoid. They resolved to relocate as a viable entity to 
Red Harbour wherein they could have lifelong friends as neighbours and fish on familiar 
grounds. Red Harbour was a familiar place. In the nineteenth century, when it was 
customary for settlers to leave blustery headlands for the shelter of wooded valleys, Flat 
Islanders resorted to winter tilts on the banks of Red Harbour River. In the post-
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Confederation era it was a place to switch from skiff to motor cars when they availed of 
the medical and commercial services in Marystown and Burin. When Davis Islanders 
decided to resettle they did so without breaking with the past. 
 How much negative reports influenced  Port Elizabethans‟ decision to construct 
their own growth centre is a matter of conjecture, but one can assume contact with 
disillusioned resettlers, negative news reports and televised documentaries raised doubts 
about the honesty of officials who promised a better life. In 1968 when Port Elizabethans 
were considering resettlement, a furore arose from the release of Communities in Decline. 
The Iverson and Matthews report attracted the attention of other social scientists, 
journalists and novelists who were equally critical of the FHRP. To calm the wave of 
protest Smallwood appointed a second Minister of C&SD, William (Bill) Rowe. 
Journalists were using words like “murder,” “genocide” and “blitzkrieg” to describe the 
way resettlement ravaged the outports. A half century after accepting the cabinet portfolio 
Rowe wrote, “[resettlement] had many opponents and some St. John‟s and mainland 
media denounc[ed] it as akin to the heinous forcing of people into concentration camps.”3  
 The provincial Centralization Plan oversaw evacuation of 115 outports without 
placing any restrictions where the households could resettle. There were no designated 
growth poles and little evidence of coercion. Several families relocated to Port Elizabeth 
in the early 1960s when Fishery Products Ltd. operated a floating fresh fish plant and 
G&A Buffett, a Grand Bank firm, operated a salt fish plant. The two companies employed 
many townspeople and imported others from neighbouring communities. In peak season 
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up to fifty persons lived in company bunkhouses. The future of the island seemed secure, 
but many Port Elizabethans still found it necessary to occasionally work  off the island.
4
 
When catches began to decline, some sharemen who had very low capital investment in 
the shore fishery made permanent moves to one of the industrial towns of the Burin 
Peninsula. But despite the closure of the plants in the mid-1960s and the decline of the 
inshore fishery, the population remained fairly stable and services continued to improve.
5
  
 The shore fishery was concentrated in a core of independent, industrious, and well-
equipped fishers who showed little interest in changing occupations.
6
 It appeared Port 
Elizabeth would survive the tsunami that wiped out so many Placentia West communities. 
Port Elizabeth was an incorporated community with a functional council, a strong 
community sense and a sound commercial base  H. E. Senior & Son supplied the region‟s 
fishermen and marketed their production. Port Elizabeth shared much in common with 
Merasheen, Tack‟s Beach and Harbour Buffett. It had telephones, houses equipped with 
electrical appliances and running water, a post office and CNT office, and it was a port for 
call for the CNR coastal boat on the east and west run from Argentia to Burin. In addition 
to these services, it had a new public wharf, a three-room school and a power plant.
7
 Some 
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families possessed electric washers, electric ranges, furnaces, radios and television sets.
8
 
Car owners  parked their vehicles at Red Harbour which was a short commute from 
Marystown which was, by the late 1960s, a thriving commercial and industrial centre. 
 A Department of Municipal Affairs Report described Port Elizabeth as a relatively 
prosperous fishing settlement, but noted that the population had fallen from 434 in 1935 to 
300 at the time of incorporation in 1962.
9
 The Municipal Affairs report listed the 
following community assets: 80 homes, a church, a three room school, a community hall, 
a public wharf, a community stage, and a diesel generating plant. The inshore fishery was 
organized around a relatively small number of prosperous, well-equipped individuals who 
employed sharemen from Port Elizabeth and nearby communities. At the request of the 
Director of Resettlement, Rev. Gerald Sacrey, the United Church pastor completed an 
inventory of  fishing equipment together with the estimated value of each item.
10
 He 
reckoned there were 1,200 lobster pots, 400 gillnets, 40 codtraps, 1,200 trawl lines, and a 
large number of caplin, mackerel and herring seines. Fishers possessed a variety of 
vessels: seven longliners, 11 punts, 70 dories, and nine trapskiffs. Sacrey speculated that 
none of the boat owners, most of whom were in the 45 and 65 year age range, wished to 
abandon shore fishing or quit the community. Resettlement was a more attractive option 
for sharemen who had the least to lose in terms fishing gear, rooms and boats, but 
Municipal Affairs felt it was unlikely Port Elizabeth would relocate since “business people 
and the most substantial fishermen have banned together to ensure that the rest of the 
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community moves as a viable unit.”11 Sacrey informed Harnum that if these fishers were 
forced to move, all the accumulated wealth would be lost, and the fishers, who had fished 
since childhood, were likely to drift into dependence. He confidently predicted that if the 
FHRC approved the move to Red Harbour transplanted Port Elizabethans would remain 
models of industry. 
 In 1969 Davis Island and Woody Island were the only permanently occupied 
islands in Placentia Bay and two communities were weighing their options. When the 
governments began to assist individual moves from non-petitioning communities to major 
fisheries growth centres, it weakened the sending community. The introduction of lot 
supplementary grants made land more affordable and the introduction of a government-
owned motorized barge made movement of houses safer and more efficient. In 1968 nine 
Port Elizabethan families applied for assistance to relocate to Burin.
12
 Alex Hickman, 
whose constituency included Burin, Fortune and Grand Bank, informed Aidan Maloney 
Minister of C&SD and Fisheries, that while 80 percent of Port Elizabethan householders 
had no desire to relocate to a fisheries growth centre 40 older fishers had applied for 
assistance to move to Red Harbour. He advised Maloney that Willard Senior, owner of H. 
E. Senior, was “strenuously persuading” the people to remain on the island.13 The Burin 
MHA informed Maloney that representatives of Fishery Products Ltd. who had visited 
Davis Island concluded that most people favoured moving, but were reluctant to disclose 
it to their neighbours. To avoid social isolation householders guarded their intentions to 
                                                          
11
Red Harbour - Relocation of Port Elizabeth. GN39/1, File S140, PANL. 
12
Letter from Bert Butler, Hedley Butler, Ralph Butler, Albert Butler, Guy Butler, and 
Gordon Frampton to Harnum, 19 July, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, 1968, PANL. 
13
Alex Hickman to Aidan Maloney, 12 August, 1968. GN39/1, File S140, PANL. 
 296 
leave until plans were firmly in place.
14
 Reports that families were contemplating leaving, 
the loss of the hospital ship, Lady Anderson, and rumours of a reduction in coastal boat 
services created anxiety even in this stable community. Port Elizabethans who took pride 
in the educational success of their children began to fear the quality of education would 
suffer as the population declined.
15
  
 It is difficult to gauge the impact of media reports describing third world 
conditions in Arnold‟s Cove, or the comments of disgruntled resettlers who alleged the 
managers of the FHRP lured them into centres that offered fewer services and 
opportunities for work than the old community. Port Elizabethans who watched the W5 
host describe the squalor and unhealthy environment in the Arnold‟s Cove resettlement 
area, could not have been impressed by what they saw, heard and read About 50 
householders, the community council, and the merchants Willard and Lottie Senior 
opposed resettlement into any existing growth centre. They resolved to move to Red 
Harbour without government approval, if necessary. Here they would continue to enjoy 
the comfort of kin, the company of old neighbours, and worship together as a faith 
community. By moving as a unit into a new community they would avoid the trauma of 
relocating to an unfriendly town. 
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 They received support from Federal Transport Minister, Donald Jamieson. The  
Burin-Burgeo MP, prompted by letters from Willard Senior, requested resettlement grants 
for three families who had moved to Port Elizabeth from Red Harbour in 1965.
16
 Jamieson 
felt the community possessed most of the attributes of a growth centre. He considered  
Port Elizabeth too prosperous, and its fishers too productive, to be resettled to anywhere. 
Furthermore, the FHRC had already set a precedent when it designated Ramea, an island 
community, as a growth centre. Jamieson pointed to the significant government 
investments in the school, wharf, diesel power plants and power lines, phones, and post 
office to make a case for making Port Elizabeth an organized reception centre for the 
region. He contended that it made no sense to vacate a community in which various 
provincial and federal government departments had invested so much in infrastructure and 
services. Funding for a new bait depot for Davis Island was already approved on the 
strength of the character of the people and their performance in the fishery. The MP 
assured Harnum the proposed bait depot would help ease the minds of older fishermen 
who did not wish to move into the larger towns where they would experience difficulty 
competing for limited industrial jobs.
17
 Harnum remained unconvinced. 
 Port Elizabethans also received tacit support from Donald Burry and Lance 
Shirley, who undertook a study of 15 Placentia Bay communities to assess their viability. 
Burry and Shirley‟s decision to omit Port Elizabeth from their itinerary is significant, and 
can be viewed as a vote of confidence. Similarly, Father Philip Lewis, who compiled a list 
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of communities likely to resettle or which ought to be evacuated, also omitted Port 
Elizabeth. The reports of the priest and the two bureaucrats gave silent testimony to the 
economic and social viability of Davis Island. But the FHRC, which was not in the 
business of preserving island communities by approving them as reception centres, denied 
Jamieson‟s request. 
 The Resettlement Committee, which did not share Jamieson‟s positive outlook on 
Port Elizabeth, was prepared to write off private and public capital investments. Savings 
on coastal boat services, closure of post offices and the shutdown of the diesel electric 
generating plant would cancel out losses. No doubt they also considered the expense of 
providing a ferry service if CN phased out coastal boat services in Placentia Bay. Under 
the FHRP movement of fishing premises remained the responsibility of the owner, and 
C&SD was prepared to let Port Elizabethan fishing families take a $600,000 loss on 
vessels and equipment by moving them to Marystown. Port Elizabethans had no desire to 
abandon expensive gear or familiar fishing grounds. Fisheries planners who considered 
the traditional shore fishery to be a dying industry never factored in the economic cost 
arising from the abandonment of fishing grounds. The FHRC ignored the industriousness 
of the people and the public investments in infrastructure that made Port Elizabeth a more 
attractive place to live than Rushoon, Arnold‟s Cove or Placentia.  
 The Resettlement Committee ignored the Ramea precedent and refused to 
designate Port Elizabeth a reception community. Ramea had a fresh fish processing plant 
supplied by deep-sea trawlers. Harnum seemed to see Port Elizabeth as nothing more than 
an outport where people clung to an archaic industry that could never produce sufficient 
returns to allow investors to live in comfort. The inventory of fishing gear and vessels, 
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which included 400 gillnets and seven longliners, indicates fishers were modernizing. 
Bureaucrats, who accepted the industrial fisheries model as the blueprint for improving 
incomes of rural Newfoundlanders, ignored the character of the people and the social 
vitality of communities like Port Elizabeth. 
 When the Resettlement Committee approved individual household moves to Burin, 
other households began to consider relocating. The loss of young families reduced school 
enrollment and bred rumours of reduced medical, transportation and communication 
services. Youth went off to colleges and careers outside the fishery with the blessing of 
parents who encouraged them to take up a career outside the fishery. The community that 
recently had salt and fresh fish plants competing for fish began to consider their options. 
Usually at this stage a field worker arrived, a public meeting was called to elect a local 
resettlement committee, a petition was circulated, and the inhabitants dispersed into 
several growth centres. The main difference here was that the majority proposed to 
resettle, not to one of the designated reception centres, but to an evacuated community. 
Port Elizabethans, who accepted resettlement as inevitable, decided that Red Harbour 
presented the best option and least disruption. Having fished from childhood many fishers 
knew no other life. 
 However, it would be erroneous to conclude that six householders who requested 
assistance to move to Burin intended to change occupations. They preferred to move to 
relocate their homes to a waterfront site to continue shore fishing.
18
 This fact did not 
diminish the desire of the MHA, municipal council or Fishery Products management to 
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have these families resettle to Burin. Even if the parents refused industrial jobs, there was 
a possibility their children might join the industrial workforce in the future.
19
 Fishery 
Products, anxious to solve the labour crisis, offered to donate waterfront land to receive 
the houses. However, the government engineer estimated cost of developing the site 
would be excessive.
20
 Until 80 percent of Port Elizabethans petitioned to move, 
householders could only qualify for a maximum supplementary grant of $1,000, making 
the waterfront lots, in the opinion of planners, too expensive. Yet C&SD, fearing the 
interested families would join the 50 households who intended to relocate to Red Harbour, 
rushed the six households onto more expensive lots at Black Duck Cove without knowing 
how much lot supplementary each would receive, or who would pay the difference if the 
price of a lot exceeded the supplementary grant.
21
 The town and the company had lobbied 
hard to recruit workers, and recognized resettlers were more likely to become plant 
workers and crew trawlers if government directed them into subdivisions where there was 
insufficient space to meet the needs of inshore fishers. The need to solve the labour crisis 
at Fishery Products took precedence over the needs of shore fishers.
22
  
 Harnum was at least prepared to investigate the possibility of relocating houses on 
the site selected by the families. He asked Municipal Affairs to do a survey and an 
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estimate of the cost of developing the site.
23
 Sametz also appeared conciliatory when he 
recommended funds from C&SD‟s Community Amenities Fund be used to develop 
waterfront lots.
24
 The minister refused.  Maloney declared that the Black Duck site was 
the only one that should be considered, and if the Burin Municipal Council and Fishery 
Products wished to have the Port Elizabeth families settle in their town, they should 
encourage them to settle in the Black Duck Cove land assembly where they could qualify 
for a $3,000 supplementary when the community petitioned to move. In rather highhanded 
fashion he advised the town and the company “not [to] distract them with other 
alternatives.”25 He pointed out that the federal government, which paid 75 percent of the 
cost of assembling land, would never agree to cost-share development of a new site while 
lots at Black Duck remained empty. As a former manager of the fresh fish processing 
plant at Ramea, the minister had firsthand knowledge of the labour shortages in the plants 
and was anxious not to let anything distract him from the goal of transferring labour from 
hosehold enterprises to the corporate fishery. While Maloney correctly predicted that Port 
Elizabeth was ready for the petition, he underestimated the determination of the inshore 
fishers to avoid major fisheries growth centres. Few predicted Port Elizabethans would 
convince the provincial cabinet and the Federal Fisheries Minister to approve a move to an 
evacuated outport in contravention of the principles of the Federal-Provincial 
Resettlement Agreement (1965) and in violation of the Newfoundland Evacuated 
Communities Act (1961). 
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 The administrators of the FHRP were anxious to avoid past mistakes. The main 
goal was to turn fishers into plant workers or trawlermen. To counteract the householders‟ 
disposition to choose small reception centres, Harnum recommended that the C&SD field 
staff ask members of the local resettlement committee to pass names of persons willing to 
resettle into a major fisheries centre along to a plant manager, clergy and community 
leaders in the reception centre. The community leaders would then make the prospective 
resettlers aware of the services and opportunities available in the fisheries growth centres. 
Harnum proposed that it would be useful for people in leadership positions to visit the 
petitioning community to advise them of the employment opportunities, availability and 
price of land, as well as the availability and prices of consumables.
26
 This 
recommendation was put into effect, but the majority of residents of Port Elizabeth proved 
immune to the pleas of plant managers and town mayors 
 Throughout 1968 the Resettlement Division tried to convince families to move into 
Burin or Marystown. Ed Nugent directed the RDO at Marystown to assemble a 
counselling team to visit Port Elizabeth to determine how many families might be 
interested in moving to a designated growth centre. The Director of Field Services asked 
Burry to provide all hoseholders with complete information on lot supplementaries, 
availability of unserviced lots outside land assemblies, and the amount of assistance each 
householder would receive if 80% of householders voted to move. In addition Nugent 
wanted Burry to remind fishers that they had a right to seasonal occupation of former 
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fishing rooms.
27
 Nugent‟s precise instructions indicated government was aware that lack 
of information had caused settlers to make some poor choices. 
 While Burry was in the midst of canvassing Port Elizabeth, a high level meeting 
took place at Confederation Building. Present at the meeting were Aidan Maloney, G. A. 
Frecker, Alex Hickman, the mayor of Burin, the Burin plant manager, Harnum, Albert 
Vivian, Chair of NLHC, the NLHC manager at Marystown, and two representatives from 
Port Elizabeth.
28
 The ministers and bureaucrats, together with the town mayor and plant 
manager hoped to move the Port Elizabeth households to Burin without delay. The NLHC 
manager at Marystown informed the meeting that lots would be ready in two or three 
days, and Maloney advised Vivian that they must proceed with the move as soon as 
possible. The premier was advised immediately of the decision and the barge operator, 
when contacted, agreed to begin moving houses within a week. The move was being fast 
tracked although Burry‟s community survey was only half complete and it was not yet 
known how many intended to move or to where they would settle. No one considered 
what would happen if less than 80% of householders voted to go or if the majority 
continued to insist on moving to Red Harbour. The Resettlement Agreement stipulated 
that until 80% agreed to move to a designated growth centre, the maximum lot 
supplementary was $1,000 and the Evacuated Outports Act prevented the FHRC from 
approving any assistance for households moving to Red Harbour. Maloney, Hickman and 
Frecker were willing to roll the dice in a high stakes game. They were prepared to relocate 
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families from a secure environment into the Black Duck subdivision without the 
homeowners knowing how much assistance they would receive or what their obligations 
would be. Harnum informed the meeting his department had received a petition with 36 
signatures and expressed confidence that the Resettlement Committee would soon 
designate Port Elizabeth an evacuated outport. At that point all householders would be 
eligible for maximum assistance.
29
 It was an example of what Ray Guy termed 
“blitzkrieg” and it produced chaos. 
 Despite Harnum‟s assurances that the move to Black Duck Cove would go 
smoothly, it turned into a fiasco. The cost of the lots for the six Port Elizabeth 
householders exceeded the lot supplementary by $1,200 to $1,700. Sametz attempted to 
persuade NLHC to reduce the price per lot to match the price of lots across the street that 
were selling for as much as $1,500 less than the lots occupied by Port Elizabethans.
30
 
James G. Reid, Minister of Community and Social Development, asked the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing, Val Earle, to adjust the price of the lots to match the lot 
supplementary. Reid later advised the new Minister of Municipal Affairs, Brian Peckford, 
to explain that after five years of occupancy the families should now be eligible to receive 
title to their land. He asked Peckford set a price no higher than was charged for other lots 
in the subdivision.
31
 Reid also referred the minister to the minutes of the divisional 
directors‟ meeting during which “a calculated risk [was] taken in telling the people from 
Port Elizabeth to move onto the land assembly in Burin while awaiting a petition and 
                                                          
29Memorandum to File From K. M. Harnum, “Re: Burin,” n. d. GN39/1, File S140, 
PANL. 
30
James G. Reid, Minister of Community and Social Development, to Val Earle, Minister 
of Municipal Affairs and Housing, GN39/1, File S140, PANL. 
31
James G. Reid to Brian Peckford, 21 October 1974. GN39/1, File S140, PANL. 
 305 
supplementary mortgage assistance.”32 Reid stressed that the householders had acted in 
good faith and the government‟s willingness to gamble had created the debacle which 
prevented Port Elizabethans from getting clear title. The lot supplementary was in reality a 
mortgage that was reduced by 20% per year for five years, so that after five years of 
uninterrupted occupancy the householder was eligible to apply for title to the land. 
 Sametz identified two reasons to act quickly. First, the householders in question 
wished to move before school opened, and secondly the labour shortage at the fish plant 
needed immediate resolution. His report overlooked the householders‟ desire to move into 
a waterfront location where they could continue to prosecute the shore fishery utilizing 
gear that they had accumulated over a lifetime.
33
  Minister Maloney was prepared to 
sacrifice individual needs when they conflicted with state policy. He claimed that the 
province and CMHC had invested taxpayers‟ money in a land assembly at Black Duck 
Cove and the householders should be moved there.
34
 Harnum also proposed that if four 
householders could be relocated to a Marystown subdivision, as many as 20 others would 
follow.
35
 Maloney suggested that the federal government would never agree to cost-
sharing another land assembly at Burin until Black Duck was filled. Port Elizabethans had 
made their preferences clear, but their desire to continue working in a traditional fishery 
clashed with the goals of the FHRP. The resettlement planners believed the economic 
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goals of the resettlement program could be achieved only if the households settled in the 
Black Duck subdivision without access to the waterfront.
36
 
 The rush to relocate the families to Black Duck Cove arose concern that if the 
families were not moved quickly, they might join the group moving to Red Harbour.
37
 
When the local committee circulated the petition, 53 of the signatories indicated they 
intended to relocate their homes to Red Harbour.
38
 Those who hoped fast-tracking 
household moves to Burin would entice others to follow, underestimated their 
determination to preserve a way of life and community identity. Instead of gambling on a 
better life in an industrial town, they opted to pressure the Premier, their MHA, and 
C&SD to assist them to move as a unit to a convenient location on the Burin Peninsula 
highway from which they could continue to fish old grounds or opt to commute to the 
industrial centres. The stage was set for a contest of wills. Leading the charge were the 
merchant, the community council and the pastor. The council chair set out the case for 
moving to Red Harbour. The proximity to traditional grounds made it easy for middle-age 
men,  “who knew nothing else,” to continue to utilize a half million dollars‟ worth of 
vessels and gear that would go to rot if they were forced to move to Marystown or Burin.
39
 
The UC minister expressed concern that middle-age fishermen who could not compete for 
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jobs in industrial towns would drift into dependency.
40
 He highlighted the industriousness 
of the people and their strong community sense which could be retained if they resettled as 
a viable unit. The council highlighted the advantages of the new site: it was in close 
proximity to the hydro power line; had plenty of fresh water; and after Red Harbour was 
designated a receiving community, it might attract settlers from Monkstown, South East 
Bight and Petite Forte.
41
 Both clergy and lay leaders believed Port Elizabethans had the 
industry and moral fibre to thrive if the government would approve the move. They were 
bent on  relocating church, school, businesses, and fishing stages into the new community 
with  minimal disruption to economic and social life. They believed it was achievable if 
the Resettlement Committee approved the petition and granted assistance.
42
 At Red 
Harbour families could continue to live in their own houses, keep fishing crews intact, 
consort with kith and kin, worship together as a faith community, and send their children 
to a community school. No other community in Placentia Bay insisted on constructing a 
new community to preserve an economy as well as the intangible assets that constitute a 
community. 
 When the federal and provincial governments approved the Hooping Harbour to 
Bide Arm and the Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour moves they did so with knowledge that 
they contravened the goals of the FHRP. Resettlement was launched on the premise that 
the industrial fishery could generate enough wealth to improve the quality of life for all. 
Blocking this policy was a shortage of affordable housing which could only be rectified 
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through a program of subsidization, or by forcing fish companies to pay higher wages. 
Everyone, including the administrators of the FHRP, realized the housing crisis in 
industrial fisheries centres was putting the new fisheries development policy at risk. 
 J. M. Roberts of Atlantic Fish Processors, Ltd. informed NLHC, that control over 
development and refusal to grant permits to low income people to construct their own 
homes, diminished the benefits of resettlement to his company.
43
 Harnum acknowledged 
that few households from the 80 designated outports had relocated to Marystown. 
Shortage of building lots in Burin and Marystown limited the usefulness of the barge. 
Roberts linked the labour crisis to the housing bottleneck. Harnum recommended building 
houses to Newfoundland standards and reserving lots for relocated houses would 
encourage people, who desired to move away from isolation, to relocate to fisheries 
growth centres. He added that unless NLHC made 30 lots available at Marystown for 
families who intended to transport houses by barge, Port Elizabeth would  move to Red 
Harbour.
44
 Harnum also hoped to direct the populations of Petite Forte, Monkstown, and 
Southeast Bight into Burin and Marystown. Planners, who were committed to evacuating 
settlements, found the notion of assisting the construction of a new inshore fishing 
community abhorrent. Rev. Sacrey‟s assertion that Red Harbour had social advantages 
was of minor import. 
 Political support for relocating to Red Harbour also came from outside Port 
Elizabeth.  John J. Lake, Secretary Treasurer of Local 150 of the Federation of Fishermen, 
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pledged to support the Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour move.
45
 Lake informed Harnum that 
unless H. E. Senior and Son re-established his business in the vicinity, the fishery of the 
region would suffer a setback. He claimed that without Senior‟s supply and marketing 
business, the fishing grounds between Petite Forte and Port Elizabeth would be 
abandoned. Like Sacrey and the community council, Lake stressed the opportunity cost of 
dispersing Port Elizabethans into urban centres. The union leader maintained the diaspora 
would have disastrous consequences for the fishery. He enclosed a petition bearing the 
signature of 49 Rushoon fishers to press his case. 
 Throughout October1968 the case of Port Elizabeth continued to attract media 
attention.
46
 The Evening Telegram reported that the island had lost half its population in 
the previous two years to Burin, Marystown and Grand Bank. Without editorializing, the 
reporter wrote the remaining residents wished to resettle to Red Harbour in order to 
continue to use the same fishing grounds. The Daily News noted that a delegation from 
Port Elizabeth was meeting with provincial officials to request assistance to move to Red 
Harbour, a place vacated under the old Centralization Plan. The News informed its 
readers, without sensationalising, that 70 families wished to resettle there as an entity. 
Neither article stirred up much controversy. 
 On 25 October Sametz informed the Department of Municipal Affairs that 25 
families had already moved and 30 others intended to resettle in the Burin - Marystown 
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area, but 47 had signed a petition to establish a new community.
47
 The petition was 
supported by letters from clergy, the people of Rushoon and a local of the Federation of 
Fishermen, but Sametz was not convinced it was the right move. The deputy minister was  
concerned that if H. E. Senior and Son dissolved after the move, the resettled families, 
who were completely dependent on Willard Senior, might be forced into dependency
48
 
This was a very real possibility. Sametz also pointed out that a breakwater was necessary 
to make Red Harbour a safe port for longliners and the federal government had not yet 
agreed to cost-share the move. Nonetheless, he asked Municipal Affairs to do a cost 
estimate of preparing 50 to 70 serviced lots, but advised H. U. Rowe to prepare a negative 
report to discourage resettlement to Red Harbour. The Director of Urban and rural 
Planning condemned the site on the grounds that there was no provision in the Burin 
Peninsula Study (1967) for the reactivation of Red Harbour, and, furthermore, the site was 
too small to accommodate 50 houses. J. T. Allston proposed that C&SD should not 
contemplate reactivating Red Harbour as a habitable community under any circumstances. 
Sametz and Allston believed that Port Elizabethans should be settled in the Burin-
Marystown area.
49
 
 While the governments opposed reactivating an evacuated community, Ian 
Watson, a Member of Parliament, suggested Smallwood should consider tourist 
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development as an alternative to resettlement.
50
 Watson informed the Premier that during 
his visit to Davis Island centralization was the major topic of conversation. Although he 
conceded resettlement might be the only possible long-term solution for most of 
Newfoundland‟s coastal people, he wondered if government would permit temporary 
occupancy of abandoned homes for tourism.
51
 If the province agreed to it on an 
experimental basis, Watson promised to promote Port Elizabeth by radio, television and 
print media. J. G. Channing acknowledged that the idea of preserving an outport for 
tourism had been considered for some time, and Sametz conceded that while many places 
were unsuited to year-round occupancy, they might be useful for seasonal operations in 
fishing and tourism.
52
 He listed several communities that had a potential for tourist 
development, but omitted Port Elizabeth because most of the attributes Watson assigned to 
Port Elizabeth applied more correctly to Red Harbour. Sametz informed Channing that 
under no circumstances would Community and Social Development approve settlement in 
vacated communities on a permanent basis. 
 Year round occupancy of a vacated community was exactly what Port Elizabethans 
intended. The community council notified Maloney that at a public meeting attended by 
every household in Port Elizabeth, “it was finally and definately [sic] decided that through 
our community council they would inform [the] provincial government of their intention 
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to request assistance to Red Harbour.”53 At this meeting they agreed to move the school 
using volunteer labour, but planned to leave private fishing premises and the bait depot on 
the island for future use.
54
 The relocated school could adequately meet the needs of 
elementary grades while older pupils could be bussed to the central high school in Burin. 
The council assured the minister that their decision was final and promised Maloney that 
they would make “every effort to make relocation a success and justify the expense 
entailed.”55 They advised the minister that if he wanted clarification of the reasons for 
choosing Red Harbour he could consult MHA Patrick Canning. He was present during the 
meeting and was fully apprised. Canning informed the press that the residents had 
carefully planned the move and were “hoping to avoid the mistakes of others.”56 He 
opined that it was “the best planned centralization move to date.”57 He told the News that 
he had attended a public meeting at Port Elizabeth and came away convinced that 
resettlement was the best option. 
 Allston advised Deputy Minister H. U. Rowe that the move was 
“counterproductive,” “uneconomical,” and “contrary to the aims of the regional plan and 
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the resettlement program.”58 He wrote “to my mind the right places for the population to 
resettle from Port Elizabeth are Marystown and Burin where lots have been prepared by 
the town councils and NLHC in conjunction with Urban and Rural Planning.”59 He 
alleged 55 families had already been assisted from Port Elizabeth to Burin Peninsula 
growth centres, while only 47 wished to move to Red Harbour. Harnum‟s response was 
more muted. He informed Willard Senior that C&SD could not approve the move until it 
was known if the relevant federal and provincial departments agreed to the project, but 
assured Senior of his full support.
60
 On the same day he asked NLHC if 24 lots could be 
found in Marystown for 24 Port Elizabethan householders, although only four indicated an 
interest in moving to Marystown. Harnum did not explain why he thought another 20 
families would soon join them.
61
 The promise he made to Senior appears to have been 
insincere for he was still actively pursuing the Marystown alternative. The game was on 
and the stakes were high for both sides. At stake for the residents of Port Elizabeth was the 
right to self-determination, the right to have some control over where and how they would 
spend the rest of their lives. On the other side were Sametz, Harnum and Allston. 
 Harnum came away from a meeting with the community council convinced that 40 
families would not resettle anywhere other than Red Harbour. The older fishers considered 
Marystown and Burin unsuitable ports from which to carry on a small-boat fishery.
62
 
Harnum informed Port Elizabeth delegation that the federal government would not accept 
responsibility for moving the bait depot, the salt fish plant, or build a breakwater at Red 
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Harbour. The community representatives said fishers would continue fishing out of the old 
community as other resettled households did. A frustrated Harnum assured Sametz that he 
had “personally made every effort to persuade the people to (sic) some other centre.”63
 Undeterred by the opposition within the government departments and agencies, the 
community council insisted they would not go elsewhere. When the Household 
Resettlement Subcommittee met on 13 March, the chair informed members that the 
province had accepted Red Harbour as a reception centre and the Committee now had 
authority to assist householders into the new community. On 7 May the provincial cabinet 
gave conditional assent to the move. Cabinet minute 305 - 69 reads:  
Ordered that the residents of Port Elizabeth be permitted to relocate at Red Harbour on the 
understanding that there will be no obligation on the Government of Newfoundland as a 
result of such move, to provide new or extended public services for them in the latter 
community.
64
 
 
The province agreed to the move them but would not commit to any services unless the 
federal government agreed to help build the new community.  
 Bill Rowe laid out the conditions that cabinet had applied to the move: households 
were ineligible for the lot supplementary grants; Community and Social Development 
would not assume responsibility for providing water, electricity, telephone, telegraph, 
school bus services, fishery facilities, church, school and other community buildings; 
enactment of these services would be left to the community council to negotiate with the 
various departments and agencies responsible for providing those services and facilities; 
and if any private land was required it would be the responsibility of the individual 
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needing it to negotiate with the owner.
65
 It was a very intimidating letter from a minister 
of the crown. The province was protecting itself in the event the federal Minister of 
Fisheries refused to approve Red Harbour as an organized reception centre.   
 Rowe‟s second letter to the council appeared more conciliatory, but it was no less 
intimidating or condescending in tone. He assured the chair of the community council that 
the reluctance of the Resettlement Committee to approve their petition to move to Red 
Harbour “was out of concern for the burden constructing a new community would place 
on householders.”66 Rowe added that neither the Resettlement Committee nor the 
government wanted Port Elizabethans to undertake a project that would result in a 
diminished standard of living. The minister assured the council that both he and the 
Premier were in sympathy with their desire to move as a community to a new site, but 
then reiterated the conditions and responsibilities outlined previously. It is obvious that the 
second letter was meant to ensure council fully understood the responsibilities that they, 
and the people they represented, were assuming. Undaunted the Community Council 
telegraphed the minister to inform him that they had selected a site at Red Harbour and 
were preparing to move in the spring.
67
 
  At the end of March the council again contacted the Minister. The council 
secretary advised Rowe that households were ready to move and the barge was on stand-
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by, but Municipal Affairs had  yet to complete a lot layout and survey.
68
 Harnum 
expressed concern that “a regular plan is not being prepared” and that the site would not 
adequately meet the needs of 50 households “especially considering services.”69 Rowe 
wired the council that representatives of the Department of Highways and Municipal 
Affairs planned to meet at Red Harbour on 14 April and shortly thereafter work would 
commence on the lot layout and local road.
70
 Perhaps frustrated by the struggle and the 
delay in preparing a land assembly in Red Harbour, six families decided to move to 
Marystown where unserviced lots could be purchased for $370 and the $1,000 lot 
supplementaries would cover the cost of land and private water and sewer installation.
71
 
Despite the attractiveness of the Marystown offer, Port Elizabethans informed Smallwood 
that they preferred to accept the conditions as outlined in the minister‟s letters dated 14 
and 17 February 1969.
72
 
 Just when it appeared the move was imminent, Municipal Affairs questioned the 
suitability of the site and the cost of developing a 50 lot layout equipped with basic 
services.
73
 Allston dismissed the move as counterproductive and suggested Port 
Elizabethans would be better off staying on Davis Island. He advised Maloney to use 
every means available under the Resettlement Act to direct the 50 households of Port 
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Elizabeth into Burin, Marystown, Grand Bank or Fortune.
74
 The Director of Municipal 
Planning suggested moving older inshore fishers to Little Bay, Mortier Bay, where there 
was ample land, a good harbour and a community stage. There they could continue fishing 
until they retired. The proposal had merit and might have worked if it had not required a 
United Church community to move into an all Roman Catholic community in which most 
resorted to work in offshore fisheries. Men displaced from the traditional bank became 
trawlermen. Little Bay was a more convenient location than Black Duck Cove, but Port 
Elizabeth fishers did not consider Mortier Bay a suitable place from which to prosecute 
the shore fishery. Besides denominationalism was still so embedded in rural communities 
that people of different sects preferred to live on “their own side” of the harbour.75 It 
would be hard to convince an all Protestant community that they would be better off in a 
growth centre surrounded by Roman Catholics and without a church or school to call their 
own. 
 Despite  warnings that the move to Red Harbour would diminish their standard of 
living and the severe conditions imposed by the cabinet, Port Elizabethans continued to 
insist on moving to Red Harbour to preserve their sense of community and culture. While 
community leaders appeared to accept the conditions set out by Rowe in February and by 
a minute of cabinet in May, in the midst of the relocation they began to make demands. 
First the council demanded electrification either through connection to the grid or by 
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transferring generators from Port Elizabeth. Secondly they insisted settling in a site that 
the Provincial Planning Office considered unsuitable.
76
 
 A report on Port Elizabeth - Red Harbour move prepared by the Department of 
Municipal Affairs, found the Port Elizabethans were not only insisting on reopening an 
abandoned community but insisted on a specific location along the highway. When the 
Director of Urban and Rural Planning accompanied by three of his staff visited Red 
Harbour they formed the opinion that the site was too small and the risk of pollution was 
high.
77
 Allston and a team from the Provincial Planning Office reported that the site was 
underlain with bedrock to such an extent that it prevented safe installation of private septic 
systems or pit toilets. Allston ignored the advantages of the roadside site such as easy 
access to the Burin Highway and focussed instead on the high cost of servicing the site.
78
 
An engineering study commissioned by Municipal Affairs maintained that everything 
from construction of house foundations to installation of water and sewer services would 
require excavation of solid rock.
79
 The engineers reported that crowding 50 households in 
the highway site would preclude construction of sheds to store gear, private sewage 
disposal systems, and, assuming that each householder used a generator to light their 
home, the noise level would be intolerable. The engineering report questioned whether 
there was sufficient space to manoeuver houses, and identified fire and avalanches as 
potential safety hazards. They estimated it would cost $150,000 to install a municipal 
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water and sewer system, plus $35,000 for constructing roads throughout the subdivision. 
The Power Commission estimated the cost of relocating the power plant to be $20,000 and 
a connection to the main hydro grid would cost $45,000.
80
 The estimated total cost of 
providing water, sewer and electrical services to approximately 50 household was 
$225,000, a large capital expenditure for a government opposed to the building of a new 
community to incur. Consequently families arrived in a community with a crude road and 
no water and sewer or electrical services. The bureaucrats‟ warnings that the householders 
would find themselves living in a community with fewer services than they were 
accustomed to on Davis Island became, by design, a self-fulfilling prophecy. From the 
outset Sametz and Allston had opposed the move, not only to the evacuated outport, but 
also to the highway site that Port Elizabethan families had selected. 
 The stage was set for a battle between the municipal council and the various 
departments and agencies responsible for resettlement. First, the council addressed a letter 
of protest to Sametz who passed their concerns along to the Deputy Minister of Municipal 
Affairs.  Sametz advised H. U. Rowe that the community council were not satisfied the 
engineers had thoroughly “explored and examined fully the possibilities of the highway 
site.”81 Sametz, perhaps wishing to get the matter resolved, reminded Deputy Minister 
Rowe of the Premier‟s directive to Municipal Affairs to prepare, “in full consultation and 
agreement with the council,” an extended layout to accommodate the Port Elizabeth 
families and when the layout was completed the Department of Highways was to construct 
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“a rough road” throughout the site.82 Sametz stressed the urgency to get the layout 
completed as the people were ready to launch houses.  
 Shortly after the dispute over the townsite was resolved, another issue arose. The 
barge operator claimed that due to bog, rock, and steep slopes it would be very difficult to 
place houses on lots.
83
 When the Minister of C&SD learned of the alleged problem, he 
decided to send W. P. Serrick, manager and chief engineer of Engineering Services Ltd., 
to Red Harbour, to assess the situation. Serrick determined that there would be no 
difficulty to locate houses in the lot layout contrary to the first engineering study. Serrick 
contended the highway site could accommodate up to houses.
84
 He informed the Minister 
that most resettlers should be able to get a “reasonably good lot.”85 With the dispute over 
the suitability of the site settled, the householders began to move houses. 
 In July the issue of a community school came to the forefront. The Port Elizabeth 
United Church School Board ignored Bill Rowe‟s warning that government would not 
commit to any expenses with regard to transporting and setting up community halls, 
churches, or schools and asked him to provide funds to relocate the school.
86
 Regrettably, 
the Resettlement Agreement made no provision for the reclamation of what officials 
termed “social capital.” The same policy applied in all evacuated outports, but usually 
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households moved into growth centres with schools and other social facilities, albeit often 
inadequate to meet the needs of the rapidly increasing population. Initially Port 
Elizabethans agreed to move the school using volunteer labour, but Benjamin J. Butler, 
chair of the school board, explained that due to the hurry of the fishery and the rush of 
resettlement, householders could not possibly dismantle the school and have it ready for 
September. According to Butler the barge operators were willing to move the three-room 
school for the sum of $12,000 plus the cost of reassembling and replacing materials 
damaged in the moving process.
87
 Bill Rowe advised Butler to contact the Burin Peninsula 
Integrated School Board (BPISB).
88
  
 The BPISB were astonished to learn that government had assisted families into a 
new community without making arrangements for the education of the children. 
Ironically, the Premier has always maintained that he entered int the resettlement 
agreements primarily for the benefit of the children. Governments should anticipated the 
problem and realized how unjust it was to expect parents, who were busy fishing and re-
establishing homes, to set up a school. The BPISB feared that school would be in session 
before the red tape was ironed out, and without special funding, the board could not have a 
school ready for September.
89
 Requests for assistance elicited the usual response from the 
Education Minister, F. W. Rowe, father of the C&SD Minister Bill Rowe. F. W. Rowe 
advised the Integrated School Board that the Department of Education had not created the 
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problem and there were no special funds to solve it.
90
  Bill Rowe insisted it was up to the 
Board to relocate the school frm Port Elizabeth or bus the students to Burin.
91
 The 
Minister of Community and Social Development reminded the settlers of the conditions 
they had agreed to in February and stated again that C&SD was not willing to make any 
further concessions to Port Elizabethans. In the end, the Board agreed to move the 
school.
92
 
  On 20 August 1969 Harnum submitted a progress report on the Port Elizabeth - 
Red Harbour move to the federal Department of Fisheries, along with a request for federal 
assistance to complete the project.
93
 In the report Harnum declared that the Resettlement 
Committee and the provincial cabinet had approved a request from the residents of Port 
Elizabeth to relocate, about half to growth centres and the remainder to Red Harbour. By 
20 August more than 40 households were living in Red Harbour. The province had to date 
prepared sites and connected the community to the electrical grid and the Burin 
Highway.
94
 Hoping to influence Davis, Harnum described the move as very successful
95
 
On 6 November Davis informed Bill Rowe that : 
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In the light of representations which I have received from the Hon. Don Jamieson, 
I have made a further review of the Riverview settlement project on the Burin 
Peninsula [and due to its] rather special and unusual circumstances have approved 
the Federal grant and supplementary assistance for Riverview.
96
 
 
Sametz recommended that the Committee approve applications for assistance for 
households who moved from Port Elizabeth to Red Harbour and designate Port Elizabeth 
an evacuated outport. Up to this point the province was on the hook for the total cost of 
the move. In the 16 December meeting of the FHRC designated Port Elizabeth an 
evacuated outport and approved Riverview (Red Harbour) as an organized reception 
centre. The reclassification not only lightened the financial responsibilities of the province 
but also eased the financial burden of the families who had left island homes not knowing 
if they would receive any financial assistance to rebuild in the new village which today is 
called Red Harbour. 
 The community council, which had fought hard to win government approval of the 
move, was not ready to rest on its laurels. In May 1970 the council requested the 
Premier‟s help to procure development funds from the Department of Regional and 
Economic Expansion (DREE) and to secure the release of $50,000 in lot supplementary 
grants to finance water and sewer systems.
97
 The council chairman was anxious to relieve 
the hardship of women who were forced to fetch water from the river and carry pails of 
human waste to the saltwater. On 27 August Smallwood informed the council that 
government had approved the water and sewer project and engineering designs were being 
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prepared, a common delaying tactic.
98
 A year later the MHA for Burin District raised the 
issue in the House of Assembly. Hickman, now in opposition, told the House that “it was 
immaterial whether it was a good or bad move, they moved there with government 
approval and were entitled to services provided in other resettled areas throughout 
Newfoundland.”99 When Hickman asked the Minister of Municipal Affairs, Eric Dawe, 
whether tenders had been called for installation of water and sewer, the minister said Red 
Harbour was on a list of communities slated to receive water and sewer services in the 
next few years. When Dawe added government was under no obligation to provide 
services to residents of Red Harbour, Hickman accused the Smallwood administration of 
leading the people of Red Harbour “down the garden path.”100 In reality the province had 
clearly outlined the conditions under which Port Elizabethans could move to Red Harbour. 
 Port Elizabeth households were capable of championing their own causes. The 50 
households who insisted on moving to Red Harbour stared down the bureaucrats and 
politicians who opposed the move and according to one newspaper headline resettled 
themselves. When bureaucrats offered to assist them to move to a major fisheries growth 
centre they had the confidence to say “No.” Resistance to the Newfoundland Fisheries 
Household Resettlement Program had solidified since the first resettlement officials toured 
Placentia Bay holding meetings with community leaders aboard chartered vessels. No 
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outport exhibited greater resiliency than Port Elizabeth. They accepted resettlement, but 
were determined to resettle en masse into a harbour that government had evacuated four 
years earlier. They selected a site to which they had an historical attachment, and built a 
successful fishing port. Their strong sense of community was tested when individual 
households began to depart, but a determined corps of inshore fishing families demanded 
the right not to be dispersed in a major fisheries growth where all the equipment they had 
acquired over a lifetime would go to rot along with the moral fibre of a proud community. 
Port Elizabethans ignored the entreaties and warnings of senior bureaucrats and cabinet 
ministers who played up the benefits of resettling into industrial growth points and warned 
them that if they moved to Red Harbour they would have to accept a lower standard of 
services than they enjoyed on Davis Island. When the Urban and Rural Planning Division 
condemned the highway site, the merchant and the community council pressured the 
Minister of C&SD into hiring an engineering firm to provide a second opinion. Shortly 
after the engineer‟s report reached the minister‟s desk, the barge began to move houses.  
 Undismayed by the minister‟s assertion that fishing premises did not come under 
the aegis of the FHRP, the fishermen attached barrels to stages and using their fishing 
boats towed them across the three mile strait. During the winter they went into the woods 
and cut timber to shore up stages and build wharves.
101
 When the Minister of Community 
and Social Development and the Minister of Education suggested that all students should 
be bussed to Burin, the parents convinced the BPISB to establish a community school for 
elementary students. 
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 The story of the relocation of Port Elizabeth is unique in the history of the 
Fisheries Household Resettlement Program. Port Elizabethans faced the demise of their 
island home stoically, but not passively. When young families resettled, the older 
generation took a proactive approach and decided to fight to keep the community alive 
albeit in a new location, which happened to be an evacuated outport closed to permanent 
settlement. Their strength lay in the shared sense of community, the character of the 
people, a merchant who was prepared to move with them and operate his business as 
before, and the support of the community council and clergy. Port Elizabethans succeeded 
in enlisting the support of Jamieson, their federal MP and Newfoundland‟s cabinet 
minister. They refused to play by rules set out in statutes ordained by the Parliament of 
Canada and the provincial House of Assembly, and successfully pressured governments in 
Ottawa and St. John‟s to approve the move from Port Elizabeth to Riverview. 
Conclusion 
 The Port-Elizabeth to Red Harbour move is the best example community 
resistance to state-controlled migrations. On a broader scale it exemplifies the 
effectiveness of everyday forms of resistance. When confronted by a well-organised 
community agents of the state were unable to direct fshers from the inshore to the offshore 
or to provide a stable workforce to the corporate fishery by closing out coastal 
communities. Port Elizabethans, who had invested over half a million dollars in vessels 
and gear, were determined to protect their investment by resettling in a place where they 
could continue to fish the same grounds. They succeeded through collective resistance. 
Municipal councillors, merchants, and clergy supported the idea of resettling together as a 
community to Red Harbour where they could enjoy the company of extended family, 
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worship together as a faith community, and where children could attend the community 
school. The spirit of the old settlement survived in the new. Few have heard of Riverview 
but the spirit of Port Elizabeth lives on at Red Harbour. The relocated houses arranged 
along the road bridge the gap between the old and the new and the stages lining the 
harbour remind the visitor of their struggle to preserve a traditional way of life. The 
longliners tied to the new public wharf are proof that the fishery remains an important 
industry, and the wharf is a reminder of the victory Port Elizabethans won over the 
bureaucrats and cabinet ministers who had “ordered that the residents of Port Elizabeth be 
permitted to relocate at Red Harbour on the understanding that there will be no obligation 
on the Government of Newfoundland as a result of such move, to provide new or extended 
public services for them in the latter community.”102 Ironically, the fish plants at Burin 
and Marystown are shut down and the offshore trawlers dispersed from Peru to Viet Nam. 
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Chapter IX 
Conclusion 
 In Newfoundland, resettlement of the outports has been a cause celebre for half a 
century. The Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program (1965-70), the 
second of two state-sponsored centralization plans, drew an emotional response from 
scholars, journalists, novelists, songwriters, poets and playwrights who created a narrative 
of cultural genocide. Premier Joseph Smallwood never escaped the pall of resettlement. 
He was, and in many quarters still is, blamed for uprooting thousands of families from 
hundreds of coastal communities. The urban cultural elites constructed a mythic outport in 
which happy people danced, sang and went mummering. At the other end of the spectrum 
policymakers pronounced the pluralistic economy archaic and identified the rural lifestyle 
with dependence, poverty, illiteracy and disease. Modernists and romantics espoused a 
dichotomous world view. Modernists depicted society as modern and progressive or 
traditional and backward. Romantics believed the folk could only live in remote spaces 
and therefore felt resettlement threatened Newfoundland‟s cultural heritage.    
 There were many actors in the drama, and in some ways the tragedy, that unfolded 
in the second half of the 1960s. At the federal level some of the key policymakers were 
Jack Pickersgill, H. J. Robichaud, Jack Davis, Richard Cashin and Prime Minister Lester 
B. Pearson supported by bureaucrats within the Department of Fisheries, A. W. Needler 
and W. L. Mackenzie. At the provincial level some of the cast were politicians John T. 
Cheeseman, C. Max Lane, Patrick J. Canning, Aidan Maloney, William N. Rowe, F. W. 
Rowe and Alex Hickman supported by Ken Harnum, Zeman W. Sametz, J. T. Allston, H. 
U. Rowe, and E. M. Gosse. Executives of integrated trawler-processing companies such as 
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Augustus (Gus) Etchegary and Arthur H. Monroe of Fishery Products Ltd., Spencer Lake 
of Burgeo Fisheries, H. Maugher of Booth Fisheries, and J. M. Roberts of Atlantic Fish 
Processors pleaded with government to remedy the labour crisis that threatened the 
viability of the industry. The mayor of Burgeo and CEO of Burgeo Fisheries, Spencer 
Lake, and the town councils of Burin, Grand Bank, Marystown and Fortune encouraged 
resettlement and participated in labour recruitment. The parish priests of St. Kyran‟s- Bar 
Haven, Merasheen and Rushoon were strong supporters of centralization and used their 
influence to persuade congregations to abandon the islands, and, when communities 
balked urged Smallwood and Harnum to institute more coercive measures. Reverend 
Edward House, who moved his headquarters from Harbour Buffett to Arnold‟s Cove, 
chaired public meetings and participated fully in the evacuation of Tack‟s Beach. Pastor 
Booth Reid, convinced that Hooping Harbour would not get a road, insisted on moving his 
congregation en masse to Bide Arm. Professional teachers preferred jobs in large regional 
schools to teaching in one and two-room schools in remote outports. Merchants like 
Freeman Wareham and Kevin Wadman encouraged their clientele to follow them into 
Arnold‟s Cove and Southern Harbour. And workers who worked outside the community 
wished to eliminate the inconvenience of a long commute. 
 Centralization of coastal communities can be framed in the context of global and 
national developments. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the migration 
pattern was from rural to urban and the economic trend was marked by a shift away from 
household production to factories. Western development experts considered traditional 
societies and pluralistic economies to be impediments to progress. In the post-World War 
II era, governments of Western countries assumed a more active role in managing 
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economies and introduced a variety of social welfare schemes to improve the quality of 
life of all citizens. In Canada rural development programs focussed on centralizing and 
mechanizing family-based enterprises to improve productivity and increase incomes. 
Governments of Western nations believed injections of capital, mechanization and 
applications of technical expertise would transform rural dwellers into productive citizens. 
Modernization was couched in terms of improved health services, roads, communication, 
and education, all of which Newfoundlanders in all parts of the province were demanding.  
 As expectations rose requests flooded into the Office of the Premier from all parts 
of the province for roads, electricity, telephones, new schools and improved medical 
services. Rural people were no longer content to accept the status quo after Smallwood 
promised fishermen a fair share of the “good things of life.” Having voted for Smallwood 
and his cause, they expected him to make good on his promises. Eaton‟s  and Simpson 
Sears catalogues awakened within the rural population a desire for the latest clothing 
fashions and furniture styles. Employment on military bases and post-Confederation 
construction boom helped create a class of workers who were dissatisfied with the status 
quo. Newfoundlanders, even those in the most remote corners, wanted modern amenties. 
They threw out homemade tables and sold their iron kettles and spinning wheels to 
antique dealers. Extension of roads and telecommunications to the larger centres of the 
region contributed to the sense of isolation in the hinterland and heightened demands for 
more equitable services.  
      Critics of Smallwood‟s modernization programs have concentrated on failed small-
scale manufacturing industries of the 1950s and the giveaways of the 1960s, but credited 
advances in education, medical and other fields to federal transfer payments. After World 
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War II the national government introduced programs to reduce poverty and unemployment 
of the slow-growth regions. In Newfoundland several royal commission reports from 
Amulree to Pushie linked rural poverty to domestic commodity production. Bates, 
Gushue, Walsh, Cheeseman and Pushie investigated and reported on the Atlantic sea  
fisheries that prescribed centralization, mechanization, and switching production from low 
capital enterprises in dispersed communities into capital-intensive operations located in a 
few strategically located ports. In the 1944 Dunn and Stewart Bates and several post-war 
fisheries committees maintained that Newfoundland should concentrate on developing a 
fresh fish trade with the United States as a means to raise incomes and bring services and 
amenities closer to North American standards. In the 1950s the Canada - Newfoundland 
Fisheries Development Committee , the South Coast Commission, and the Royal 
Commission on Canada‟s Economic Prospects (1956) recommended switching production 
out of family-based enterprises using manual methods to assembly lines in capital 
intensive trawler-processing plants operating year round. Although Smallwood created a 
Department of Fisheries and Co-operatives in 1949 his commitment to the co-operative 
model soon waned. 
 The Premier, who purportedly had told fishermen to burn their boats and join the 
march to progress, accepted a model of fisheries modernization that predated 
Confederation. In 1953 he introduced the Centralization Program to assist householders to 
move from isolation on the proviso all families must leave, but the state applied no other 
restrictions. Although the province invested heavily in the corporate fishery, the provincial 
government made no attempt to direct households into industrial fisheries centres or 
extend extra compensation to the families that did. The provincial plan, which 
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concentrated on moving people to social services to avoid the cost of providing 
infrastructure, more closely resembled a welfare program than a fisheries modernization 
strategy. The federal-provincial Fisheries Household Resettlement Program incorporated 
principles that characterized rural development plans designed to reduce poverty in other 
less developed regions of Canada by rationalizing, or eliminating, semi-subsistence 
economies through assisted migrations. The FHRP is an example of state-controlled 
relocation of marginal communities in which the inhabitants were not too marginalized to 
resist. They countered with tactics that ranged from foot dragging and avoidance to 
offering an alternative development model.  
 By the 1960s the offshore fishing fleets had reduced per capita productivity in the 
inshore sector. Once the haddock stocks were destroyed in the early 1960s, the draggers 
switched to harvesting cod. The demise of Labrador fishery pushed families from the 
islands of Bonavista Bay to the near mainland, and the termination of the salt bank fishery 
undermined the viability of isolated south coast communities that supplied most of the 
manpower. A national economic recession in the late 1950s coincided with a decrease  in 
demand for fresh fish in American markets. Thousands of unemployed construction 
workers turned to the shore fishery as an employer of last resort. The introduction of 
seasonal unemployment insurance benefits also proved irresistible. By the 1960s 
Smallwood realized he had to explore ways to modernize the industry he had neglected 
since Confederation. The Premier invited the federal Minister of Fisheries and senior 
fisheries bureaucrats to St. John‟s to to explore possible ways to revive the salt cod trade, 
but the initiative sparked little interest in Ottawa. The minister‟s absence from the 
conference and the cancellation of experiments aimed at creating artificial drying methods 
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that replicated sun-curing suggests that Ottawa had given up on the inshore seasonal 
fishery. When the landings 200 offshore trawlermen surpassed the landings of 15,000 full 
and part-time inshore fishers, the demise of the traditional shore fishery was imminent. 
Reports ranging from the Newfoundland Royal Commission Report (1933) to the Royal 
Commission on the Economic State and Prospects of Newfoundland and Labrador (1967) 
recommended reducing dependence on domestic commodity production and the transfer 
of excess labour to the industrial sector as quickly as possible. But the major sticking 
points the demographic and economic realities of Newfoundland. The fishery had kept 
Newfoundlanders dispersed into over 1,200 communities without few options for no-
fishing employment.   
 Modernization was a costly process and the province lacked the fiscal capacity to 
centralize and consolidate the industrial fishery and at the same time to extend credit and 
subsidies to small-boat  fishers to upgrade gear and vessels. Small local fish companies 
also required government intervention in the form of guaranteed loans, loans and subsidies 
to expand trawler fleets and processing facilities. Modernization was a burden that the 
Newfoundland government shouldered with minimal assistance from Ottawa.  When 
Smallwood requested special funding for fisheries development, Nova Scotia claimed that 
Newfoundland was trade competitor and objected to Ottawa providing programs to one 
province that were not available to others. St. Laurent, in the vein of classic federalism, 
was unwilling to participate in development programs that he considered to be within the 
purview of the province. The Prime Minister ignored how primitive Newfoundland fishery 
was in comparison to Nova Scotia‟s more centralized and capital-intensive industry. 
Canada had not yet articulated mechanisms to address regional disparities. 
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 In 1957 Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, a native of Saskatchewan, recognized 
that not all regions or citizens shared equally in the wealth of the nation and signalled a 
more co-operative approach to regional development. The Agricultural and Rural 
Development Act (1961) reflected an ideological shift in Ottawa. ARDA funded federal-
provincial rural development initiatives across the country. Although the cabinet voted 
down Smallwood‟s request for the federal government to assume the full cost of 
centralization and modernization, but in a spirit of co-operative federalism agreed to use 
ARDA funds to fund research projects designed to solve the productivity problem in the 
Newfoundland fishery. 
 Between 1957 and 1966 the federal government introduced a number joint 
programs to aid development of areas where economic development lagged behind the 
wealthier regions. Many of the slow-growth economies were characterized by a 
proliferation of family-based enterprises utilizing manual methods of production. In the 
mid 1960s the federal government entered into agreements with the provinces to reform 
pluralistic economies through applied scientific research and programs that were aimed at 
centralizing, consolidating and mechanizing industries. The planners felt the labour-
intensive primary industries using centuries old technology was archaic and the pluralistic 
economies needed infusions of capital to raise the standard of living in the region. projects 
in rural parts of Canada. By 1965 the government of Canada was prepared to enter into 
joint agreements with the provinces to cost-share infrastructure development, 
centralization programs and training programs to increase labour mobility. In addition to 
these measures, the Canadian government provided aid to private companies to modernize 
and expand production. In Newfoundland the Pearson administration introduced a 
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program of subsidies, bounties and loans to aid fresh/frozen fish processors to acquire 
modern stern trawlers and expand processing capacity. The governments of 
Newfoundland and Canada constructed a shipyard  to build and new trawlers and refit 
older vessels. While Pearson wanted Canada to have a greater share of North Atlantic fish 
stocks, he also wished to show the flag to reinforce Canada‟s efforts to extend the three 
mile territorial limit.  
 In 1965, the federal and provincial fisheries ministers signed the Newfoundland 
Fisheries Household Resettlement Agreement to assist fishing families to move to centres 
with improved opportunities for employment and modern amenities. The FHRP offered 
larger financial incentives, the majority of which was underwritten by Canada, to increase 
the tempo of fisheries modernization and centralization. The joint program was more 
radical and interventionist than the provincial than the old Centralization plan in several 
ways. On the strength of a petition signed by 90%, later reduced to 80%, of householders 
the Resettlement Committee designated the petitioning community an “evacuated 
outport.” It also directed householders into one of the designated growth centres, 
preferably an industrial fisheries base. The Agreement underwent several modifications 
that led to charges of coercion that resonated in the outports. Lot supplementary grants and 
provision of assistance for individuals relocating major fisheries growth centres intensified 
state direction and highlighted the economic goals of the program. The amendments were 
also an indication of the degree the subjects were resisting state control and direction.
 The focus of this work is not federal-provincial relations or formulation of state 
policy, but how fishing families responded to, and reshaped, government policy. Chapter 
II discusses the obstacles to modernization and centralization of the fishery. The greatest 
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material impediment to centralization proved to be the shortage of affordable housing in 
the offshore fisheries bases. For outport families engaged in household production home 
ownership represented more than shelter from the elements. Factored in with earnings and 
subsistence activities, home ownership made it possible to survive and be more 
independent. Resettlers realized that in growth centres most in-kind incomes would 
disappear and that the wage of a fish plant worker could not meet a resettled family‟s 
basic needs. Outport families were generally averse to renting. When resettlement 
officials, industry and church leaders attempted to direct the shore fishermen into one of 
the major fisheries growth centres, most declined. They opted instead to resettle from the 
islands and remote outports to places where home ownership and continuance of a familiar 
lifestyle were possible. Shore fishermen of Placentia Bay resisted relocation to 
Marystown, Burin, Grand Bank, or Fortune, for the same reasons Hooping Harbour 
resettlers said no to Englee, and the families of New Ferrole and Currant Island objected 
to moving to Port au Choix. Most Currant Islanders felt they would be worse off working 
for low wages in a fish plant than if they moved their houses across the tickle to 
Forrester‟s Point while New Ferroleans insisted they were not going anywhere. Resistance 
intensified when church and state authorities tried to push them into centres which settlers 
considered disadvantageous to their financial and social well-being. The residents of two 
of the most viable communities in Placentia Bay, Harbour Buffett and Tack‟s Beach, 
chose the small fishing settlements of the isthmus of Avalon rather than a fisheries growth 
centre. Home ownership, access to old fishing grounds and desire to live in a familiar 
environment trumped wage labour.   
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 Lack of counselling in sending and receiving communities created tensions 
between newcomer and longtime resident. Reception centres such as Arnold‟s Cove and 
Southern Harbour were unprepared for the influx of resettlers that overcrowded local 
infrastructure and polluted community wells. There were similar problems in every 
category of growth centre. Competition for limited jobs, lack of affordable housing, 
overcrowded schools created resentments. Community and Social Development ignored 
the advice of field workers who advised against concentrating too many households in one 
area to the detriment of everyone. Both groups demanded government action on such 
matters as overcrowded classrooms and pollution which threatened the health of every 
person. Neither Arnold‟s Cove nor Southern Harbour had local government before the 
resettlers arrived. When elite relocatees organized Arnold‟s Cove as a local improvement 
district animosity between resident and resettler intensified. Financing new school 
construction also widened the gap between the two groups. The long-time residents felt 
their two-room school had been adequate before the resettled households arrived while the 
newcomers why the fine schools in the abandoned communities could not be moved. 
Others drew attention to the injustice of paying off mortgages on abandoned school 
buildings. The Education Minister, F. W. Rowe and the minister responsible for 
resettlement denied  requests for special funding and shifted responsibility to and fro.  
 Ironically, the Resettlement Committee, which had reluctantly approved moves to 
the isthmus at the insistence of the applicants, found itself under attack. The national and 
local media descended on Arnold‟s Cove, garnered some local comments, shot pictures of 
muddy subdivisions and filed stories on the horrific conditions in the resettlement 
subdivisions. The Resettlement Division assigned two field workers, Lance Shirley and 
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Donald Burry, to investigate conditions in the two growth centres. They too prepared a 
very negative report. Burry and Shirley considered the school at Southern Harbour a 
health risk and recommended its permanent closure. Many outport schools lacked 
plumbing, but the Resettlement Committee should have established some objective criteria 
for designating growth centres. At Southern Harbour a dozen householders found 
themselves in a desperate situation without access to a road or the salt water. They 
believed that they experienced a greater degree of isolation and loneliness in the growth 
centre than they had known in their old communities. 
 Matthews noted the trauma induced by the resettlement programs was similar to 
that experienced by the survivors of a natural disaster. None of the households interviewed 
for their study admitted to resettling voluntarily while Duggan found that three of four 
households she interviewed at Little Harbour East and Placentia were content with life in 
the old community and if the FHRP had not intervened they would have been satisfied to 
remain there. They identified several push factors: the departure of young people caused 
discontent among the older generation who began to consider moving when assistance 
was offered; difficulty getting teachers; the removal of parish headquarters to the 
mainland; and the departure of the merchant was a deciding factor. Duggan reported that 
the families who transported homes to growth centres felt less estranged than the 
households who had been unable to relocate houses. The forced abandonment of churches, 
schools, and halls was also traumatic and represented a material loss. 
 Resettlement into Placentia, which took place when the town‟s two major 
employers were downsizing, was especially disruptive. Deprives of harbour facilities, 
many families returned to live in the old community from Monday to Friday and returned 
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to Placentia each weekend or at the end of the fishing season. Mrs. Loyola Pomeroy, who 
returned each year to fish at Great Paradise, summed up the anguish she and her husband 
experienced. Looking up from the bow of her fishing boat, she explained to the CBC Land 
and Sea host why families returned to the old homestead: 
I mean to leave a place where you can earn plenty for your family and go to some 
place where you can‟t do that, it‟s frightening. Can‟t you understand that? 
 
Many resettlers had to choose between welfare and establishing a seasonal fishing camp in 
the old community. Most resettled households, who had been underemployed in the 
sending community, became unemployed and welfare dependent in the new. Families, 
who resettled from Kingwell and Harbour Buffett to Little Harbour East, informed 
Duggan that they had to return to Long Island to earn a decent living. Those households 
who left houses behind had little choice but to move into abandoned substandard military 
units in an area of Placentia that Duggan described as a ghetto. These were the resettlers 
most likely to claim they had been forced to move, rather than admit they had made a bad 
choice. But the government had succumbed to political pressure and designated Placentia 
a growth centre. 
 Resettlers in major fisheries growth centres, including Harbour Breton and 
Trepassey, who lived in subdivisions separated from the main town site, felt isolated and 
disoriented. Householders, who had been community leaders before moving, withdrew 
from participation in church activities and organizations. Protestant families who settled in 
Trepassey felt especially isolated. They had no church or school to call their own. 
Relocatees complained they were worse off than before the move due to low wages and 
high rents which Fishery Products deducted at source. Meanwhile relocatees from Roman 
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Catholic communities adjusted quite well. Counselling in the sending community would 
have reduced disillusionment after the move. Woolfrey alleged years of living on 
merchant credit and in-kind relief left settlers without the skills necessary to transition to 
industrial life. Unused to managing money, they wasted it on liquor and cars rather than 
invest in home ownership. Woolfrey preferred to berate the  people, rather than fault the 
program. It was a common practice with a long history to blame economic problems on 
the character of Newfoundlanders. 
 At Harbour Breton tension arose due to a downturn in the US markets.  BC 
Packers responded to poor markets by downsizing its trawler fleet and shortening the 
work-week. The local union and community leaders attributed underemployment and low 
wages to the surplus of labour generated by the resettlement program. Sametz attempted to 
ease tensions by reassuring the union that fishers who were contemplating moving from 
neighbouring communities were motivated by a desire to move to improved social 
services rather than an intention to change occupations. Overcrowding of the schools 
made the deputy minister‟s allegation that they were moving to better services 
questionable. Children received instruction in unventilated, poorly lit classrooms in 
buildings that were never intended to house students.  
 Resettlement was often an unhappy experience for parent and child. While 
children attended poorly equipped schools, parents worked in a hostile workplace in which 
the union executive blamed them for low pay rates and reduced hours. Newcomers 
labelled the larger community cliquish and restricted social relations to a cluster of 
resettlers who originated from the same sending community. The people of neighbouring 
outports shared a negative opinion of Harbour Breton before resettlement, and saw no 
 341 
reason to change their mind after relocating. According to Sharon Driscoll, a C&SD field 
worker, half of the resettlers interviewed alleged they would leave if the opportunity arose. 
Driscoll‟s study corresponded with reports of the Anglican clergy and the Frontier College 
worker.   
 Tensions were present in growth centres in all parts of the island. Centralization in 
St. George‟s district suffered a setback when the Stephenville town council opposed 
creating new subdivisions to receive houses C&SD planned to transport from Gallants. 
Some councillors proposed shutting the doors to all resettled families. The council 
suggested, for sociological reasons, it would not be in anyone‟s best interests to 
concentrate all resettlers in one neighbourhood. The town council favoured infilling over 
“pocket concentration,” which had slowed or blocked completely the integration of the 
settlers in other growth points. By 1970 municipal governments were rebelling against the 
urban and rural planners who wished to concentrate resettlers and their salvaged houses in 
land assemblies that the press described as ghettoes and the Anglican Churchman called 
shack towns. The town councils and clergy were more sensitive to the needs of settlers 
than the bureaucrats in the capital. If municipal governments had existed in designated 
growth centres and the outports much of the trauma associated with the relocations could 
likely have been avoided. Few opposed resettlement in principle, but many opposed the 
way Household Resettlement program was implemented. Bill Keough was an exception. 
The MHA, who had been a co-operative field worker for St. George‟s Bay region during 
the Commission Government era, firmly opposed the relocation of Gallants to 
Stephenville. 
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 Church leaders were ambivalent. While church hierarchies supported resettlement 
in principle, they criticized the FHRP for not covering the cost of removing church 
property, and condemned governments for not treating families with respect, dignity, and 
humanity. The Anglican and United Church called on government to treat resettled 
families humanely by ensuring that they received housing at a reasonable cost and offering 
counselling to smooth the transition from rural to urban life. The Roman Catholic priests 
in Placentia Bay parishes advocated a more radical program that would close out the most 
marginal communities. Collins, Lewis and Walsh were motivated by a desire to centralize 
their parishes. The Anglican rector of Burgeo organized pressure groups, chaired 
meetings, and pressured Smallwood to maintain and improve services in the community. 
Edward House participated in the resettlement of Tack‟s Beach and Harbour Buffett. The 
rector moved the parish headquarters to Arnold‟s Cove and in so doing encouraged 
parishioners to settle beside him. He chaired public meetings and advised Harnum that the 
former parish headquarters should be evacuated in a timely fashion. The RC priest at Port 
aux Choix advocated cutting services to New Ferrole as a means to resettle the 
congregation to Port au Choix. He was not breaking a new trail. On the eastern side of the 
Great Northern Peninsula, Apostolic Faith Pastor Booth Reid, first lobbied the FHRC to 
approve Hooping Harbour as a growth centre, and when that failed, he pressured 
government ministers to approve the move to Bide Arm and then proceeded to manage 
every aspect of the move. He chaired the local resettlement committee, oversaw the 
circulation of the petition, employed householders to build barges and roads,   install a 
water and sewer systems, and construct a school at Bide Arm. He forced the province to 
pay the full cost of the community school and deviate fro the 70-30 formula. The Hooping 
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Harbour to Bide Arm move demonstrates the contradictions within the resettlement 
program and how determined local leaders manipulated the process.    
 By 1969 opposition to the FHRP coalesced. Coastal people in every part of 
Newfoundland began to question the benefits of moving to a growth community when the 
described the horrendous conditions in the growth centres. Households returning to the 
evacuated communities to fish confirmed the media reports. Communities in Paradise 
Sound, Fogo Island, the Port au Port Peninsula as well as Great Harbour Deep rejected 
resettlement. When Smallwood gave the settlements of Fogo Island three options: do 
nothing and stagnate; resettle; or develop the local economy, Fogo Islanders chose the 
latter and enlisted the aid of MUN Extension Services and the National Film Board. 
Through co-operatives and self-help programs, they not only survived resettlement, but in 
the process helped create an experiment in rural development that was adopted 
internationally. The Fogo Islanders constructed a shipyard to build longliners for a modern 
fishery and a fresh fish processing plant. In the process they proved the co-operative 
approach to development was a viable one. By banding together the communities 
benefited both economically and socially. Under the leadership of elite males Fogo 
Islanders accepted a definition of community that included the whole island. After much 
debate the communities agreed on a location for a regional high school and medical 
complex. The Fogo Island Producers Cooperative established a viable multi-species plant 
in line with local needs and bucked an ideological trend that had more to do with 
evacuating islands than creating viable communities on them. 
 Great Harbour Deep, a White Bay North community of 300, also demanded 
resource development and services instead of resettlement grants. They lobbied the 
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province for a road connection to the St. Barbe highway, or at least a resource road to give 
them access to timber stands. Parents, who took great pride in the accomplishments of 
their children, demanded a new school to replace one which was allegedly so poorly 
equipped children had to bring chairs to school. Unlike Fogo Island, wherein residents 
enlisted the aid of outside experts, Harbour Deep and the communities of Paradise Sound 
were reduced to circulating petitions, letter writing and holding public meetings to fend 
off efforts to resettle them. One resident of Harbour Deep informed Smallwood that 
relocating families to Englee, St. Anthony or La Scie was not a privilege but slow murder, 
and that rumours were driving people “mental.” However, the social integrity of the 
community held fast. Unlike the MHA for Placentia West, the White Bay North MHA 
promised to support development of resources and to improve communications. The 
householders voted unanimously against moving to Englee, La Scie or St. Anthony where 
they feared they would become dependent. 
 In Paradise Sound the people of Monkstown, South East Bight and Petite Forte 
believed in the region‟s potential for development. The economy of Monkstown ranked 
among the most diversified economies of any rural Newfoundland community. Residents 
were employed in fishing, lumbering and boatbuilding. Led by women activists, who 
wrote letters to Smallwood and circulated petitions to prove there was no interest in 
resettlement, the community of Monkstown demanded an end to isolation. Burry and 
Shirley were impressed by the diversified economy and the potential for improvements in 
fisheries, lumbering and tourism development. There were no dissenting voices. Women, 
who took on a leadership role, received unanimous support from all householders as they 
battled the Placentia West MHA who was determined to close all communities without a 
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road connection to the Burin Peninsula highway. Canning asked the Minister of Highways 
to delay constructing branch roads to encourage resettlement of St. Joseph‟s and Little 
Harbour West. The women of Monkstown asked the Premier to replace Canning. At South 
East Bight women also organized against resettlement and challenged not only the state 
but their priest, a member of an all-male organization who professed that if the husband 
(the old rooster) decided to leave, the wife (the old hen) would surely follow. Resettlement 
was not always a masculine controlled event. 
 The future of a community often depended on the character of the people. Burry 
and Shirley commented on the industriousness of the people of Monkstown, Father Lewis 
recognized a similar trait in the fishers of South East Bight, and Leslie Harris commented 
on the entrepreneurial spirit of the people of Petite Forte. Salvation Army Lieutenant 
Lorne Hiscock and several women pointed out the economic diversity that currently 
existed and the potential for improvement if the community had a branch road. Hiscock 
advised the Premier that scenic Monkstown, with its two salmon rivers and abundant 
wildlife, only needed a crude road to become a popular tourist destination. He was backed 
up by Mrs. W. Butler who assured the Premier the people were happy with their two-room 
school, had no trouble recruiting teachers, and the two stores in the community met all 
their basic needs. Hattie and Laura May, too , lobbied for a road and electricity. They 
asked  Smallwood to support their effort to convince CNR to make Monkstown a port of 
call for the coastal boat if  Davis Cove resettled. Mrs. W. Butler informed the Premier that 
they intended to stay in their healthy community, road or no road. They identified Canning 
as their enemy and asked Smallwood to get rid of him. The Mays enclosed a petition 
signed by every householder to prove they had the full support of the community. 
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Monkstown survived because voices of local church leaders, merchants and women were 
heard, and heeded, in the capital.  
 Petite Forte survived due to the determination of a core of inshore fishing 
households who were convinced they had a better life in Petite Forte than Southern 
Harbour, Rushoon or Marystown could offer. They opted to live in limbo for eight years 
rather than succumb to “wearing down” tactics. Harnum directed the local resettlement 
committee to circulate the petition several times to try to get 80% of householders, 
including those who had already relocated, to vote for resettlement. Petite Forte held out 
until Leo Barry defeated Canning and Frank Moores replaced Smallwood. Barry promised 
to bring services to Monkstown, Petite Forte and South East Bight and Premier Moores 
announced his administration would end community evacuations. 
 Port Elizabethans did not object so much to abandoning Davis Island as they did to 
relocating to Marystown and Burin. They preferred to resettle as an entity to Red Harbour 
with a minimal amount of social and economic disruption. The push factor came mainly 
from within the community as the population slowly declined. At one point Donald 
Jamieson, Member of Parliament for Burin Burgeo and Minister of Transport, asked the 
FHRC to designate Port Elizabeth a growth centre for the isolated communities of the 
region. The idea of turning the last occupied island in Placentia West into an organized 
reception centre for Monkstown, South East Bight, and Petite Forte was more sound than 
one might expect. It had a municipal council, and in the first half of the 1960s the salt and 
fresh fish plants employed workers from neighbouring communities, and a well-equipped 
group of inshore fishers operated successfully. Several families were assisted to Davis 
Island under the provincial Centralization Plan. When a half dozen families indicated 
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interest in moving to Burin and householders who worked at Grand Bank decided to make 
the moves permanent, the idea of saving the community by relocating as a viable unit to 
Red Harbour gained traction. It was opposed by Aidan Maloney, Minister of C&SD and 
Fisheries, who insisted on moving the families into the Black Duck Cove subdivision at 
Burin. Government attempted to head off a general community migration to Red Harbour 
by fast racking individual moves to Burin. The planners feared a delay would cause them 
to join the group who were insisting on moving to an evacuated outport. C&SD was so 
strongly opposed to reopening the evacuated outport of Red Harbour that Sametz asked 
the Department of Municipal Affairs to condemn the highway site preferred by Port 
Elizabethans. The Provincial Planning Office subsequently reported that insufficient space 
and steep and rocky terrain precluded development of the site. When Port Elizabethans 
received this report, the merchant and council pushed back. They pressured Bill Rowe, 
Minister of Resettlement and Housing, to order a second engineering study. The 
engineer‟s report confirmed that the highway site could accommodate the relocatees from 
Davis Island.  
 In the end, a group of industrious Port Elizabethan householders forced the 
provincial cabinet to approve the move to Red Harbour, albeit without a commitment to 
provide services. But this did not deter relocatees, who were in the midst of moving, from 
demanding assistance to move the school before September. C&SD stood firm, but 
eventually the parents, with the help of the United Church minister pressured the school 
board into paying the cost of dismantling, transporting and rebuilding the community 
school. Within a brief period the Power Commission connected Red Harbour to the grid 
and the Department of Highways constructed a branch road to the Burin Peninsula 
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highway. The province assumed the cost of building a road throughout the community 
while the federal government, which designated Red Harbour a growth centre for the 
communities of Placentia West, constructed harbour facilities. Fishers, who at first 
intended to return to Davis Island to fish, relocated stages without using the government 
barge. In 1970 the community council lobbied the Minister of C&SD for lot 
supplementary grants to finance the construction of water and sewer services. The Port 
Elizabeth to Red Harbour move was the best organized and most successful of any 
community relocation in Placentia Bay despite the opposition of bureaucrats and ministers 
of the crown. Sametz, who had adamantly opposed the move, touted it as a success story, 
but neither bureaucrats nor the district MHA could take credit for it. It was due to the 
resilient nature and industrialism of Port Elizabethans. 
 Resistance to resettlement took many forms and the FHRP was contested in many 
arenas in multiple ways. The decision to give the province control over implementation of 
the program made it vulnerable to political pressure. Ten of fifteen members of the 
Federal – Provincial Newfoundland Resettlement Committee were provincial appointees 
and the Resettlement Agreement imbued the provincial minister with discretionary powers 
to approve community evacuations without the of 80 percent requirement being met. Ken 
Harnum, who had been Director of Resettlement under the provincial program, retained 
this influential position under the new plan. By securing control over the process, the 
province to was able to continue the practice of relocating households from one unviable 
community to reduce the cost of bringing services to them. Since the federal government 
underwrote most of the cost, it was expedient to give into resettlers‟ demand for grants to 
move to a site that seemed irrational to planners but made sense to the subjects. 
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 The drama of the Newfoundland resettlement program had a large cast of actors 
that included politicians and bureaucrats, merchants, clerics, and town mayors, and central 
to the production were the coastal people themselves. Although male household heads 
organized public meetings to elect the community resettlement committee to carry the 
petition to the people, the pro-active role of the women of Monkstown, South East Bight, 
New Ferrole and Point women is evidence feminine voices were heard and respected. The 
signatures of female household heads were critical, particularly in very small outports. 
The female voices either extolled the virtues of the semi-subsistence economy in which 
they were equal partners, or bemoaned the hardships of isolation.  
 People‟s decisions to abandon a coastal community and a way of life that had 
survived since the early eighteenth century, resulted in part from attacks on the traditional 
economy by powerful political leaders and bureaucrats in St. John‟s and Ottawa.  In the 
mid-twentieth century the state accepted the industrial vision as the best option for 
fisheries development. Governments assumed that a highly capitalized and centralized 
industry producing cod fillets and cod blocks to an expanding American market could 
generate enough wealth to enhance the quality of life in coastal Newfoundland. 
 Modernization and growth pole theory may have shaped the ideology of planners 
and political leaders in the 1950s and 1960s, but a study of the resettlement of 
Newfoundland outports must consider other forces in play in the mid-twentieth century. 
The traditional economy was in decline by the 1960s. The great Labrador and schooner 
banks fisheries ended in the mid-1950s. The invasion of the Grand Banks by factory-
freezer trawlers began shortly after Confederation and intensified thereafter causing a 
decline in production inshore, forcing shore fishermen to rely more heavily on social 
 350 
services. In the same period subsistence activities were no longer being pursued with as 
much intensity as in the pre-confederation era.  
 Furthermore, individual families responded to the FHRP according to their own 
circumstance. A person employed outside the community, reacted differently than the 
fishers who had their life savings tied up in capital equipment and gear. The large welfare 
dependent family, who had little invested in the fishery, seized the opportunity to get a 
large grant to relocate to a growth centre with minimal financial setback. Disabled and 
sick residents who found the expense of frequent medical trips prohibitive benefited from 
resettlement grants. Families with young children shifted to give their children better 
educational opportunities. High school graduates joined in a natural migration to urban 
centres and when younger families and youths left, a sense of loneliness infected the 
community and seniors responded by moving to reunite with family. Older householders, 
who could not compete for jobs in the industrial wage economy, either refused to resettle, 
or insisted on moving to a reception centre from whence they could continue to fish old 
grounds. The success of the moves often depended on the absorptive capacity of a growth 
point, for it was in the growth centres that the drama of resettlement played to an audience 
who too often considered themselves victims of a modernization scheme orchestrated by 
Premier Joseph R. Smallwood. 
 My dissertation acknowledges that aspects of the Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program were coercive. People who did not want to leave had limited 
options when a community petitioned to relocate or the minister used his discretionary 
authority to approve the petition. The critics of centralization looked at the conditions in 
Arnold‟s Cove and concluded government had forced the people from the islands into a 
 351 
welfare ghetto. However the archival record shows that the householders insisted on 
moving to the isthmus and resisted the appeals of fish plant executives, mayors and clergy 
as well as government bureaucrats and political leaders who wished to relocate them to 
fisheries growth centres. 
 The FHRP was not so much coercive as poorly managed. The resettlement division 
was flooded with enquiries about the program before the program was properly organized 
and criteria for designating outports and growth centres only vaguely defined. The 
program proceeded without benefit of independent study to determine the viability of 
either the sending or receiving community. It resulted in moves that social scientists and 
some economists described as irrational. Goals were not clearly defined and the FHRC 
approved some moves that contradicted the aims of the program. Political interference 
caused the Committee to approve Placentia, a community that was in decline, as a growth 
centre. By refusing to adopt a policy that would provide resettlers with houses equivalent 
to ones left behind the governments created the most serious impediment to resettlement 
and burdened the resettled household with debt. The needless concentration of people into 
one small growth centre produced a storm of protest that affected resettlement everywhere 
in the province. 
 Migrations, whether voluntary or directed by agents of the state, are always 
traumatic. Iverson and Matthews, after studying several community moves under the 
provincial Centralization Plan and the joint Fisheries Household Resettlement Program, 
concluded that the amount of trauma experienced by the households was the same for both 
programs. The FHRP was similar to rural development programs that took place in other 
parts of Canada. But in Newfoundland it involved a dozen government departments and 
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dozens of agencies who operated without a careful study of local conditions or a co-
ordinated plan. When plans went awry charges of coercion followed.  
 In 1970 the governments of Canada and Newfoundland signed a new resettlement 
plan known as the Household Resettlement Program (HRP). To distinguish the new 
centralization program from its predecessor, and perhaps free it from the controversy that 
swirled around it, the government of Canada shifted responsibility for the HRP to the 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion. In St. John‟s the Department of 
Community and Social Development retained control. Under the new program DREE 
covered the full cost of assembling and servicing lots and financed the construction of 
schools in Burin, Marystown as well as other industrial centres, including St. John‟s. 
There was no longer an emphasis on moving fishers to offshore fishing centres. By 
constructing well-equipped schools and making more affordable housing available, the 
governments hoped to remove the most serious impediments to resettlement. The second 
five-year agreement focussed more on assisting individual household moves, but 
community moves were encouraged until Smallwood was replaced by a Progressive 
Conservative government led by Frank Moores. In 1975 the governments chose not to 
sign another joint five-year-agreement and in 1977 the joint Resettlement Committee met 
for the last time to finalize moves approved under the second agreement. 
 My study of the Newfoundland Fisheries Household Resettlement Program 
necessarily touches on policy and policymakers in St. John‟s and Ottawa but the spotlight 
is on the coastal people of Newfoundland and their response to a state-directed migration 
as a rural development strategy. My work gives a voice to the fishing families and 
demonstrates how the subjects reshaped the program‟s goals and outcomes. It also exposes 
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ways clergy, merchants, executives of fish companies, and government field staff  were 
involved in resettlement before and after the move. It also gives a voice to the women who 
engaged in the resettlement debates and took a proactive role in the process of preserving 
communities, contrary to popular opinion that women were primarily interested in moving 
to better services. Resistance was not violent but the strategies resettlers engaged in were 
effective. Letters, petitions and political action forced governments to compromise and 
modify goals and eventually to end community evacuations. 
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